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This dissertation is about the practices of legal knowledge-making within the 
Argentine Supreme Court of Justice. It does not offer an analysis of judicial decisions, 
or the modes of legal reasoning. Nor does it further the idea of law as a problem-
solving tool. Rather, it examines, in the ethnographic mode, the practices of the 
subjects who actively participate in the making of the law, understanding these 
practices as a means of crafting the law, a technique of lawmaking. Accordingly, this 
work provides a fine-grained description of the mundane aspect of judicial practice: 
the workings of the legal bureaucracy—the quotidian world of files, reports, 
memoranda and hearings, among others, that are quintessential instruments of legal 
knowledge-making practices. But yet, it brings to the surface the different sets of 
social relations that emerge from these practices, even from those that work on the 
most routine grounds.  
More broadly, this project engages in an interdisciplinary method of analysis 
of knowledge production and circulation practices based on theoretical contributions 
from different areas of socio-legal scholarly concern like legal anthropology, law and 
society, comparative law and contemporary social thought. Science and Technology 
Studies’ insight about the production and circulation of knowledge is particularly 
relevant to this work as it advances the appreciation of legal knowledge as part of a 
larger network of knowledge practices rather than an isolated outcome (namely, the 
judicial decision), or the result of the actions of a few individuals, for instance, judges.
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is about the practices of legal knowledge-making within the 
Argentine Supreme Court of Justice. It does not offer an analysis of judicial decisions, 
or the modes of legal reasoning. Nor does it further the idea that law is fundamentally 
a process or mechanism of dispute resolution. Rather, it examines, in the ethnographic 
mode, the practices of the subjects who actively participate in the making of the law, 
seeking to understand the legal phenomenon “from the native’s point of view,” in 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s words.1 In more specific terms, it addresses judicial 
practice as a technique of lawmaking, a mode of crafting the law; not merely as a 
means to an end relationship, but as an instantiation of knowledge relations;2 and yet, 
as itself a modality of knowing about the law.  
At this point, it is worth noting that by referring to the practices observed 
within the Court as “lawmaking” practices, I do not intend to dispute either the 
normative argument or my subjects’ assumptions that in civil law regimes, such as the 
Argentine, judges do not make law. Rather, I seek to advance the appreciation of these 
practices as technologies of (legal) knowledge production. This dissertation, therefore, 
can be understood more as an ethnography of technique (or techne3) than as an 
ethnography of law’s normative discourse.4 
The research project that led to this dissertation arose out of a moment of 
exhaustion. In the context of political instability following the 2001/2002 economic 
                                                 
1
 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge, Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, 2000 edition (Basic 
Books, 2000), 55-70. 
2
 Annelise Riles emphasizes Heidegger’s description of the technical “as a knowledge practice—
revealing—which is not an end, but which nonetheless foreground its own means…” Annelise Riles, 
“Property as Legal Knowledge: Means and Ends.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 
10:4 (2004): 775-795, 789. 
3
 See: Tom Boelstorff, “Crafty Knowledges,” The Political and Legal Anthropology Review 31:1 
(2008), 96-101, 96. 
4
 See: Marie-Andrée Jacob, The Match of Relatedness: Bureaucracy, Legitimation and Kinship in  
Organ Transplants. J.S.D. Dissertation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2006). 
2 
crisis in Argentina, public skepticism in political and legal institutions gained 
momentum merging with enduring critiques about the workings of the Argentine 
judicial system. Issues such as transparency, accountability, and legal predictability 
rapidly moved to the top of the political agenda, advanced in particular by NGOs’ 
discourse. It was my experience and reading of these events, and exhaustion of the 
way in which legal critique (not the critique itself) was (and still is) articulated, 
apparently with no chances to move beyond a “speaking truth to power rhetoric,”5 that 
triggered my interest in the subject of this study. In this sense, this dissertation is a 
reaction: it tries to keep the project away from the contingencies of the field and 
assumptions about the subject; in other words, from the temptation of taking a 
normative stance toward judicial practice. As anthropologist Lawrence Rosen 
observes: “the task is to sort out these influences [the full range of historical factors 
that shape people’s lives] and to see how, given the particular issue under study, a 
balanced apportionment of the contributing factors best account for the matter at 
hand.”6 As a matter of fact, this dissertation does not present a focused analysis of the 
post-crisis context in which my subjects’ practices develop, but certainly it remains 
latent in the background of my work. But in another sense, this dissertation becomes a 
response: it offers a different modality of knowing about law; thus, it opens up 
different possibilities for the critical project.  
This project engages in an interdisciplinary method of analysis of knowledge 
production and circulation practices based on theoretical contributions from different 
areas of socio-legal scholarly concern like legal anthropology, law and society, 
comparative law and contemporary social thought. Science and Technology Studies’ 
                                                 
5
 See, generally: David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
6
 Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice. Law as Culture in Islamic Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) 5.  
3 
insight about the production and circulation of knowledge is particularly relevant to 
my work as it advances the appreciation of legal knowledge as part of a larger network 
of knowledge practices rather than an isolated outcome (namely, the judicial decision) 
or the result of the actions of a few individuals (judges). Additionally, at different 
moments of this research I rely on a series of insightful works drawn from the above 
fields. Among them, the works of Bruno Latour, Rolland Munro, Adam Reed, 
Annelise Riles, Marilyn Strathern, Mariana Valverde, Cornellia Visman, and Barbara 
Yngvesson, constitute a coherent chain of authority to back my claims. 
Beyond Law’s Ends  
As initially framed, my project aimed to shed light on how different legal 
experts—or holders of different types of juridical capital, following Pierre Bourdieu—
interacted in the practice of judging and the institutional construction of legal “truth.” 
In Bourdieu’s view, the content of the law that emerges from judgment is shaped 
through power relations articulated among holders of different types of juridical 
capital (judges, legal scholars, professionals) that converge in a “juridical field,” 
which, driven by its own logic, operates like a disciplined and professionally 
hierarchized “apparatus.”7 This insight seemed particularly relevant to my project’s 
law and society approach, which shared classical realism's long-standing assumption 
of a gap between “law on the books” and “law in action.” 
However, after several months of trying to gain “formal” access to the Court—
a formality compelled by Cornell's IRB policy—I found myself holding nothing more 
than a bundle of scattered sheets: my dossier. This encounter reshaped my entire 
conception of the project, as I found myself at the intersection of the workings of two 
different bureaucracies: the Cornell IRB, on the one hand; and the Court, on the other. 
                                                 
7
 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” Hastings Law 
Review 38 (1987) 805-53. 
4 
In other words, I was able to get “inside” the institution in an unexpected way: my 
research project itself was turned into a file, a Court dossier; and, as such, it would be 
reviewed and decided upon according to the rules and procedures that regulated the 
Court’s decision-making. Indeed, that encounter materialized a new subject of inquiry, 
the file or dossier, which, in turn, drove my attention toward an unanticipated subject: 
the Court as a bureaucratic body, in the Weberian sense, and its commonsensical 
knowledge practices.  
This ethnographic finding is not a novel one. It replicates a constellation of 
anthropological projects that have taken up documents, themselves objects of 
modernity, as salient devices—artifacts—that make it possible to explore and 
understand the modern subject in multiple domains of current anthropological inquiry, 
“from law to science, to the arts, religion, activism, and market institutions.”8 
Moreover, building upon Marilyn Strathern’s insight, Annelise Riles argues that the 
artifact is what the ethnographer looks for in the field.9 Nevertheless, if I look back at 
my initial approach to the Court’s workings I find this overlooking of bureaucracy 
(understood as a knowledge practice in itself) to be part of the ordinary reaction of a 
socio-legal project’s inquiry into legal knowledge. Indeed, socio-legal scholarship 
tends to approach law through more traditional subjects such as “legal norms, legal 
processes, legal institutions, actors, or even languages.”10 In doing so, the more 
mundane and routine aspects of lawmaking practices are often ignored or taken for 
                                                 
8
 Annelise Riles, “Introduction: In Response,” in Documents: Artifacts of Modern Knowledge,  
Annelise Riles ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 1-38, 4. 
9
 [An artifact] “is something one treats as if (Leach 1986 (1954)); Vaihinger & Ogden 1924; Wagner 
1986) it were simply a found object in the world. And yet, it is by definition always the artifact of 
ethnographic work as much as a found object. Specifically, it is the fruit of the ethnographic effort of 
working through one’s theoretical concerns not by deductive analysis but laterally, through the 
ethnographic apprehension of, or empathy for others’ analytical concerns.” (italics in the original).  
Ibid. 16-7. 
10
  Annelise Riles, “Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law, Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann eds.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 775-813, p.804. 
5 
granted—not only by socio-legal scholars but also by judicial bureaucrats themselves. 
Indeed, for the most part, forms, procedures, and everyday administrative practices on 
which the work of legal institutions rest, appear too technical and monotonous to be 
worth approaching from a theoretical perspective. Yet, borrowing Science Studies’ 
terminology, one might say that these tools of bureaucracy on which the workings of 
law rest—in this particular case, the organizational and communicational role that 
written records play within the judicial apparatus—become somewhat “blackboxed”11 
by socio-legal scholarship’s emphasis on the social forces and power relations at play 
in different legal arrangements.12 
In this vein, Annelise Riles observes that scholars who engage in humanistic 
legal studies, the “culturalists”13 as she calls them, find the technical dimensions of 
law or “legal technicalities”—legal instrumentalism, managerialism, procedures, legal 
technocrats, and the forms of legal doctrines, among others—too “mundane” and 
“profoundly uninteresting” to require investigation.14 Indeed, these scholars see legal 
instruments more as part of “the realm of practice than to theory,”15 and hence, “non-
strategic” for critical socio-legal scholarship.16  
                                                 
11
 In Science Studies, “blackboxing” is used to indicate the social process through which the joint 
production of actors and artifacts becomes entirely opaque by its own success: “When a machine runs 
efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one needs to focus only on its inputs and outputs and not in 
its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque 
and obscure they become.” See: Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science 
Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 183; 304.  
12
 See Annelise Riles, “Comparative Law,” 806-8; "A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: 
Taking on the Technicalities," Buffalo Law Review, 53 (2005): 973-1033; Mariana Valverde, 
“Jurisdiction and Scale: ‘Legal Technicalities’ as Resources for Theory,” paper presented at the Law 
and Society Annual Meeting, Montreal, May 29-June 1, 2008. Unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author.  
13
 Among them, “…constitutional theorists, legal historians, law and society scholars, jurisprudes and 
legal philosophers, literary theorists, feminists, anthropologists, critical race scholars.” See: Annelise 
Riles, "A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities."  
14
 Ibid, 976. 
15
 Ibid, 974. 
    Similarly, Riles argues that for those scholars who share a more instrumentalist approach to law: the 
“instrumentalists” (economists, political scientists, doctrinalists, cognitive scientists, corporate lawyers, 
etc.) the technical character of law is relevant only insofar they are useful to solve actual legal 
problems. That is to say, both approaches to law— the culturalist and instrumentalist—overlook the 
6 
Along the same lines, Mariana Valverde argues critically that “Law is usually 
examined by critical legal studies and socio-legal scholarship as a key site for the 
reproduction and contestation of various forms of power relations.” However, she 
notes, “if power works through knowledge, it should prove useful to undertake the 
examination of some legal events that highlights the knowledge dimension.”17 In 
Valverde’s project, this means to observe the constitution, contestation, and 
circulation of certain sets of truths within legal arenas “through and in” the work of 
some legal actors, namely state officials, lawyers and judges.18 Riles’s research 
agenda, for its part, urges culturalist legal scholars to shift their attention to the core 
aspects of legal thought, that is, to the legal technicalities, and hence to turn them into 
objects of humanistic inquiry:19 “Indeed, it is precisely the commonsensical quality of 
the thing that makes the lawyer’s love of tools an appropriate point of entrée for an 
ethnographer into contemporary law and institutions.”20 
But what ethnographic possibility do these tools offer? Moreover, how can the 
researcher “appropriate” these instruments of legal knowledge-making and turn them 
into analytical constructs, artifacts of her own knowledge? The subject, as in any other 
anthropological project, poses methodological, epistemological and political 
challenges to the ethnographer’s representational strategies. Like a piece that is re-
created for others’ view, the object of study demands the researcher to take on 
responsibilities.  How to keep one’s account “faithful” to the body of the object that 
                                                                                                                                             
quintessential feature of law, “what makes law as opposed to literature, or economics or cognitive 
science: the technicalities of legal thought.” Ibid. 974-5  
16
  Ibid., 976.   
17
 See: Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003) 1.  
18
  Ibid.  
19
 See: Riles, “A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law,” 1033; “The Anti-Network: Global Private 
Law, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State," American Journal of Comparative Law 56:3 (Summer 
2008) 605-30  
20
 See Annelise Riles, “Introduction. Making Sense of the Means: Private Governance and the Legal  
Technologies of Collateral,” In Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reason in the Global Financial Markets  
(forthcoming).  
7 
the analysis penetrates? What version of the object should the ethnographer construct 
(or re-construct)? What are the artifacts of her intellectual work? Ethnography, in its 
conventional notion within anthropology, forged in Malinowski’s tradition, “implied 
that a culture or society could be captured in an assemblage of domains (economy, 
magic, family, etc).”21 Anthropological writings, notes Clifford Geertz, are themselves 
interpretations, and thus, fictions—in the sense that they are “something made,” 
“something fashioned,” “not that they are false, un-factual or merely “as if” thought 
experiments.”22 Geertz embraces an interpretive view of culture:23 data, he argues, 
“are really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what their 
compatriots are up to….”24 In Geertz’s understanding, “Man is an animal suspended in 
the webs of significance he himself has spun,” and culture is those webs whose 
meaning can be analyzed through a process of interpretative and microscopic “thick 
description:” ethnography.25  
Indeed, Geertz’s view of ethnography as a “thick description” extended well 
beyond the disciplinary boundaries. Yet, scholars in other fields (as in my own case) 
have embraced ethnography in an effort to make sense of the particularities of local, 
cultural realities of individuals, acts, objects, and utterances.26 However, at the same 
                                                 
21
 Markus Schlecker and Eric Hirsch, “Incomplete Knowledge: Ethnography and the Crisis of Context 
in Studies of Media, Science and Technology,” History of the Human Sciences 14:1, 69-87, 70.  
22
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Boos) 15.  
 Along the same lines, James Clifford argues that “Even the best ethnographic texts – serious, true 
fictions – are systems, or economies, of truth.” James Clifford, “Partial Truths,” in Writing Culture, The 
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, James Clifford and George E. Marcus eds. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1986) 1-26, 7.  
23
 This is not to say that culture is an “out-there” totalizing whole, “a self-contained “super-organic” 
reality.” Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 11. On the contrary, anthropologists have long rejected 
a holistic conception of culture. See, e.g.: Sally Engle Merry, “Human Rights Law and the 
Demonization of Culture (And Anthropology Along the Way), The Political and Legal Review 26:1 
(2003), 56. Annelise Riles, “Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law, Mathias Reinman and Reinhard Zimmerman (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
776-813, 798-9. 
24
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 9.  
25
 Ibid., 6, 20-21. 
26
 For instance, Schlecker and Hirsch note that the turn toward ethnography by media and cultural 
studies (MCS) and science and technology studies (STS) scholars resulted in a crisis of context in these 
8 
time that other disciplines become even more enthusiastic about ethnography, 
anthropology poses questions to the method which the discipline itself gave birth.27 
After the internal critiques in the 1980s, the limits of conventional fieldwork have 
become even clearer; but, however, as Riles notes, “the question of what ethnography 
should become,” in light of this self-criticism, “still remains out of focus” (italics in 
the original).28 In Bill Maurer’s words: “The reflexive turn tended to query the “I’ but 
not the “there” in the old textual formulas establishing the ethnographer’s presence in 
the field.”29 
In what appears to be a radical shift from conventional ethnographic practices 
that traditionally have kept the anthropologist and her subjects as analytically 
separated units, current proposals focus on the working parallels between 
anthropologists’ own representational practices and those of their subjects.30 This, in 
turn, redefines the character of the relations between the ethnographer and the people 
she encounters in the field, moving away from the traditional model of researcher-
informant relation to a more collaborative schema31 of “intellectual partners in 
                                                                                                                                             
disciplines. If the increasing use of the ethnographic method in various fields responded to scholars’ 
need to contextualize their subjects’ practices in everyday settings, the effect was, at least in MCS and 
STS, the attempt to reach ever more extensive contextualization: “It became ever more apparent that 
any perspective was simply a perspective on another perspective or relation to another relation. The 
debates effected a fundamental epistemological uncertainty about a given ‘essence’ of individuals and 
things before all perspectives or contexts: i.e., before all sense making.” Schlecker and Hirsch, 
“Incomplete Knowledge,”71.  
27
 See: Annelise Riles, “Introduction: In Response,” 2-3.  
28
  Ibid., 3. 
29
 Bill Maurer, Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral Reason 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 12.  See, also: Aaron Turner, “Embodied 
Ethnography. Doing Culture,” Social Anthropology 8:1 (2000) 51-60. 
30
 See, e.g., Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out  (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
2001); “Real Time: Unwinding technocratic and anthropological knowledge,” American Ethnologist 
31:3 (2004) 392-405; Hirokazu Miyazaki and Annelise Riles, “Failure and Endpoint,” in Global 
Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, Aihwa Ong and Stephen 
J. Collier, eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 320-331; Douglas R. Holmes and George E. 
Marcus, “Cultures of Expertise and the Management of Globalization: Toward the Re-functioning of 
Ethnography,” in Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, 
Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 235-62, 236.  
31
 See, Annelise Riles, “Introduction: In response,” 4. 
9 
inquiry.”32 Yet, the mere demonstration of contemporary connections or affinities 
between the ethnographer’s and her subjects’ practices, Marcus argues, stands itself as 
a critical statement against conventional efforts that sustain distanced and separated 
domains that the modernist insight about global integration nonetheless brings 
together.33 This is not to say that globalization lays out per se a realm of 
commonalities between the ethnographer and her subjects; rather, it represents the 
frame within which new anthropological problems are presented: in assemblages, 
uneasy and unstable relationships; across diverse social and cultural situations and 
spheres of life.34 The insight invites anthropologists to rethink not only 
anthropological inquiry, but also social inquiry in general, as this latter practice 
“defines itself in relation to the adequacy of its representations, its abstractions, to a 
reality that supposedly precedes it.”35 
Anthropologists have reflected on their representational strategies, and moved, 
in Riles’s words, “not straight on, in the guise of critique or self-reflexivity, but 
laterally, that is, ethnographically”.36 Thus, the anthropologist moves between their 
subjects’ practices and her own by treating the former as if the latter. This way of 
knowing culture has become known in anthropology as “lateral thinking,”37 or more 
recently, “lateral reason.”38 
[…]  rather than treat culture as a thing “out there” to be 
studied with “our scientific tools here” they try to know 
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the world (“here” or “there”) by thinking through 
familiar problems “as if” through others’ knowledge 
devices. Rather than describe the “other” as an object of 
study, these analyses draw from such others a method of 
investigation.39  
My investigation of judicial decision-making practices builds upon the lessons 
of anthropology’s move toward laterality by working through the artifacts of 
knowledge that are proper to my own subjects, and, as such, are capable to replicate 
their movements and shapes. Indeed, my encountering of lawmaking practices in the 
field has been through the mundane forms of bureaucratic knowledge, beginning with 
“legal looking” documents, such as informed consent forms; and continuing with piles 
of dossiers that circulate within the tribunal, memoranda, reports, appeals; as well as 
other instruments of judicial reasoning, such as hearings that are quintessential to the 
making of law on a daily basis. Drawing on the aesthetics of these legal forms and 
their informational content, my work seeks to render visible the relations of 
knowledge that these instruments of lawmaking elucidate within the judicial 
apparatus. What is more, at different junctures, I take these mundane tools of legal 
reasoning as if they were analytical categories to advance my own knowledge of the 
subject,40 thus, furthering the aesthetics of instrumentality—the means and ends 
relationship—embedded in these instruments.41 The move, therefore, is both 
methodological and epistemological. It also replicates, to some extent, what Annelise 
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Riles has called the “literalization” of the Realist metaphor; that is, the Realist insight 
about the instrumental nature of law is itself fashioned as an actual instrument.42 
Accordingly, this dissertation is articulated on four different artifacts: place, 
documents, subjects, and performance. First, place seems to be indispensable to 
situate my fieldsite, but neither in purely physical nor symbolic terms. Indeed, the 
notion of the judicial space developed in this dissertation challenges the representation 
of judicial practice as a phenomenon constrained within a delimited site. In so doing, it 
sheds light on the articulation of the judicial space through the subjects’ senses of 
mobility and access perceived within the Court; as well as on the institutional efforts 
to re-state the order disrupted by these practices. Documents, for their part, play a 
crucial role in my analysis. They propose a somewhat different possibility for socio-
legal studies by moving the analysis beyond the ultimate results of the judicial 
process, judgment, and focusing, instead, on the means; that is to say, on what lies 
before the law’s ends. The movement toward the means furthered by the analysis of 
legal documents also entails shifting the attention back to the subjects that elaborate 
these documents who nonetheless remain often “behind the scene” if the study of the 
law favors a focus on legal decisions and the judges’ behaviors. Finally, performance, 
as used in my work, helps enact another dimension of legal knowledge-making: a 
“staged for an audience” aspect through which mundane bureaucratic instruments of 
legal procedure, like hearings, and of judicial administration, such as Court’s bylaws 
and other institutional documents, also can be appreciated as political tools, and thus, 
as the means to advance the different agendas of the actors who converge in the 
judicial space.   
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Chapter overview 
In the first chapter I replicate in general terms my access to the Court by 
working on the spatial arrangements that I observed within the institution. My account 
focuses not only on my direct observation of the daily dynamics of the judicial 
apparatus, but, more importantly, on particular moments in which the judicial 
institution is instantiated through my subjects’ notions and senses of place. The 
chapter lays out a set of metaphors of space and place through which judicial actors 
and socio-legal scholars imagine and re-create the judicial apparatus. Either explicitly 
or implicitly, I also build upon these metaphors to advance my own description of the 
Court’s spatiality. However, in working on these crude metaphors of space, I also 
question the commonplace representations of the judicial space that they further (i.e. 
hierarchy, status, enclosure) by providing a description of the most routine aspects of 
the Court’s own social dynamics. The chapter’s main argument advances the idea that 
the notions and senses of places that I encountered in the field are actually practices 
that work to create and perform the judicial apparatus, and hence make up the legal 
phenomenon as much as the documents, circulation of files, public hearings and legal 
bureaucrats’ documentary practices that I encountered in my fieldsite. Additionally, 
the chapter elaborates on the aesthetics of restoration, prompted in my field by the 
scene of the ongoing restoration of the Court’s building, to suggest the tensions that 
arise out the efforts to re-construct judicial authority.  
Chapter Two builds upon an anecdote from the field: it recounts how the 
introductory letters and informed consent forms that I brought to the field in 
fulfillment of Cornell University policy on the use of human subjects in research were 
turned into a Court dossier. The anecdote offered to me a unique opportunity to 
explore the rationality embedded in these surfacing and quintessential artifacts of 
bureaucratic knowledge such as legal forms—specifically, the judicial dossier. Far 
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from considering the practices of file-making that unfolded in my field as an 
exceptional instance of research, I take advantage of the ubiquitous character of these 
practices, and turn the found dossier into my own artifact; that is, as both my point of 
entry into my subjects’ practices and analytical tool. In so doing, my field site can be 
apprehended ethnographically. This chapter also lays out one of the main arguments of 
this dissertation: legal knowledge can be accessed by not only its ends, for instance 
courts’ decisions and their interpretations of particular facts and rules, but also through 
its own means, that is, the mundane and routine instruments of bureaucratic 
knowledge through which lawmaking is performed.  
Chapter Three elaborates further on this argument. Again, I build upon the 
materiality of the file or dossier to examine the forms of the figures that create these 
files, in particular law clerks. These figures are typically perceived and portrayed as 
impersonal and interchangeable in the bureaucratic logic. Nonetheless, as these 
subjects’ documentary practices unfold, they render them visible in different forms, 
though not always accessible to outsiders. Persons are displayed through a 
bureaucratic circuit of files that simultaneously furthers and denies human agency 
while reinforcing the division of labor within the institution. These dynamics, I argue, 
can be understood in light of Marilyn Strathern’s insights about the forms of 
objectification and personification that operate in two “ethnographically conceived” 
social domains: a Euro-American commodity-driven economy and Melanesia’s 
economy based on gift-exchange. 
Chapter Four provides a detailed look at the mode in which the Argentine 
Supreme Court exercises its power to decide what cases to review and what cases to 
discard, a mechanism that, it is argued, borrows from the United States Supreme 
Court’s writ of certiorari. Nevertheless, I do not seek to draw in this chapter a 
comparative analysis between how the practice of the certiorari is performed in these 
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two different jurisdictions. Rather, I focus on the form that this practice of gatekeeping 
assumes in the Court and its implications as an act of definition of law by the 
exclusion of “garbage cases” from the sphere of cases that deserve judicial attention. 
Additionally, I suggest the effects of this exclusion upon the construction of judicial 
authority.  
Chapter Five draws on the aesthetics of public hearings at the Supreme Court. 
It looks at a particular set of hearings that the Court held for a case that involved the 
pollution of one of the most populated industrial urban areas in Argentina. Noticeably, 
the hearings, themselves instruments of legal knowledge-making, also may become 
powerful displays of the conceptions of place that I encountered in the Court and 
described in the first chapter. In fact, as the chapter shows, not only hearings but also 
legal Court documents, such as bylaws, can be turned into objects of performance, 
and, as such, political tools. The chapter brings a detailed look about how these 
practices build upon technologies of transparency, which, in turn, work to render the 
institution (and the Justices) visible to both particular audiences and to the larger 
public. Additionally, I examine the effects that said visibility has on different legal 
actors such as the litigants, NGOs, and the Court itself.  
In the conclusion, I reiterate the law in the making dimension furthered in this 
dissertation. I also recapitulate the findings of the previous chapters in light of the 
artifacts on which I draw my analysis. In taking these artifacts together in this section, 
I seek to show how they enable two levels of analysis of judicial practice, one 
intrinsically related to the other. More broadly, in the conclusion I seek to demonstrate 
how an account of judicial practice whose shape replicates the forms in which this 
practice is articulated produces a new insight on judicial decision-making by 
broadening the understanding of legal knowledge formation.  
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CHAPTER 1 
LOCALIZING THE JUDICIAL SPACE 
 
What I first noticed upon my arrival to the Supreme Court in August 2005 to 
conduct field work was that the façade of the so-called “Palacio de Tribunales” 
(Tribunal Palace) or just the “palacio,” the Supreme Court’s house, was being 
restored. In 1995, after noticing that the building façade was seriously damaged, and 
that many parts had already collapsed, a project for consolidating the entire building 
was implemented. The restoration process began in 1997 and would continue for a few 
more years.43 In 1999, a presidential decree declared the Court’s house a “National 
Historic Monument.”44 
 The preservation and conservation works of the palacio were preceded by a 
series of proofs which consisted of diagnoses of the status of materials, damages and 
other pathologies affecting the building; the observation of the reaction of the 
replacement materials by the remaining originals; and the cleaning systems for the 
façade. Above all, declared Court’s preservationists, they sought not to compromise 
the building’s original materials.   
Restoration, as a technology of architectural conservation, involves more 
complex decisions than repairing a piece of work or re-establishing its original state or 
appearance. It implies both aesthetic and ethical commitments and attitudes toward the 
object of restoration. Different approaches throughout history account for ongoing 
debates about the subject. Restoration, it has been argued, may be destructive, 
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conservative or eclectic, whether it is aimed at preserving nothing of the original 
building, or conserving everything down to particular period; or yet, whether the same 
restoration endeavor seeks to restore sometimes, or to remodel other times.45 
To restore has been interpreted as to revive the object to its original 
appearance, which, in fact, might also produce an ideal state that it had never enjoyed 
in the first instance:46 “it is impossible, as impossible as to raise the dead, to restore 
anything that has ever been great or beautiful in architecture,” declared John Ruskin,47 
advocating for a moderate attitude in restoration, and hence suggesting that restoration 
should refrain itself from any attempt that would go beyond preserving from further 
injuries.48 Restoration, in this sense, would become “protection”; and maintenance, for 
its part, should be performed only by means that were meant for supporting and 
covering, with showing “no pretence of other art.”49  
Nevertheless, as Harold and Marion Meek point out, a more ethical approach 
to the object in a restoration project does not necessarily ensure an aesthetically 
pleasant result. In this respect, other ethical concerns may arise: what should be given 
priority? A full visual record, even though it implies resorting with artificial 
materials?; to the careful reconstruction of every stone? Should restoration be focused 
on ‘façadism’, and hence to preserve only the street frontage in the belief that only the 
façade of a building is part of public domain? And yet, in many cases, preservation 
means to assign a building a use different from that one it was originally conceived to 
perform. Adaptive reuse, note Harold and Marion Meek, has become the key for the 
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conservation of many buildings, even when new activities might force the building to 
face ideological opposition; that is a use completely different from which the building 
was originally conceived.  
Architectural conservation debates in late 20th century, explain these two 
authors, were summarized in the so-called Venice Charter drafted at the International 
Congress for Conservation held in 1964 in Venice; where the International Council on 
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) was launched to promote the conservation principles 
of the Charter. The document has been accepted by many countries, but yet it lacks 
legal standing, which paved the way to widely varying interpretations of its text. And, 
also importantly, principles that are applied in restoration of archeological sites might 
not work for buildings that are currently in use. In sum, the complex scenario of a 
restoration project suggests that any restoration manifesto should yield to concrete 
experiences and particular objects, as each piece may pose unique ethical and aesthetic 
dilemmas to its own restoration process.  
My interest in these debates on restoration was triggered by my daily 
observation and experience of the Supreme Court’s façade restoration. Not only did 
the restoration workings dominate the landscape but they also modified it affecting the 
movements of those who interacted within the judicial apparatus (Figures 1 and 2). 
The front access to the building, for instance, was constantly moved away according to 
the physical needs of the restoration project, thus, confusing people as to where they 
should access the palacio.  
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Figure 1. Front façade of the Palacio de Tribunales  
(February 2, 2006) 
 
 
19 
 
Figure 2. Restoration workings on the Palacio’s façade  
(January 31, 2007) 
Indeed, throughout my fieldwork, I was able to see partial results of the 
restoration process as different parts of the façade were gradually uncovered to the 
public, revealing delicate details of the building’s original architecture. Until January 
2008, these details remained unnoticeable; first, because of the aged aspect of the 
building; and, later, once restoration was underway, due to the scaffolding and veil 
that covered the façade to protect both workers and passersby. In fact, the building 
which I first entered in late August 2005 looked very different from the one I left 
behind in March 2007 when I finished my fieldwork. And yet, when I visited the 
Court last summer during my follow-up research, the same building looked even more 
renovated. In this lapse, conservation workings managed to imprint a light and vivid 
appearance to the old and opaque palacio across Lavalle square (“Plaza Lavalle”) in 
downtown Buenos Aires.  
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My appeal to the forms of restoration may be viewed here as a way of setting 
the stage on which legal practices are performed. More than describing a physical 
place, namely the “judicial palace,” it seeks to convey the forms in which the judicial 
institution gets negotiated in this space. To me, my field site often melted into the 
landscape of the restoration of the palacio. Thus, as in any other process of restoring a 
building, ethical and aesthetic dilemmas developed toward the object that, in my 
subjects’ view, seemed to be restored: the Court’s authority.  
When Argentina’s economy collapsed in December 2001, the Supreme Court 
also became a recurrent target of massive demonstrations held against the economic 
policy of the then President De la Rua (1999-2001). In the eyes of a largely 
disenchanted public, especially middle-class depositors, the Supreme Court Justices 
appeared as co-responsible for the country’s debacle. Additionally, in the context of 
political instability following the economic crisis, public skepticism in political and 
legal institutions increased and themes of transparency (transparencia), 
accountability, and legal predictability (seguridad jurídica) gained momentum, mostly 
as part of NGO discourse. Specifically, with respect to the judiciary, NGOs’ critiques 
of the Court were materialized in reports, public campaigns and long-term judicial 
reform projects articulated through a sort of “Speaking Truth to Power” rhetoric50 
aimed at impacting the Court’s workings. Principally, contemporary demands of 
Argentine NGOs called for the opening up of judicial decision-making to include 
citizen participation.51 Yet, simultaneously to these demands for change, four new 
Justices were appointed (out of the seven who currently preside on the bench) in the 
period of 2003-2005, which meant a substantial change in the composition of the 
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Court.52 In this context, the image of an ongoing institutional change in the Court 
emerged and advanced, significantly, by a rhetoric of change articulated not only by 
the Court’s Justices, but also by opinion-making institutions, among them NGOs, and 
the media.  
Disruption and Continuity  
It is worth noting that the juxtaposition of legal forms with other forms of 
culture (as in this case, with the forms of restoration) on which I rely here is not a 
claim of direct correlation or influence;53 rather, it is just an exercise in thinking about 
legal practices through the appropriateness of forms.54 Restoration holds the promise 
that everything will be perfect in the future; but meanwhile, everything is a mess,55 
that is, the present appears chaotic and impractical. On the one hand—and probably 
more palpably felt—is this idea of “messiness,” as suggested by the restoration 
workings, that I attempt to capture in this chapter through the description of my own 
ethnographic access to the Court’s building. In focusing on its spatial aspects, such as 
infrastructure, appearance, internal distribution, as well as the daily dynamics of its 
social space, I seek to bring to the forefront the actual appearance of the Court’s site. 
The image of my account suggests a dysfunctional space (and institution). However, 
this image is neither a novel nor surprising one. Indeed, it reflects a perception of the 
judicial space currently shared by both legal experts (lawyers, legal scholars, NGO 
staffers, and even judges) and laymen, such as litigants and spectators. This view, for 
instance, is epitomized in the general store metaphor which Supreme Court Justice 
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Carlos Fayt drew upon in response to a group of journalists who asked him about his 
colleague Justice Belluscio’s resignation from the Supreme Court in June 2005: “the 
Court has become a general store” ("la Corte se ha convertido en un almacén de ramos 
generales”),56 the judge replied, giving voice, in plain language, to critiques of the 
Supreme Court’s becoming everything but a highly specialized tribunal. Seen in this 
light, the Court, like a town’s general store where the people purchase their general 
goods, has become the place where virtually any kind of judicial conflict can be heard, 
in direct contradiction with the constitutional mandate that grants the Court 
exceptional jurisdiction and status of a state power.57 
On the other hand, at a more critical level, I appeal to the notions of 
preservation and resistance implicit in restoration’s promise to suggest the tensions 
that arise between the daily dynamics of the judicial space and a specific and settled 
representation of judicial practice as a localized and detached phenomenon. In my 
opinion, this latter representation yields vis-à-vis the concrete senses of mobility, and 
even disruption at work within the contemporary judicial space; though it is 
nonetheless constantly re-enacted by institutional practices that tend to “naturalize” 
any disruption to the judicial order. Borrowing from Guillaume Ratel’s material on the 
Parlement of Toulouse, I would like to argue that this image of the judicial 
institution—readily accepted as that of the Court itself—identifies this body with only 
some particular functions and practices: “those that manifest most clearly the 
sovereign attributions of the court.”58 These are the activities underlying the accounts 
of many of my interlocutors at the Court, who claim for the Court “to regain 
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legitimacy,” to assert its role “as a real state power,” to act as “a check of both the 
Congress and the Executive,” and to behave as a “co-governance body.”59 
In Ratel’s account, the representation of the parlement (the court), was 
restricted to the activities that took place in a particular room, the Grande Salle d’ 
Audience.60 As he argues, this representation of the parlement was actually the one 
“that the parlementaires sought to give of themselves”; indeed, a “self-representation” 
that endured from the creation of the parlement onward, and yet, one that was well 
endorsed by modern historians who constrained their narratives “to the sovereign 
attributions and political activities that were manifested in that room.”61 Implicit in 
these historical narratives of the court, he finds a link between “the unity of place” and 
“unity of action”;62 a connection that I also embrace in this chapter to explain how 
place and knowledge practices are imbricate.  
What I understand as a detached and localized representation of the Court’s 
practices cannot be identified with any individual room, such as the hearing room 
described by Ratel as the overriding image of the Parlement’s activities.63 Judicial 
practice at the Court is usually regarded as constrained within a space that is vague 
and diffuse but nonetheless removed, distant. In my opinion, this space is constantly 
enacted in the Court bureaucrats’ representations of the Court’s “essential” functions, 
for which the tribunal should keep itself apart, detached from those aspects that are not 
a proper matter of law, that is, of the Court. “There are cases that should not be here 
[in the Court],” a Justice’s clerk told me while pointing toward the dossiers piled up 
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for review on her office’s floor.64 Yet, it is common that clerks see the current 
caseload as a deviation from the Court’s proper activities, and hence from the status it 
enjoyed in the past when the Court had more control of its docket.65 But also 
importantly, scholarly narratives have contributed to create an image of judicial 
practice as a phenomenon separated from social practices. In this sense, the field is 
rich in metaphors of space that further a commonplace image of judicial practice in 
terms of hierarchy, status, and enclosure. Like Court bureaucrats, these metaphors 
work to remove the practice of the tribunal from the public at large; however, while in 
the accounts of those bureaucrats  the judicial space is something conceptually diffuse 
and imprecise, scholarly representations tend to locate this space “behind-the scene,” 
to borrow Ratel’s terms.66  
In building upon these two aspects of restoration, on the one hand, the 
messiness and impracticality that a restoration process brings about, and, on the other 
hand, the preservation and recovery of the damaged object that a restoration project 
presupposes, I seek to reflect the tensions regarding the construction of judicial 
authority in the particular context of the Argentine Court’s practices. But yet, this 
effort of renegotiating the semantic field is not the subject of a focused analysis in this 
chapter. Rather, I rely on it only laterally, through the aesthetics of restoration, to 
comprehend and restage my subjects’ everyday practices, as affected—or not—by the 
context in which they unfolded in my fieldsite. My main point in this chapter, instead, 
is that we can gain access and draw useful insights on the Court’s knowledge practices 
by observing the spatial dynamics of the legal institution as this makes visible how 
place and the relations it enacts exist in a mutually constitutive association. This 
means to draw my analysis not only on my direct observation of the daily dynamics of 
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the Court, but, more importantly, on particular moments in which the judicial 
institution is instantiated through my subjects’ notions and senses of place. My 
argument, however, would not be complete without explaining my point of departure. 
Accordingly, in the next section, after introducing a brief vignette about law’s 
relationship to place, I address descriptions of legal settings that successfully show 
how place (i.e. courtrooms) may become an artefact of political and symbolic systems. 
Nonetheless, despite my sympathy for these approaches, I find them still engaged with 
the notion of place as static, fixed, an even external phenomenon. In the subsequent 
section I introduce the bodies of literature that informs this chapter in connection with 
the larger approach to which this project is indebted. Later, I provide a description of 
the Court’s spatiality that seeks to replicate my own access to the institution. A series 
of metaphors of space through which judicial actors and socio-legal scholars imagine 
and re-create the judicial institution also flow in my description. However, as the 
ethnographic materials presented in this chapter will demonstrate, the commonplace 
representations of the judicial space that these metaphors further are challenged 
permanently by the Court’s own social dynamics. Building upon the relations of space 
and knowledge that unfold in legal bureaucracy’s practice, I return in the conclusion to 
the point about the (re)construction of judicial authority suggested by the aesthetics of 
the Court’s building restoration. 
The Symbolic Place  
The association of law and place usually spawns enduring debates about the 
place of law; indeed, as Sarat, Douglas and Umphrey assert: “It is difficult to think of 
law without adding the name of a place—be it a powerful nation-state, or a small 
municipality.”67 Despite the fact that these debates are beyond the scope of this work, 
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it is worth mentioning them very briefly.  
Law’s relationship to place has usually been analyzed in fairly standard 
geopolitical terms—territory, sovereignty, jurisdiction, etc.68 However, new analytical 
forms emerging from recent socio-legal scholarship offer alternative ways 
(bureaucratic;69 disciplinary;70 ideological; etc.71) of conceptualizing the role of law in 
the construction of place and vice versa. Indeed, Sarat, Douglas and Umphrey notice a 
shift in the literature about the modes of interpreting place vis-à-vis law, which, 
leaving behind geopolitical notions of place, asks instead about its sociological 
construction. According to these authors, this literature may be grouped in two general 
ways of thinking about the place of law in social life: the instrumentalist, on the one 
hand; and constitutive, on the other hand.  For the instrumentalist, law is just a tool, an 
auxiliary for changing aspects of social life or maintaining the status quo. 
Instrumentalism draws on a firm division between the legal and the social, and, 
therefore, denies that law is already an integral part of what it regulates.72 Law is 
interpreted as outside of real life, as an artificial category. In contrast to this, the 
constitutive perspective takes law's interior place in society as the starting point for its 
analysis. Law shapes society from inside out, and is imbricate in social relations73—
law is a part of the structure in which social action is embedded.74 In thinking about 
the place of law, the scholars who adopt the constitutive perspective, “tend to see the 
links between law and society at the level of networks of legal practices on the one 
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hand, and clusters of beliefs, on the other.”75  
Descriptions of the legal settings, mostly courtrooms, have played a central 
role in socio-legal analysis of courts’ decision-making processes. In recreating 
courtrooms’ designs and management, scholars seek to account for the nature of the 
legal proceedings they observe. Rituality, drama,76 performance, constraint, 
surveillance, and even informality,77 are some of the categories used to describe the 
life of the court. Yet, the aesthetics of courtrooms may themselves at times adopt an 
overtly political role, as we see, for instance, in Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil:  
[…] the proceedings happen on a stage before an 
audience, with the usher’s marvelous shout at the 
beginning of each session producing the effect of the 
rising curtain. Whoever planned this auditorium in the 
newly built Beth Ha’ am, the House of the People (now 
surrounded by high fences, guarded from roof to cellar 
by heavily armed police, and with a row of wooden 
barracks in the front courtyard in which all comers are 
expertly frisked), had a theater in mind, complete with 
orchestra and gallery, with proscenium and stage and 
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 I have in mind Luigi Ferrajoli’s portrayal of a trail. Suggesting an analogy between historians and 
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 Noticeably, informality appears as antagonistic to the alleged solemnity and detachment associated to 
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with side doors for the actors’ entrance.78  
Likewise, in analyzing the Israeli military court system, Lisa Hajjar interprets 
this system’s courtrooms as instantiations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself: “The 
bench is on an elevated dais, enabling judges to survey the room over which they 
preside. It requires little stretch of imagination to read the position of judges as 
analogous to that of the Israeli state they represent, or the courtroom as a synecdoche 
of Israeli surveillance and control over the occupied territories. Defendants see the 
courtroom through the bars of a fenced enclosure that surrounds the dock. This, too, is 
analogous to the constraints and punitive dimensions of life under occupation.”79 
Though more subtly, Michael Peletz’s account of the informality pervading the 
atmosphere of Malaysian religious courts may be read in equally political terms: 
“most of the hearings in the courthouse are held in the kadi’s chambers, not in the 
actual courtroom. The kadi prefers to hold hearings in his chambers because those 
who appear before him are more comfortable and relaxed in that setting…The various 
decorations adorning the desks and work spaces of the staff help render the courts 
more familiar to litigants and others who visit the building…the presence of the kadi’s 
children contributes to the informal atmosphere within the courthouse and helps 
convey the impression that the kadi is a father and, by implication, a husband. Because 
he is a ‘family man’, the kadi certainly knows something of the challenges of 
maintaining relationships, of what is involved in supporting a wife and children, and 
of what his familial duties and responsibilities are.”80  
In accounting for courts’ spatial aspects, scholars usually build upon 
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generalizations about the court's symbolic construction.81 This idea is epitomized in 
Antoine Garapon’s work Bien Juger, Essai sur le Rituel Judiciaire, in which the 
author studies an architectural style specific to the construction of the judicial space.82 
The canon of “architecture judiciaire” (judicial architecture), says the author, is the 
result of a long and complex historical construction.83 Garapon’s genealogy of the 
“temple de justice” (justice temple) accounts for the symbolic external “registres” (or 
styles) (cosmological,84 mythological, religious,85 and historical, among others) that 
initially commanded the construction of the judicial space. He notes that when the 
figure of the “palais du justice” (palace of justice) became associated with that of a 
“Temple” in early eighteenth century, the emancipation of adjudication from religion 
was complete, and justice gained symbolic autonomy, that is, justice’s symbols 
became secularized.86 Garapon also provides a detailed and enlightening description of 
how canonical judicial architecture gets therefore organized around the notions of 
distance, neutrality of forms, abstraction, separation, enclosure, symmetry, order, etc., 
that symbolize modern judicial adjudication (i.e. impartially, objectivity, detachment, 
rationality). Remarkably, the symbols, when taken in conjunction, play a significant 
role in elevating justice to the realm of the sacred.87 
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 Place is essential for Garapon’s description of what he calls the “évènement de 
juger” (the event of judging, adjudicating);88and he succeeds in pointing out the 
symbolic link between space and judicial practice.89 Nonetheless, I think that his 
placing so much emphasis on the symbolic judicial apparatus actually overlooks the 
effects of mundane bureaucratic practices on the construction of the judicial 
institution. The “cadre symbolique” through which justice works builds upon the 
separation between legal and social practices—law and society are, therefore, 
mediated through justice’s rituals and symbols. In this scheme, judicial practice 
assumes an artificial and even dramatic character; and gets confined to the legal 
procedure developed within the boundaries of a fixed locality, the judicial palace.  
The Nature of Place: theoretical considerations 
As I elaborate below, place (or the judicial space, paraphrasing Garapon) 
unfolds in my field site as a composite of spatial aspects and individual and 
institutional practices that enact the Court—for instance, circulation of files; public 
hearings; and even, the Court’s use of certiorari.   
In his ethnographic research of Bomana Prison in Port Moresby, Papua New 
Guinea’s capital, Adam Reed offers an insightful account of the links between place 
and relations. Drawing on other anthropologists working in Melanesia, he argues:  
Places take the form and significance through the history 
of life activity that marks them—the gardens people 
make, the houses they build, the paths they use, the 
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everyday acts of feeding and sharing (Weiner 1991; 
Kahn 1996; Leach 2003). Particular landmarks—a river, 
a group of stones or a mountain—reflect peoples’ 
memories of those events and remind them of 
obligations. Sets of relations animate those places, 
just as places animate those relations.90(emphasis 
added).  
Moreover, as Annelise Riles recalls, anthropologists, literary theorists, cultural 
geographers and even legal scholars all addressed—in various ways—both the 
constructed and the constructive nature of space and place in the early 1990s.91 That 
scholarship, she notes, focused on the fundamental role that conceptions of place—
aesthetic, geographic and political—played in the formation of personal, group, and 
national identities: for instance, studies showed that ideological constructions of space 
and place informed regimes of racial exclusion; that displacement correlated to the 
loss of personal or group identity; and even that space became a means of resistance 
and empowerment.92   
Similarly, while drawing on the tensions between place and space, Edward 
Casey approaches the culturally constitutive character of place from a 
phenomenological point of view.93 He explains the special ways in which place is 
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manifested, hence stressing its gathering capacity. Minimally, Casey argues, place 
holds things (both animate and inanimate entities); but it also keeps experiences, 
histories, even languages and thoughts: “Being in a place is being in a configurative 
complex of things.”94 Casey makes it clear that he does not take place to be something 
simply physical. He argues instead that place is more an event than a thing to be 
assimilated to known categories (i.e. space and time, substance or causality). As 
events, places continually demand from us new forms of understandings: 
 Rather than being one definite sort of thing—for 
example, physical, spiritual, cultural, social—a given 
place takes on the qualities of its occupants, reflecting 
these qualities in its own constitution and description 
and expressing them in its occurrence as an event: places 
not only are, they happen…Sorts of places depend on 
the kinds of things, as well as the actual things, that 
make them up.95 (italics in the original).0 
Perception is central to Casey’s phenomenological account of place: there is no 
knowing or sensing a place except by being in that place; and to be in a place is to be 
in a position to perceive it.96 Casey argues that place is the most fundamental form of 
embodied experience—the site of a powerful fusion of self, space and time.97 Place is, 
therefore, a concrete experience. 
In one sense, all of these approaches are remarkably consistent: they share a 
similar starting point—a different engagement with place—which, in turn, opens up 
different analytical possibilities. This approach has particular resonances with Science 
                                                 
94
 Ibid., 25.  
95
 Ibid., 27. 
96
 Ibid., 17-8.  
97
 Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso, “Introduction”, in Senses of Place , Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso 
ed. (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1993), 4-11, 9. 
33 
Studies scholar Bruno Latour’s work, whose influential approach to scientific 
knowledge production influences this project. Turning to the study of law, by 
inquiring into the decision-making process in the French Conseil d'État, Latour 
accounts for the legal process as an assemblage of people, texts, everyday objects and 
even architecture.98 Following the clerical movement of files, he makes visible the 
network of people, objects, texts, concepts, and even infrastructure that make up the 
legal phenomenon.  
In the Place 
Located across “Plaza Lavalle” (Lavalle Square) in downtown Buenos 
Aires99—the “Palacio de Tribunales” (Tribunal Palace, hereafter the palacio), home of 
the Supreme Court, is an eight-story building designed by the French architect Norbert 
Maillart following the European classicism canon. The building itself is considered a 
typically eclectic work due to its stone-like façade, its Doric style pillars, the 
monumental appearance, the sculptures, and the sober decoration—features altogether 
taken as symbols of the function “that the building was called to perform.”100 The 
project began in 1904 and, even though the building was not complete until late 1940s, 
it opened in 1910.   
Visitors can access the building through the three public entrances located on 
the second floor—the main entrance on the front, facing Lavalle square; and two on 
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each side of the building. The palacio not only houses the Supreme Court’s offices; it 
is also the home of federal first instance courts, court of appeals, and a number of 
other offices involved in the administration of justice. Space organization tends to be 
vertical—as it is mostly observed in the distribution of the criminal courts: while the 
judges in charge of pretrial investigation (instructing judges) are on the third floor, the 
trial courts are on the seventh.  
On the way through the front entrance there is the atrium; on its facing wall, a 
ten foot tall statue (an allegory of Justice) dominates the scene. Two lateral hallways 
connect the atrium to the main court (“patio principal”), the building’s most vital 
center. The patio hosts a branch of the City of Buenos Aires Bank (“Banco Ciudad,” 
where attorneys usually line up to pay the docket fees), a post office, and a 
convenience store.  A bit further down, off one of the hallways, there is also the press 
room. At the rear there is the Federal Court of Appeals’ hearing room (“Sala de 
Audiencias de la Cámara Federal”). This room has a special meaning in the Argentine 
judicial history, as in that place the military juntas that ruled the country from 1976 to 
1983 were tried and convicted in December 1985 by the Federal Court of Appeals. 
Thus, any mention of the so-called “juicio a las juntas” (trial to the juntas) seems 
inescapably associated to that courtroom. In many senses, this particular image 
became a symbol of democratic restoration and subjection of the military dictatorship 
to the rule of law, even through the uneasy transition. Carlos Nino describes this trial’s 
beginning in this way:  
 The first public hearing in the “big trial” took place on 
April 22, 1985. The atmosphere was highly charged and 
emotional. Fifty thousand people demonstrated, in 
Buenos Aires as well as the cities in the interior, in 
support of the trial. Many people were moved when they 
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saw the once all-powerful dictators stand as the six 
civilian judges entered the room. Hebe de Bonafini,101 
Perez Esquivel102 and Eduardo Rabossi103 attended the 
first hearing. The atmosphere was rather heated, when 
Jose Maria Orgeira, Viola’s104 counsel, addressed the 
court in a disrespectful manner, the presiding judge, 
Arslanian, ordered his disciplinary arrest.105(quotes in 
the original). 
Nowadays, this courtroom is used by the Supreme Court and serves as an ad 
hoc hearing room for other tribunals (i.e. the Supreme Court itself; or the Special 
Jury106 that adjudicates in cases—impeachments—against federal judges).  
The second floor is also the home of a number of lower court offices. As I 
mentioned above, first instance tribunals and court of appeals are spread across the 
building. Yet, the Supreme Court has moved recently its admission office (“Oficina de 
Mesa de Entrada”), from the fourth to the second floor, certainly a more accessible 
place than its previous location.107 Among the offices with significant roles in judicial 
adjudication other than courts that operate in the palacio, I want to note the Judicial 
                                                 
101
 The President of the Association of Madres de Plaza de Mayo.  
102
  An Argentine Human Rights activist and 1980 Peace Nobel Prize Laureate. 
103
  A philosopher and lawyer, and Undersecretary of Human Rights during President Alfonsín’s 
administration (1983-1989).  He was one of the members of the CONADEP (National Commission on 
Disappeared Persons), the executive commission created right after Alfonsín took office in December 
1983. The commission was charged with the investigation of the fate and whereabouts of those who had 
disappeared during the latest dictatorship.   
104
 One of the defendants, an Army general and junta member who acted as the Nation’s president from 
1979 to 1981. 
105
 Carlos S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1996), 82.  
106
 The Jury was created by the latest Constitutional Amendment in 1994 and regulated by Law of 
Congress. See: Argentina’s Constitution, Section. 115; Law No. 24937, December 10, 1997, B.O. 
28802, 2;  and Law No. 26080, February 22, 2006, B.O. 30854, 1. The latter statute was passed amidst 
an intense political debate as it changed the composition of the Jury members. The Jury has jurisdiction 
over all federal judges except Supreme Court Justices who can be removed only by Congress’ 
impeachment. See Argentina’s Constitution, sections 53 and 56.  
107
 Fieldnotes, February 4, 2008.   
36 
Detention Center #28, located on the building’s basement.108 Generally known as the 
“Alcaida de Tribunales,” the detention center is actually a branch of the Federal 
Penitentiary Service (“Servicio Penitenciario Federal”)109 in charge of transporting 
criminal defendants held in pretrial detention from the prison facility to the court and 
vice versa. Institutional information on the center notes that it is only a transit place, 
thus, no prisoner can be held in custody overnight, except by judicial decree.110 
Though visits are not allowed there, family gatherings (mostly women and children) at 
the entrance of the detention center are part of prisoners’ daily arrival and departure 
routines.  
 
 
Figure 3. Entrance to the Judicial Detention Center on Lavalle Street 
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The fourth floor exclusively houses the Supreme Court’s offices. The 
occupants include the seven Court Justices, the Justices' clerks, the Court’s General 
Administration office, and a few general Court clerks (Secretarios de Corte).111 As I 
will explain further in this dissertation when I discuss the division of labor within the 
Court, law clerks at the Court may work for a Justice (in that case, they work in a 
Justice’s “vocalía”) or in one of the Court's eight specialized judicial secretaries 
(“secretarías judiciales,” or just “secretarias”). The secretarías are chaired by Supreme 
Court clerks (“Secretarios de la Corte Suprema”; or “Secretarios de Corte”; or just 
“Secretarios”). Law clerks and Court clerks are equally “funcionarios judiciales” 
(judicial bureaucrats, civil servants), though they rank differently in the judicial 
hierarchy (the latter hold a higher-ranking).  
 Also on the fourth floor, across the Honor Court (“Patio de Honor”), there is a 
compound of rooms devoted to institutional events. Among them, the Court’s hearing 
room or courtroom (“Sala de Audiencias”); the Justices’ conference room or “Sala de 
Acuerdos,” the site of Justices’ formal weekly business meetings; the ambassadors’ 
room, devoted to official gatherings or special occasions;112 and the so-called “tea 
room”—at present the Court clerks’ waiting room.113   
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Figure 4. Salón de Acuerdos  
(Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación) 
This is the salón de acuerdos, the Supreme Court’s conference room, where 
the Justices meet every Tuesday at 9:00 AM around this ten-sided table to approve and 
sign the final versions of their decisions. Notice the crucifix on the facing wall, and the 
Argentine flag in a glass box at the corner.114 
In addition to the fourth floor and the second floor, the Court’s offices have 
expanded gradually to other floors, a fact that several of my informants take as 
evidence of the rapid growth of the judicial (Court’s) body—both in number of its 
staff members and its docket—since the early 1990s.115 Accordingly, most of the third 
floor has been devoted to the Court’s office space, including the offices of Court 
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clerks and their law clerks. When I asked about the reasons behind such a spatial 
distribution, that is Court clerks’ offices being located on the third rather than on 
fourth floor, an informant responded that many of the third floor’s occupants had been 
relocated as a result of the Court’s enlargement process—it was necessary to make 
room for the new Court’s staff, that is the post-enlargement Justices and their clerks, 
he said.116 The Justices, he explained to me, traditionally exercise the privilege of 
locating their clerks' offices nearby.117 He, however, also believes that in some 
instances relocations have been used as a means of [masked] punishment to high-
ranking Court’s functionaries.118  
The seventh floor is mainly occupied by the Court’s Central Library. The 
library’s reading room is open to the public from 7:30 AM to 7:00 PM. Admittance is 
allowed upon showing a personal ID, or a Buenos Aires Bar Association’s 
membership card (so-called “Tomo y Folio,” in reference to the way that membership 
numbers are recorded in the Bar Association’s files).119 First-time visitors’ names and 
                                                 
116
 In 1990, a Court-packing plan promoted by then-President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) enlarged the 
Court from five to nine members, and also increased the number of law clerks from approximately 
thirty in the 1980s to over 150 by the mid-1990s. See: Horacio Verbitsky, Hacer la Corte (Buenos 
Aires: Planeta, 1993); Gretchen Helmke, Courts under Constraints, Judges, Generals and Presidents in 
Argentina (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). My informants´ (clerks and judges) 
estimations about the current number of clerks are vague; though they estimate that number to be 
around 150. In 2006, Congress passed a law cutting down the number of Supreme Court’s Justices to 
five. However, since the number of Justices was seven at the time the law was enacted, it was therefore 
statutorily established that the Tribunal would be composed provisionally by seven members— and that 
four (out of seven justices) would make majority.  See: Law No. 26183, November 29, 2006, 
B.O.31055, 1. See, also Chapter Three of this dissertation.  
117
 Interview, December 16, 2005. 
118
 Interview, December 14, 2005.  
119
 In my very first visit to the library’s reading room I was asked at the admittance desk if I was a 
lawyer, to which I responded affirmatively. Then, they requested me to show my Bar Association ID as 
proof of my professional status. I told the library employee that I did not have one. She looked at me 
and replied that I had said that I was a lawyer. Yes, I said, but “I am not a member either of the Buenos 
Aires Bar Association or of any other bar association”.  She then asked me for my ID (“Documento de 
Identidad”) and typed the numbers on her computer keyboard. Fieldnotes, September 9, 2005. Since 
then, every time I visit the reading room, I just have to repeat, after greeting the employee on duty at the 
admittance desk, the words “número de documento” (ID number) to warn her or him that I will not 
access the room by “ tomo y folio.” The employee then asks me the number and types it on the 
keyboard and I wait for a few seconds until my name pops up on the computer monitor. The employee 
repeats my name and I confirm it. Only then am I cleared to access the reading room.  
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ID numbers are saved on a computer system for subsequent visits. A big terrace also 
extends on the seventh floor, around which are situated the offices of the judicial 
employees’ union, the Federal Police Fire Division, facility management, and public 
restrooms, among others.  
On the eight floor the University of Buenos Aires Law School operates one of 
its legal clinics, so-called “el práctico” (the practice) in reference to the (academic) 
year long legal practical course that law students must take to graduate. These classes 
are held from February to December from Monday to Friday, 8:00 AM to 8:00 PM. 
The clinic offers pro bono legal counseling to low-income people on issues related to 
family law, immigration law, tort law (battery), social security law, labor law, criminal 
law, etc.120 The clinic also participates in client interviewing during business days 
(except on Wednesdays), from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM.  
As the legal clinic classroom and office are accessible only through the 
staircase located on the corridor next to the library’s reading room, I usually shared the 
elevator (either the elevator #1 or #2) with students and clients in my way to the 
Court’s library. The elevator #2 takes one directly to the library (and to the clinic); 
though sometimes this is not the fastest way to get there. During the building’s 
operational hours (from 7:30 AM to 1:30 PM), the line to get a spot on the elevator 
may take about ten minutes—not to mention during the “rush hours”  (11:30 AM to 
12:30 PM approximately), when the lines are even longer. There are ten public 
elevators in the building, which from 7:00 AM to 7:00PM are (mechanically) operated 
by staff of the palacio.  The elevators are actually sites of brief intersections: people 
with different backgrounds come together and break apart. But they also may be 
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 See: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Derecho, Departamento de Práctica Profesional-
Centro de Formación Profesional; 
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regarded as artefacts of the hierarchical [judicial] organization. Signs inside the public 
elevators citing a 1974 resolution order preferential treatment (priority) to the 
magistrates who identify themselves as such to elevator operators.121 In other words, 
they grant judges a spot on the public elevators. However, I did not see it in practice 
during my fieldwork. That was not because judges do not have priority; but because 
judges usually take elevators other than those assigned to the public. Indeed, besides 
these elevators, there are two exclusive ones: one for lower-instance judges, Court 
clerks, law clerks and other judicial bureaucrats; and the other for Supreme Court 
Justices; though the latter also may be used by distinguished visitors, like high-ranking 
government officials, foreign chiefs of state, diplomats, etc.122 I recall an anecdote 
from the field that shows how hierarchical space distribution is enacted through the 
use of elevators: it was January 2007, at the very end of the judicial holiday (“feria 
judicial”), and I had just finished my interview with a law clerk. She gently offered to 
accompany me to the elevator. We left her office and she naturally turned in direction 
to the elevator that she, a Court bureaucrat, usually took. She called the elevator while 
affirming that that would be the fastest way to get out of the building. I asked her if I 
was “allowed” to use that elevator, and she responded that nobody would care; that it 
was almost evening, and also the building was empty due to the summer break. Yet, 
she replied to my query with another anecdote, one of her own: she was walking along 
with a Court Justice through one of the hallways on the fourth floor. She was relating 
an informal oral report on a case she was studying. She then stopped suddenly when 
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 Supreme Court Resolution No. 464, 1974. Following customary courtesy rules, another sign posted 
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pregnant women, and women with babies.  
122
 I personally witnessed the reception ceremony held on the occasion of the visit of Chile’s President 
Michelle Bachellet to the Supreme Court on March 22, 2006. On that opportunity, two Justices waited 
for Bachellet’s arrival at the palacio’s doorways, escorted her on a red carpet through the atrium to the 
Justices’ elevator that would take them to the fourth floor to join the other Supreme Court Justices. A 
quite similar ceremony was held on the occasion of Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio (Lula) Da Silva's 
visit to the Supreme Court on February 22, 2008. 
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she realized that the Justice was heading to the Justices’ elevator. She asked the Justice 
the same kind of question I asked to her: whether she was allowed to get on that 
elevator reserved for the Justices exclusively. He replied she could because she was 
with him.123  
Mobilization  
The easiest way to get to the fourth floor (the Court’s floor) is taking either of 
the two main staircases located on either side of the main patio on the second floor.124 
Signs painted on the walls indicate the floor numbers, though the fourth floor is 
exceedingly noticeable by the fences that block the direct passage from the staircases 
and the hallways to the Court’s offices.  As the fences are not fixed, one may access 
the floor by simply getting around them (usually there is a small break between the 
fences and the wall). Once on this floor, the Justices’ chambers are easily discernible 
due to the fact that in front of most of them125 there is a police officer guarding the 
door.  
The fences in the Court date from the most recent economic crisis 
(2001/2002),126 when the Court became a target of middle-class protestors who 
demonstrated, first against the restrictions imposed by the De la Rua Administration 
on cash withdrawals from bank accounts (the so-called “corralito,” or the blockade 
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 Probably the most salient aspect of the 2001/2002 Argentine crisis was the economic breakdown 
(both the financial crisis and the debt default), reflected by the image of hundreds of depositors banging 
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Party leaders in the lootings that marked the end of De la Rua´s government.” See Catalina Smulovitz, 
“Protest by other means. Legal mobilization in the Argentinian Crisis” (2003). Unpublished manuscript 
on file with the author.  
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drawn around bank accounts restricting access to savings), 127 and later against the 
“pesification”—the forced conversion of the previously frozen savings accounts in 
U.S. dollars into Argentine pesos at unfavorable rates.128 Additionally, as early as 
December 2001, thousands of injunctions (“amparos”) against the corralito were 
being filed all across the country, both in Federal and Provincial courts.129 Gretchen 
Helmke provides a sensitive description of that moment:  “Week after week, hundreds 
of protesters gathered outside tribunales and the private homes of the justices130 to 
demand their resignations. In expressions of rage and disgust, protesters carried signs 
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in Argentina so-called “escrache” (to uncover, in Argentine slang), developed during the 1990s and into 
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theater performances, and music.” Susana Kaiser, “Escraches: demonstrations, communication and 
political memory in post-dictatorial Argentina,” Media, Culture & Society 24:4 (2002): 499-516 
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with phrases including “Argentines: We have already thrown out Cavallo [De la Rua’s 
economic adviser]…Now, it is time for the Supreme Court”; “Supreme Ones are the 
Corrupt Ones”; “Supreme Court: Don’t you have any shame? The people do not want 
you”; and “Argentina reclaims justice: Get out Supreme Court.” In one particularly 
symbolic gesture, protesters drove a hearse with a coffin in front of the Court with a 
sign that read, “The death of Justice.” In another public display, nine actors dressed up 
in prisoners’ garb with the names of each judge slung around their necks and posed on 
the steps of tribunales. For the first time since the human rights trials, the justices 
began receiving death threats.”131  (italics added). 
Since the time of the crisis the fences have been kept at the premise and moved 
throughout the building, according to the multiple demonstrations that usually take 
place both inside and outside the palacio.132 Nonetheless, far from disrupting the 
Tribunal’s everyday practices, the fences have been gradually integrated to the Court’s 
daily landscape, as if they were part of its infrastructure. Likewise, the kinds of 
protests and manifestations that the fences were supposed to deter have been 
internalized to the palacio’s routines. It would be a mistake to see them as exceptional 
to or even disruptive of judicial practices. For instance, until the Court’s handing 
down a decision on the corralito,133 in December 2006, bank depositors used to rally 
every Tuesday morning at the palacio’s doorsteps, and then march to the fourth floor 
demanding the Court’s favorable ruling in the case. This anecdote illustrates this 
point: it was Tuesday morning and the Supreme Court Justices were holding a public 
hearing on a pollution case in the Court’s hearing room on the fourth floor. Suddenly, 
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 Another line of fences was placed along the building’s front, but at present it was completely 
removed after the restoration of the frontal façade concluded in January 2008.  
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 See: “Massa, Juan Agustin c/Poder Ejecutivo Nacional-Dto. 1570/01 y otro s/ amparo Ley 16986”, 
C.S.J.N, 329 Fallos 5913 ( 2006). In this ruling, the Supreme Court held that to guarantee both the 
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a firecracker exploded nearby. The then-Chief Justice turned to the right, and 
whispered to the Court’s Vice-President: “son los ahorristas” (“they are the bank 
depositors”), and the comment was loud enough to be caught by the microphone and 
heard by the audience.134 The hearing, however, proceeded as if the protest was not 
taking place only few steps from the hearing room.  
 
 
Figure 5. The Supreme Court's Floor (Fourth Floor) 
(September 5, 2006 after the first public hearing held on the Riachuelo case)135 
In addition to the vast repertoire of social protests136 that hit the judicial 
scenario in the last several years, other social mobilizations have taken place both 
inside and outside the palacio. Figure 6shows a rally organized by the Buenos Aires 
Bar Association to protest Congress’ passing a bill modifying the composition of the 
Special Jury in February 2006. The banner on the left reads “We are the only option”; 
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the other banner, on the right, reads “Defend yourself, participate, get involved.” The 
building has become a sort of “natural” protest forum for the National Judiciary 
Employees’ Union’s (“Unión de Empleados de la Justicia Nacional- UEJN”); 
professional associations, like the Buenos Aires Bar Association; Non Profit 
Organizations (NGOs),137 and Human Rights activists.  
 
 
Figure 6. Rallying at the doorsteps of the Palacio de Tribunales 
The building anticipates the events that will eventually occur. In other words, 
if you happen to be inside the building immediately before a mobilization, you will 
most likely realize what is about to happen by observing either the reinforced police 
guard or the fences’ deployment around a particular site, for instance, the Court’s 
floor, the hearing room on the second floor, or one of the entrances to the palacio. One 
afternoon, I was to leave the building through one of the side gates that are usually 
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 Since 1994, members of Memoria Activa” (Active Memory), a non profit organization created after 
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open during the Courts’ business hours, but the gate was closed. As it was too early 
for the gates to be closed under normal circumstances, I asked a policeman on duty 
next to the gate why they had closed it earlier. He responded: “Chabán comes (“viene 
Chabán”),138 and indicated an auxiliary door through which I finally exited the 
building (Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Police deployment at the Judicial Detention Center  
guarding against protests (Clarin, December 7, 2007) 
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 Omar Chabán was the manager of the night club “República de Cromagnon” that was destroyed by 
fire on December 30, 2004, killing 194 people, mostly teenagers who were attending a rock concert. 
Chabán faces several criminal charges and his movements are closely monitored by the victims’ parents 
and relatives. During my fieldwork he was held on pretrial detention, therefore, any time he had to 
plead before the court, he was taken through the judicial detention center on the basement. What the 
policeman explained to me in just two words “Chabán comes” was that his coming to the palacio most 
likely would trigger of the plaintiffs’ anger who radically opposed his release from pretrial detention. 
On December 7, 2007, the federal court of appeals ordered Chabán's release until the trial which finally 
began in August 2008. See: “Chabán dejo la cárcel en medio de un gran operativo de seguridad” 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2007/12/07/um/n-01558881.htm (accessed, March 4, 2008). Remarkably, 
just across the judicial palace (also on Lavalle square), there is a large signpost with the names of the 
people who died in the fire at Cromagnon.  
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Mobility  
The above descriptions seek to convey a concrete sense of “mobility” within 
the judicial complex—as a matter of fact, even though random searches are conducted 
at the front door, everybody is admitted to the palacio. This mobility is created by the 
daily flow of people in dynamic interaction with the judicial apparatus and, to a lesser 
extent, by the apparent absence of physical constraints to move across the building. 
Adam Reed accounts for a similar sense of mobility encountered in his ethnographic 
research of Bomana Prison. Mobility, argues Reed, is produced by the constant arrival 
and release of prisoners, despite restrictions upon movement and coerced dwelling that 
incarceration imposes: “Metaphors of enclosure and residence are sometimes 
substituted by language that emphasises the gaol as a site of continuous dispersal. 
Prisoners are keen to point out the arrivals and departures, the comings and goings of 
fellow inmates, in particular, the fact that these movements are often unanticipated. No 
one can be quite sure who might be arriving tomorrow and who might be released.”139 
Nonetheless, he notes that this sense of mobility contrasts to penal routines—“the lack 
of qualitative change from day to day, month to month”— which inmates experience 
as “slowing down, a lack of spatial and temporal movement.”140 The experience of 
detention cannot be compared to the routines that make up the sense of mobility 
within the palacio. However, in both situations, mobility seems to rest on encounters 
that rapidly disintegrate. The nature of these encounters is synthesized in the bus stop 
metaphor through which a Bomana inmate explained to Reed his vision of the prison: 
a place where people from different backgrounds are first thrown together and then 
scattered.141 When attention rests on brief intersections, argues Reed, notions of 
stability and coherence drop away. Drawing on the metaphor of the bus stop, Reeds 
                                                 
139
 Adam Reed, Papua New Guinea’s Last Place, 77.  
140
 Ibid., 88.  
141
 Ibid.,78.  
49 
concludes that if the prison can be regarded as a meeting place and site of dispersal, 
then encounter and mobility become features of incarceration.  
The senses of mobility and accessibility enacted within the physical space of 
the judiciary also help elaborate perceptions about the courts’ contemporary practices, 
as this chapter proposes—after all, access to justice and progress are principles that 
animate per se the conception of the legal process in Western legal cultures.142 In her 
study of the criminal cases filed ex officio by the Argentine federal police to the 
criminal courts with jurisdiction over the City Buenos Aires (courts located in the 
palacio), anthropologist Lucia Eilbaum remarks how her subjects’ (criminal court 
bureaucrats) narratives are organized around a spatial logic.143 Lower instance criminal 
judges, in charge of criminal investigation are located on the third floor (“jueces de 
instrucción”; instructing judges or hearing judges), whereas higher instance criminal 
courts, the trial courts (“tribunales orales”), are situated on the seventh. Such spatial 
distribution, she notes, indicates the passage from one instance (lower) to the other 
(higher). Formally, in Argentina’s Criminal Procedural law, the passage from the judge 
who carries out the investigation to the trial court is called “to elevate the cause to trial” 
(“elevar la causa a juicio”). Thus, it is frequently said within the Oral Tribunal that cases 
go “up” to the second instance—when the decision is appealed to the higher court, the 
Court of Appeals (Cámara de Apelaciones)144—or go “down” if they are remanded to the 
instructing judge. Thus, in these situations, argues Eilbaum, space reflects both the 
judicial hierarchy and the sequence of the judicial process.   
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Turning to the proceedings at the Supreme Court, it is worth noting that access 
(by access I mean here the passage of cases from the courts of appeals to the Supreme 
Court) is governed by specific statutory provisions.145 Additionally, the National Civil 
and Commercial Procedural Code grants the Supreme Court the authority to reject 
appeals at its own discretion.146 Yet, access is also restricted by the Court’s bylaws 
that set up formal requirements for appeal documents (i.e. docket fee; a suits’ cover 
page layout; maximum number of pages for appeals).147 Nonetheless, the perception of 
an almost unrestricted access to the Court, that is, the tribunal’s availability to hear 
almost every judicial case in the country148 is palpable in my informants’ accounts of 
the Court’s workings, and references to the Court’s case load pervade their 
descriptions of everyday practices.149 Moreover, through a discourse that evokes the 
Supreme Court Justice’s metaphor above described, they find the gradual and steady 
extension of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction during the last two decades to be 
responsible for the tribunal’s lost control of its own docket.150  
Notably, access in my field site also holds political implications. As I will 
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show later, access has become a keyword of the Supreme Court Justices’ (in particular 
the newly appointed ones) discourse of change and accountability, and hence this 
keyword informs new institutional practices of transparency that aim to bring the 
Court to the people. In this context, access turns into an artefact of performance. 151   
The accessibility and mobility perceived within the Palacio de Tribunales 
certainly challenges the notions of fixity, separation and symmetry of the judicial 
space outlined by Garapon’s canon of judicial architecture reviewed above. This does 
not mean, however, that they come into conflict with the formalism and detachment 
associated with the judicial bureaucracy.152 On the contrary, the artefacts that enact 
such mobility simultaneously elucidate bureaucracy’s workings: elevators, for 
instance, while acting as sites of intersection and encounter, nonetheless elicit 
differences by unfolding the judicial hierarchy and separating out the judiciary from 
the public at large. Likewise, the fences that indicate routines of political 
mobilizations and demonstrations also demarcate the borders of the protest forum by 
isolating the Court’s floor.  Moreover, the recently adopted practices aimed at opening 
the Court’s decision-making process to public participation (i.e. public hearings) build 
on a dynamic that certainly removes the Court from the public at large, and ultimately 
excludes the Court from any external gaze.153 These practices that aim to open access 
to the Court may be experienced simultaneously as images of physical constraint.  
Preserving the Judicial Space 
The materials discussed in this chapter show that place is not a neutral scene; 
rather, it is one of the forms in which the bureaucratic body is instantiated—a 
composite of spatial aspects and individual and institutional practices, and even 
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metaphors,154 that work to create and perform the Court155—as much as the circulation 
of files, public hearings and documentary practices on which I will elaborate in the 
next chapters. This questions, therefore, whether judicial practice is constrained within 
a delimited spatial site. The senses of mobility and access perceived within the palacio 
reveal that knowledge practices also unfold at moments of brief intersections 
generated by the bureaucratic body’s dynamics, challenging, in my view, the 
conventional understandings of legal knowledge as a localized phenomenon advanced 
by both the subjects in the Court and scholarly narratives.  
Additionally, in the particular context of the Argentine Court practices in 
which I worked—a post-crisis context which I compared with the process of restoring 
a building—these mundane idioms, forms, and practices of the judicial bureaucracy156 
become the site where the institution negotiates its own legitimacy. The set of photos 
displayed in this chapter depict an institutional order which is most obviously visible 
in the photo of the Justices’ conference room with the ten-sided table (Figure 4) where 
Church (the crucifix), State (the Argentine flag in the glass box) and the ancestors’ 
knowledge (for instance, the ex-Supreme Court Justice’s portray) are symbolically 
brought together in the room for the Justices’ guidance. However, this order is 
challenged permanently from different instances: the rallies and demonstrations that 
regularly take place both inside and outside the judicial palace, the Court’s current 
case backlog; and even the new sets of knowledge practices, such as public hearings, 
which have been enacted in response to the demands for transparency spawned by the 
2001/2002 crisis.157 Notably, despite the tensions that they may generate within the 
judicial space, these disruptions have become “naturalized,” integrated into the 
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Court’s routine. The Court is permanently re-enacted through practices articulated in 
reaction to the challenges to its order. Indeed, these practices work to re-instate the 
disrupted order and to reconfigure the proper space of law. To a large extent, these 
reactions are reflected in the photo of the removable fences located on the fourth floor, 
near the entrance to the Court's inner chambers (Figure 5). It is through these portable 
fences (supposedly used in temporary instances but now almost a constant presence, if 
only in their very public storage) that the judicial space is materially recovered from 
any disruption to its order. Through these fences, then, the Court's authority is 
preserved; in other words: restored.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BEFORE THE LAW 
 
Files, documents, and other tools of legal reasoning while distinctive as 
concrete technical instruments of law may also be appreciated as analytical objects in 
their own terms.158 These artifacts lay at the “surface” of legal knowledge; and they 
are probably the most visible dimension of lawmaking. Indeed, paper trails are the 
mode through which institutions are analyzed; for instance, scholars scrutinize the 
workings of courts through the content of legal decisions; lawyers, for their part, 
interpret these documents as the mode to advance (or not) their clients’ interests; and 
under current transparency governance, documentary records and self-descriptive 
documents become the form in which the institution’s good behavior is assessed. 
However, the mundane and too familiar character of documents—or rather, of the 
practice of document-making—works to obviate their capacity to become objects of 
analysis and knowledge themselves. Files, memoranda, and paperwork in general, are 
seen as routine instruments of bureaucratic practice, the means for achieving an end: 
the decision, the judgment. Thus, the analysis tends to focus on results, the results of 
institutional acts but not on the process of institutionalization that files entails.159 In 
this sense, law is apprehended by its ends (e.g. the social and political interests that the 
legal decision foregrounds, the individual rights it asserts); and, therefore, the legal 
analysis tends to be framed within the epistemological boundaries of the same ends.160  
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 My point in this chapter is that there are instances of judicial practice, other 
than the decision itself (the outcome, the end), through which legal knowledge can be 
accessed and apprehended. Specifically, I want to bring attention to the quintessential 
bureaucratic practice of file-making, as it unfolded in my fieldsite through my 
investigation into the status of my personal Court dossier. In looking at the dossier as a 
particular knowledge-making practice, I seek to point toward aspects of legal 
knowledge that remain a blind spot of legal studies due to the peculiar instrumentality 
of legal documents. Files and documents are ordinarily regarded as just mediators 
between the law and the decision; passages from law to execution; what stand before 
the law.161 However, it is this intermediary position that files are said to occupy in the 
legal process which actually turns them into artifacts to access and apprehend the 
practices of legal knowledge-making. Files speak of events; they record processes; 
they are constituents of a number of relations of knowledge within the legal apparatus; 
and even, they set the boundaries of their own reality, of legal knowledge’s reality. 
And as such, they become subjects of critical attention. My interest in files, it is worth 
noting, is largely instrumental; therefore, other ways of assessing the technologies of 
documents, for instance, the quest of its normative dimensions,162 are beyond the 
scope of this essay.163 Yet, for the purpose of this study, I use files and dossiers as 
identical categories. Authors like Goldstein, for instance, distinguish between the file 
and the dossier where the latter is assumed to be an instrument of surveillance.164  
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To have one’s day in court  
On December 19, 2005, I was conducting archival research at the Argentine 
Supreme Court’s Library when I received a phone call from a law clerk telling me that 
he had been informed that there was a file about my research at the Court’s General 
Administration office.165 I then decided to pay a visit to this office and check the 
accuracy of the information I was given. At the front desk, a staff member confirmed 
that there was indeed a dossier named “Expediente No. 3737/05 Barrera, Leticia 
(Doctorado en Cornell University Law School) s/pasantía a la CSJN” (Dossier No. 
3737/05 Barrera, Leticia (Doctorate at Cornell University Law School) on internship 
to the Nation’s Supreme Court of Justice) (Figure 8), which, however, I could not have 
access to at that moment because it was ready to be circulated to the seven Supreme 
Court Justices for consideration. I replied that I had never presented my work to the 
Court General Administration and, therefore, I wanted to know who had made such a 
petition on my behalf. The Court employee replied looking through his personal 
computer that, as far as he could tell from the electronic records one of the Justices’ 
offices had forwarded a letter to the Court Administration to be analyzed; and that the 
counseling division (“Asesoría Jurídica”) of the Administration Office had concluded 
that all Court Justices should consider such a letter prior to the granting of consent for 
my “internship” (“pasantía”) at the Court.166 He also made it clear that as in any other 
case that the Court decides, I would need a majority of five affirmative opinions out of 
seven Justices for my petition to be approved.167  
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Figure 8. Front cover Dossier No. 3737/05 "Barrera, Leticia (Doctorate at 
Cornell University Law School) on internship to the Nation's Supreme Court"  
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The letter that the staff member referred to was one of the introductory letters 
addressed to the Justices that I had brought to the field in fulfillment of Cornell 
University’s policy on the use of Human Subjects in research. These letters provided a 
rough description of the ethnographic research I intended to pursue at the Court, 
explaining such matters as the methods I would apply in the field, my course of action 
within the institution, and above all, my commitment to confidentiality. From those 
letters I would like to highlight two sentences in particular:  
We will be very grateful if you give permission to 
Leticia Barrera to conduct field research at the Supreme 
Court for a period of approximately seven months. 
During that time, she will be attending public hearings, 
observing daily office interactions, and conducting 
participant-observations at the places of your choice.168  
I had always taken those letters as just an introduction to my research project 
for my subjects, which also provided informed consent documentation. Yet, I had 
chosen to deliver them in person to each Justice’s office instead of doing it through the 
Court’s front desk (“Mesa de Entradas”) to avoid further procedural formalities; and 
even planned to follow up the Justices’ responses to these letters in subsequent visits 
that I was hoping to pay to their offices. Nonetheless, regardless of how I had intended 
originally to introduce my work to the Court Justices, the fact that I had chosen to do it 
in writing meant, in the eyes of the judicial body, that I had filed a petition which 
should be reviewed and decided upon according to the rules and procedural 
mechanisms that regulate the Court’s workings. To put it differently, what I had 
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defined as a matter of formal rituals to open the way to research was interpreted and 
transformed by Court officials into a matter of law.169 
In recounting how her fieldwork experience was mediated by bureaucratic 
procedure, anthropologist Jennifer Shannon describes ethnographically how informed 
consent documents enact “certain kinds of relationality in fieldwork relations.”170 
Drawing on Annelise Riles’s argument that “documents anticipate and enable certain 
actions by others,” Shannon describes the consent form as an “actant that sets people 
into action, as well as an institutional symbol in an existing cultural context.”171 She 
addresses informed consent from a comparative approach, reflecting on it in two 
different periods: first, as a staff fieldworker for the National Museum for the 
American Indian (NMAI) working with Native American communities, and, later, as a 
Cornell University graduate student in the Anthropology Department working in the 
same sites. Building upon these two research experiences, she recounts the different 
responses she received in the field to the consent forms as a representative of these 
two institutions.172 She seeks to demonstrate that consent forms are located at the 
intersection of bureaucratic and ethnographic practice, impacting the nature of 
fieldwork relations. 
What Shannon’s comparative insight suggests is that the more bureaucratically 
regulated the informed consent becomes the more it takes on the form of established 
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legal practices and, as a consequence, the more it compels “legal relationality.” She 
notes that the “shift to legality” that is part of institutional review board (IRB) 
practices today makes both researchers reconceptualize both themselves and the 
research participants. Researchers are no longer only interlocutors or co-participants 
with their “research subjects”; they also become “bearers of documents, institutional 
representatives, cosigners, and consent brokers.”173 What is more, Shannon finds the 
relationship between the individual fieldworker and her research participants disrupted 
by the insertion of the institution into this relationship. Her point is that fieldwork 
relations—formerly regarded under the rubric of personal relations—must now to be 
rendered in legal terms. In other words, Shannon empirically encounters in the 
intersection of bureaucratic practice and ethnographic practice the breaking point of 
personal fieldwork relationships (the “façade of personal relations,” in her terms) as 
evidenced in the shift from a “collaborative ethics” (furthered by the ethnographic 
practice) to a “contractual ethics” (that one advanced by IRB institutional practice).174 
That is, the increasing formalization of ethical practice by IRB enacts a kind of 
relationality that is different from the one that disciplines such as anthropology 
privilege.175  
I recall Shannon’s work here since my initial attention to my dossier focused 
on how the introduction of “legal oriented” (informed consent) documents 
representing Cornell University would impact upon what I had imagined as 
communicative and consensual relationships in my fieldwork. As a matter of fact, as 
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an essential part of my research, and even before I was informed about the existence 
of the dossier, I had begun constructing relationships with other interlocutors in the 
Court (mostly law clerks) on less regulatory grounds. Therefore, I was afraid the 
dossier would pose a threat to my future work in the field as I was expecting that 
bureaucratic practice would demand now that I shift positions: from a researcher to an 
institutional representative who presented a formal request to the Court, as indicated 
by the dossier’s subject (Figure 8).  
Nonetheless, this shift of positions, which under the light of Shannon’s work 
one might attribute to the enactment of IRB regulations for the researcher’s fieldwork 
practice, appeared in my field as the ordinary effect of my own engagement with the 
judicial apparatus, whether this interaction is articulated through informed consent 
letters or through any kind of document submitted to the Court. In other words, when I 
indicated earlier that Court officials interpreted and transformed in a legal matter what 
was a question of informed consent, or rather, what I understood was a question of 
informed consent, that reaction was actually bureaucracy’s ordinary response to any 
written request: the making of a file or a dossier. Yet, such reaction becomes even 
more commonsensical if we look closely the case of my dossier, as the petition I 
submitted to the Court had all the formal appearance of an institutional request (e.g. a 
letter written on university’s letterhead, the presence of the institution’s logo, the 
school authorities’ signatures). Indeed, for a given problem or petition to be 
considered by the bureaucratic (legal) apparatus it must be framed in the institution’s 
own terms, that is, subjected to official definitions (as in the case of my request, 
framed as an “internship request”), and follow pre-determined procedures (“carefully 
scripted routines,” paraphrasing Riles).176 In this respect, events that one may identify 
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as simple matters can be “transformed” into a different kind of subject matter for the 
Court itself. And the other way around, matters that petitioners understand as 
appropriate for judicial intervention may be considered as not sufficiently serious for 
consideration before the Court. In my understanding, this is not a question of the 
framing (“naming”) capacities of judicial actors,177 but rather it speaks of the mode of 
construction and development of a particular form of knowledge: bureaucratic (legal) 
knowledge.178  
In the Argentine legal system—as in most civilian legal cultures built upon a 
marked tradition of written and usually faceless legal procedures179—the practice of 
file-making epitomizes the workings of the judicial apparatus.180 Indeed, files are 
mundane objects—if not the most ordinary ones—of a court’s life. They are the forms 
that set into motion the tribunal’s work dynamics, and organize all its activity, even 
though this commonsensical quality of files does not yet have its place in legal 
theory.181 But even more significantly, files work as the devices that set up the 
contours to the judicial scope; that is, the search for (legal) truth is achieved, 
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contested, and negotiated only within the boundaries of the official dossier.182 
Accordingly, fact-finding, witness examination, evidence-collection, legal opinions, 
and every other judicial proceeding are meticulously recorded in the file, a practice 
that somewhat resembles double-entry bookkeeping operations. This practice of 
documenting,183 however, cannot be taken as just the inscription of words on paper; 
rather, it accounts for my subjects’ commitment to the file as a source of authority:184 
from the point of view of the Court’s bureaucrats that I encountered in the field, the 
dossiers are the venues of knowledge-making; that is to say, that which counts as 
knowledge is actually that which is in the files.185 An old decision of Argentina’s 
Supreme Court helps illustrate this point: in defining the character of the extraordinary 
appeal to the Court, the ruling declared that an extraordinary appeal based on an 
alleged violation of the right to defense in trial cannot be admitted if the denial or 
substantial restriction of such right does not emerge from the dossier.186 This double-
negation arising out of this Court’s decision actually suggests, in Cornellia Visman’s 
words, “the performative operation of law in constructing reality.”187  
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From Authority to Administration 
Writing practice, argues Goody, affects not only lawmaking practices (the 
reasoning in law, the sources of law) but also the organization of law: “The 
relationship of law to society becomes formalized with the advent of writing. Since 
there is no longer a quasi-homeostatic adaptation of norms, the written law achieves a 
kind of autonomy of its own, as do its organs.”188 Moreover, Goody relates the 
evolution of courts as independent bodies with the development of the legal 
profession. For instance, the growing presence of highly literate specialists 
encountered both outside and inside the courts, such as advocates who argue clients’ 
cases before the court and clerks, respectively.189 And yet, he notes, the internal 
organization of the courts requires the keeping of records.190 Judge-made law, Goody 
remarks, becomes elaborated on the use of precedents; and even records and law 
reports are useful for “the subsequent checking, control and reviewing of judgment by 
appeal courts or administrative officers….”191 This is precisely one of the attributes–
and effects—of documents in the bureaucratic organization. As Marie-Andreé Jacob 
remarks, documents, in particular standard printed forms, provide an “aura of 
propriety and plausibility”; they answer the bureaucratic needs for efficiency and 
comparability (of documents), as it has been observed in the history of notary 
practices in which the formularies simplify processes, give practices a routine 
character, and ensure consistency among documents.192 
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These insights point toward the notions of durability and authority entailed by 
writing—and hence, by legal documents and files as the deposits of written law. 
Indeed, writing, in contrast to speech, is assumed to hold a “potential to be received 
even more broadly and disseminated beyond the confines of a particular ceremony”;193 
and, as such, to develop a capacity of enforcement that a speech act lacks. But files are 
also about administration; they speak of transfers, exchanges, controlling 
operations.194 My interest in files’ instrumentality, as I noted in the introductory 
section to this chapter, lies at their capacity to work as an organizational and 
bureaucratic practice, in the understanding that through the process that files set into 
motion other dimensions of legal knowledge are elicited. These are aspects of 
bureaucratic practice that are imagined as “something outside of and beyond 
knowledge”,195 and that even my subjects in the Court do not regard as knowledge 
practices.  
The ethnographic moment196 when this insight became palpable to me came at 
the second or third visit that I paid to the office of one of the Supreme Court Justices 
to follow up on the status of an interview request I had made through his assistant. On 
this occasion, the Justice’s assistant asked me if I had made any official presentation 
before the Court regarding a judicial internship. I replied that I had just handed out 
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introductory letters from Cornell Law School to each of the Justices’ offices but that I 
had never filed a formal presentation on my own—I purposely avoided to mention that 
I knew about the dossier that was in circulation among the Justices. The Justice’s 
assistant said that she had seen a dossier circulating with my name on it a few weeks 
before, and that she remembered my petition (she insisted on calling it that) quite well. 
She added the dossier came from the President’s (Chief Justice) office in the Court, 
information I was not aware of up to that moment because the dossier was still 
circulating and I had not accessed it. She even went on to mention to me that she had 
seen a few of the Justices’ signatures on the dossier, which meant that they had 
already taken a position on my “internship” request. When I was to leave the office, 
after reiterating my interest in meeting the Justice, she said that the overall problem 
was that my request had been judicialized (“judicializado”). And that if I had tried to 
access the Justices through a “less formal way” (less formal than the introductory 
letters on Cornell Law School letterhead) I probably would have succeeded in gaining 
“access” to the Justices.197 In other words, that my request had been judicialized 
meant, to the eyes of this Justice’s assistant, that it was being reviewed through 
mechanisms that she associated with judicial decision-making practices. Therefore, it 
was not the issue involved in my dossier that made it appear as a judicial case to her 
eyes, but the process that the dossier was undergoing within the judicial apparatus; 
specifically, its material circulation that, in the assistant’s view, gave the dossier its 
judicial character.198  
The moment was even more insightful since at the initial instance of my 
following the dossier’s path, my interlocutors—the staff at the Court’s general 
administration desk, two administrative law experts with whom I had previously 
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discussed my “procedural” movements regarding my dossier, had insisted on framing 
my dossier as an “administrative issue” as opposed to a “judicial case.” I further 
endorsed this framing by splitting my interest in what appeared to be two different and 
parallel topics of research, the Court’s judicial adjudication operations, on the one 
hand, and the Court’s administration or management activities, on the other. In fact, 
besides judicial adjudication, the Court decides on administrative matters that involve 
its daily operations. For instance, it deals with issues involving personnel, payroll, 
internal procedures and organization, budget, facility management, etc.199 Moreover, 
the Court’s administrative activity is often materialized in general agreements reached 
by the Court’s Justices, so-called “acordadas” (that often work as the tribunal’s 
bylaws), resolutions issued by the Court’s President (“resoluciones”), and other kinds 
of legal documents with no particular denomination, for example, the Court’s decision 
on my case, generically called “providencia.”200 Court judgments on judicial cases are 
regularly called sentences (“sentencias”), yet, the Court’s discursive practices change 
depending on whether the tribunal issues an acordada concerning an administrative 
matter or rules in a judicial case. Notably, there are differences between the mode in 
which the Court addresses itself in the text of a judgment and the way it addresses 
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itself in an acordada or administrative decision. Accordingly, judgments are presented 
as decisions reached by “la Corte” or “esta Corte” (“the Court” or by “this Court,” 
meaning the Court as an institution) whereas acordadas are taken by “los Ministros” 
(the Court Justices) and signed by the Court general manager (“administrador 
general”). A Court Justice explained to me this “double-subjectivity” game in these 
terms: in the first case, when the Court plays a “judicial role,” “it is the Court who 
speaks,” a state power; in the second, when the Court decides as an administrative 
body, “it is us.”201 
The judge, indeed, speaks of judicial decision-making as a result, of an end; 
that is, the law that is transmitted through a judgment or a bylaw, whereas the 
assistant’s view of the Court’s decision-making as a process actually points toward the 
“transmission medium itself.”202 In my opinion, this finding, which became even more 
apparent to me through my follow up of the circulation of my own dossier, breaks up 
any functionalist divide between judicial and administrative matters and brings to the 
surface the material aggregation of documents as a legal bureaucracy’s knowledge 
practice, with no distinction as to whether the Court rules on relevant judicial cases, 
like past human rights violations, or whether it decides on quotidian, mundane matters, 
such as my interview request (or “internship,” glossing the Court’s terminology). 
What is more, it advances the appreciation of legal knowledge as part of a larger 
network of knowledge practices rather than as an isolated outcome—the judgment—or 
the creativity of individual agents.203 
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The Agency of Legal Documents 
In his essay “Forms,” Charles M. Yablon provides a description of the 
summons, probably the most routine legal form in a civil action.204 In examining the 
materiality of the summons, for instance, the written statement and the blank spaces, 
he points out sets of relations that this ordinary legal document enacts and anticipates. 
Yablon, however, focuses more on the meaning of forms as instruments of 
surveillance than on making them visible as constituents of social relations. 
Accordingly, he pays particular attention to the indeterminancy of the legal language 
of the summons, which, drawing on Derrida’s insight that meaning does not reside in a 
text but in the writing and reading of it,205 he sees as reflecting “an overabundance of 
meaning, of denotations and connotations, of words that mean many things at 
once.”206 But words in context (in a Derridean sense), like the context of given 
summons, “are not malleable putty that can mean anything we desire.” 207 In other 
words, what Yablon remarks is that the summons, understood in the context of its 
conditions of production and reading, also becomes an “instrument of power and 
pain.”208 
Certainly Yablon’s attention focuses on the disciplinary aspect of legal forms. 
However, in one sense, his account becomes important to my own approach to legal 
documents. Although he does not say it explicitly, what he foregrounds in his study of 
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the summons is the character of the legal form as an agent—or an actant in Science 
and Technology Studies’ language. Accordingly, the summons compels and 
anticipates different kinds of reactions by the subject: “the summons is all about the 
things you must do”209—thus, it is also expected that “you may fail to live up to 
expectations.”210 As Yablon’s account suggests, legal forms are a point in a chain of 
relations (rules, plaintiffs; defendants, lawyers, clerks, deadlines judgment, among 
others) that make up the legal process.211 “The summons presumes, without ever 
stating them, the existence of clear, mandatory, determinate rules, time deadlines, 
rules for counting, expected actions, forbidden actions.”212 
Legal documents’ capacity to anticipate and enable responses and relations—
as well as to condition and constrain them—actually indicates that “once created, 
instruments take on a certain agency.”213 For instance, this agency is apparent in 
Yablon’s description of the plaintiff and defendant of the summons not as authors of 
the documents, but as their subjects: “When the blank spaces are filled in in some 
lawyer’s office, the plaintiff’s name will sit uncomfortably just above yours [the 
defendant] in the caption of the case. It will be neither larger nor smaller than yours 
and will be separated from your name merely by the interposition of the printed “v.” 
That letter “v.” is a part of the form. It is the part of the form which places you two, 
plaintiff and defendant, literally and figuratively, on opposite sides.”214  
In pointing out the intimate relationship between the aesthetics of the summons 
and its informational content215—a relationship also encountered in other artifacts of 
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bureaucratic knowledge, such as the consent forms216—Yablon actually foregrounds 
the agency of the legal form. “You have been drafted by a document,” he concludes; 
meaning that you became a defendant, a subject, by the action of the document. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that human agency is obviated in the constellation of 
relations that the summons brings about.217 Rather, it assumes another form, distant 
from the core assumption that human agency can be linked only to will or intention.218 
In certain ways this resembles the practices of consent fabrication in a hospital 
bureaucracy, as described by Jacob, where agency takes up the form of submission to 
the hospital bureau’s rules.219  
Along the same lines, Riles’s description of the practices of posting of 
collateral for the global swap markets in Tokyo shows how many aspects of the 
routine practice of swap trading are organized and performed around specific pre-
printed forms. Accordingly, she remarks that legal documents work as “technologies 
for engaging in a communicative routine” which consists “of a set of material 
practices of document production, filing, and exchange—practices that in turn call for 
further practices, further documents.”220 This routine, however, is enabled not by a 
shared set of norms but by the forms’ aesthetic criteria221 which demand from their 
users specific forms of behavior.222 In this sense, Riles remarks that “the document 
                                                 
216
 Jacob, “Form-made persons,” 253.  
217
 Yablon, 1350  
218
 See: Marilyn Strathern, Property, Substance and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons and 
Things, 17; James Leach, “Modes of Creativity,” in Transactions and Creations: Property Debates and  
the Stimulus of Melanesia, Erich Hirsch and Marilyn Strathern eds. (New York, Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2004) 152.  
219
 Jacob, “Form-made persons,” 263-4. 
220
 Annelise Riles, “The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the 
Legitimacy of the State,” American Journal of Comparative Law 56 (Summer 2008): 605-630, 620. 
 See, also: Annelise Riles, “[Deadlines] Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and 
Anthropological Analysis.”  
221
 As Riles notes, unlike letters, legal opinions, or e-mail messages, printed forms are distinguishable 
by their “very rigid aesthetic standards.” Riles,“The Anti-Network,” 620. 
222
 “One chooses the law that applies to the ISDA master agreement by circling the proper word; one 
delineates who is the responsible contact person for the agreement by completing the relevant box.  The 
form is not set out to be read; it is presumed that the “users” (the term is significant) will jump to the 
72 
prefigures, and makes possible a set of exchanges defined by the particular kind of 
knowledge at issue, technical knowledge.223  
What can be said of legal forms also can be applied to files. Every file note, 
explains Visman, “indirectly contains a command”;224 files hold imperatives that set 
off chains of reactions;225 formulas that enclose themselves the execution of official 
acts: for instance, as in the case of my file, to circulate the file for Justices’ opinion, to 
grant me access to read the file, to send the file to the Court’s archive when the legal 
process was finished, to take the file out of the archive upon my request, all 
proceedings that reflected my file’s own progression.226 “Reporting the execution of 
an order triggers the next one,” notes Visman, pointing out the double orientation of 
an executed command: “it generates the next command and notes its own execution. It 
is both imperative and information.” 227 
Either directly, as in the case of Riles, or not, as in Yablon’s and Visman’s 
works, in my opinion, they all resonate with paradigms developed within of Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) about the character of scientific and technical 
knowledge. Specifically, Bruno Latour’s effort to understand the character of legal 
knowledge by focusing on the material quality of lawmaking—the production and 
passage of legal texts, opinions, drafts, reports, that make up the legal decision—as 
observed in his extensive empirical study of the Conseil d'État.228 STS, and in 
particular ANT (Actor-Network Theory), refuses to grant any “epistemological 
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privilege to human actors”229 Indeed, in the approach to the study of scientific 
knowledge production that ANT advances, human, scientific and technical 
instruments, and even theory, emerge through the things they do; they are treated all as 
inputs, actans, parts of the network of knowledge production.230 This insight, 
however, does not mean to just ascribe human agency to nonhumans because that 
would imply there is a true agency and a false one.231 Instead, “the point is to focus on 
the enrollment of humans and nonhumans in the production of a scientific (or a legal) 
fact.”232 (italics in the original). As I noted in the introduction to this dissertation, I 
find this insight particularly helpful as a methodological approach233 as it furthers the 
appreciation of legal knowledge as part of a larger network of knowledge practices 
rather than as an isolated outcome—the judgment—or the creativity of individual 
agents. 
Focusing on the Means  
The clerical movement of files that I encountered within the Argentine 
institution produces an effervescence of papering practices that are manifest in 
different interventions performed for and in the dossier: resolutions, legal opinions, 
memoranda, reports, conclusions, and exchanges among judicial bureaucrats. 
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Documents are attached (as different layers, one below the other) in the order of 
circulation of a given file, to the point that my subjects tend to measure the size of the 
file by the “thickness” of the layering. Thus, if there are different legal opinions on a 
case, all of them are probably enclosed in the dossier through their accompanying 
memoranda, each of which explain the reasons for the different judicial decisions 
proposed in the same case.234 Additionally, my interlocutors in the Court, mostly 
clerks, tend to give an account of their own lawmaking practices—and in general of 
the Court’s—in terms of this continuous movement of documents: dossiers are 
documents that constantly come in to their offices for review, and go out for others’ 
(other clerks and judges) review.235 Therefore, this constant circulation of files appears 
as both the engine and demise of judicial bureaucrats’ practices.  
The “collective manipulation of the dossier,” that is, the review, discussion, 
and deliberation on the dossiers that circulate within the judicial apparatus, becomes in 
Latour’s view the essential component to understand how the law, or rather the 
Conseil d'État, works.236 For Latour, the passage of files entails a complex process of 
transformation through which facts become annexed, assembled, juxtaposed to the 
preceding legal text, and ultimately transformed, to the point that he compares this 
transformation with the workings of an industrial boiler.237 
In other words, the textual process that the circulation of files generates in the 
Court’s routine makes visible files’ capacity to operate as a technology of bureaucratic 
action, as a means to an end: the legal decision. Files, indicates Visman, work toward 
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the law; “they lay the groundwork for the validity of the law,”238 but they are not the 
law. However, by focusing on files’ mundane execution of the legal procedure and 
official acts, one is allowed to access legal knowledge from instances that remain 
impervious to the analysis if one concentrates on the study of the law itself—of its 
ends. Yet, as I elaborate further in the next chapters, these instances are moments of 
knowledge creation and expansion.239  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FORMS OF LEGAL EXPERTS 
 
This chapter builds upon another artifact of legal knowledge-making practices: 
the subjects of the practices of adjudication, as encountered in the Argentine Supreme 
Court. The attributes of judicial officials, their relationships, and the manners in which 
they decide have been widely examined by socio-legal scholars, as in Critical Legal 
Studies and Law and Society literatures. However, rather than assuming—as in many 
of these analyses—that these subjects, in particular judges, are ideological actors,240 or 
that their behaviors are guided by political interests,241 here, I want to “step back” and 
look at instead the persons and relations that the practices of legal knowledge-making 
unfold within the judicial bureaucracy.  
I focus my attention on law clerks, whose figures, albeit conceptually present 
in any description of the judicial organization, are nonetheless often overlooked when 
the study privileges the analysis of  the legal decision or modes of legal reasoning, and 
hence, assigns judges the most salient role. From this view, law clerks are typically 
perceived and portrayed as impersonal and interchangeable in the bureaucratic logic. 
My account, in contrast, suggests that law clerks are not clothed in the aporia 
of bureaucratic indifference. Rather, they emerge as prominent figures of day-to-day 
legal bureaucratic practices. Clerks, as I explain below, can work either for a Supreme 
Court judge or for one of the Court judicial secretaries. They draft legal opinions, 
write memoranda, conduct research, and even may hold private “hearings”242 with 
counsels and the parties to a case. But yet, I refuse to describe them as merely 
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assistants to the judges, who may help them bring about an outcome: the legal 
decision or judgment. Therefore, to appreciate the actual dimension of the clerks’ 
figures as they unfolded in my fieldwork, I propose to examine their interventions 
within the judicial bureaucracy; specifically, to go back to the quintessential practice 
of file-making as described in the previous chapter. Indeed, files, as analytical tools, 
may enact different forms of knowledge of these subjects of bureaucracy, which, 
particularly in the Argentine context, may contribute to move beyond the modern/pre-
modern, objective/subjective, stable/erratic dichotomies through which legal 
bureaucrats’ behaviors are often depicted. In other words, a look at the Court’s 
documentary practices enables a more differentiated portrayal of the knowledge 
relations that develop among judicial bureaucrats.  
Law clerks are first encountered through a schema of division of labor based 
on the clerical posts they are formally assigned within the judicial structure. In this 
light, I will argue, making connections with Marilyn Strathern’s ethnography of 
Melanesia ,243  that the figures of clerks become palpable through the documents they 
create throughout the judicial process. But yet, drawing again on Strathern’s insight, I 
will also argue that the fact that clerks become visible from the vantage point of these 
documents does not preclude them from also being rendered apparent and cognizable 
from another point of view,244 which, however, is not accessible to outsiders. From 
this internal point of view, also instantiated by the circulation of documents (files), 
clerks are apprehended not as documents but as persons themselves. Using a clerk’s 
account of her work, I will attempt to connect these perspectives.  
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Encountering legal expertise: law clerks 
 In addition to the seven Justices—so-called ministros (ministers) in the 
Argentine judicial lexicon—who currently sit on the bench, there are several lawyers 
who work for the Court. Lawyers may clerk for a Court Justice as his or her staff 
attorney, in which case they work as law clerks (secretario or prosecretario letrado) 
in a Justice’s vocalía, that is, a Justice´s office. Alternatively, lawyers may work also 
as law clerks for one of the eight Court judicial secretaries or judicial desks 
(secretarías judiciales), each of which is chaired by a Court clerk, so-called secretario 
de la Corte Suprema or just secretario,245 and specializes in a different branch of law. 
Accordingly, the first secretaría handles Civil and Commercial Law issues; the 
second, cases on Civil and Social Security Law; the third entertains Criminal Law 
matters; the fourth, Administrative Law or Public Law; the sixth, Labor Law; the 
seventh, Tax Law, Customs and Banking affairs; and the eighth studies cases of 
original jurisdiction. The fifth, which had been inactive for years, was recently “re-
launched” as the secretary that handles “cases of institutional importance or of interest 
for the public.”246 Additionally, there is a secretaría of jurisprudence and comparative 
law.  
Both law clerks and Court clerks are called funcionarios judiciales (judicial 
bureaucrats, civil servants), which is indicative of clerks’ high-ranking in the judicial 
hierarchy. Indeed, as many clerks pointed out when I first met then, law clerks hold 
the equivalent ranking of first-instances judges,247 and Court clerks are comparable to 
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appeal court judges.248 The pairing of the figures of clerks with those of judges is 
actually materialized in the salaries that law clerks and Court clerks receive. What 
seems  more important to the day-to-day Court’s practices, however, is the symbolic 
capital249 that these legal experts acquire through their association with judges—
competence, status, authority, are the salient features that differentiate clerks from 
other judicial staff members.250 Nonetheless, the following account by one of my 
subjects, an ex-Court clerk who was appointed later as a court of appeal judge, about 
her reasons for becoming a judge explains what the coupling of judges and clerks 
actually leaves out: 
Certainly I did enjoy the same status there at the Court 
as I am holding now as a judge and earned the same 
salary as an appeal court judge; but after so many years 
in the Court there is a moment in which you do not want 
to write for another person; you want to have 
jurisdiction of your own…Here, in the court of appeals 
it is you, the judge, who holds the authority to 
adjudicate, here you sign your own decision, while in the 
Court there is ‘another’ [the judge] who decides; it does 
not matter that you have drafted yourself the decision; 
what finally matters is who takes it.251  
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The number of Court clerks and law clerks working at the Court has increased 
gradually.  This is particularly so for law clerks.252 In 1990, a Court-packing plan 
promoted by then-President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) that enlarged the Court from 
five to nine Justices,253 also expanded the number of law clerks dramatically: from 
approximately thirty in the 1980s to over 150 by the mid-1990s.254 A few clerks 
among those I interacted during my fieldwork (from August 2005 to March 2007) 
estimated their actual number to be about two hundred.255  
 The post-enlargement Court (so-called “the Menem’s Court”)256 has been 
highly criticized.257  However, these critiques focused on more normative and political 
aspects of the enlarged Court’s workings and decisions. But the enlargement also has 
affected somehow the way in which judicial bureaucrats imagined and performed their 
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sociality. As it emerges from clerks’ accounts, in particular, those who entered the 
Court in the mid-1970s, perceptions about the Court as a site in which people knew 
each other dominated the field;258 “each Ministro (Justice) had only one or two 
clerks,”259 a clerk explained to me. Another clerk, appealing to a kinship metaphor, 
remembers the pre-enlargement Court as a family: “Every morning the justices 
stopped by the clerks’ offices to check if everything was okay and to ask if we needed 
anything…we were like a little family…with the Court’s enlargement, this went out of 
our hands….”260 Remarkably, from another perspective, critical to this clerk’s 
invocation of kinship, a younger clerk makes sense of the family metaphor in these 
terms: “They [older clerks] speak about the ‘Court of 5’ (five justices), an elite 
Court,261 as the best Court ever, not because of its members’ intellectual skills—
actually they were better—but because of the Court's size; it was a small Court and 
they knew one another.”262 She continued, “Though Menenismo263 changed many 
things dramatically in the Court, for the worse, it also made the Court a more 
accessible place.”264   
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Notably, the idea of the Court as a family (or the judiciary, in general), is the 
rubric upon which indigenous representations of the Argentine judicial system are 
usually constructed. Indeed, kinship becomes a ubiquitous analytical category in 
scholars’ attempts to explain not just the Court’s workings but also those of other 
judicial instances,265 to the extent that it is presented as a competing (pre-modern) 
logic defying the judicial bureaucracy’s rationality.266 Accordingly, the judiciary is 
portrayed as a double-faced body: on the one hand, a modern institution, a 
bureaucratic apparatus, governed by universal and general rules; and, on the other 
hand, a world of personal relations characterized by a pervading clientelismo (a 
clientele, patronage system), status, and hierarchy. These apparently contradictory 
“worlds,” the argument goes, nonetheless operate in a relationship of reciprocal 
reflexivity: they feed and complement each other.267 From this point of view, kinship 
is encountered in multiple forms within the judiciary (“it changes according to the 
context and the actor who enunciates it”):268 it can be defined in terms of blood (the 
biological family); or “contingently crafted and mobilized “for specific purposes (i.e. 
appointments and promotions), that is, as “fictive’ kinship.”269 It is even employed in a 
metaphorical meaning when it refers to the “judicial family” (“the union and 
corporative defense of the judicial power”).270 In my opinion, to assume kinship as an 
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encompassing analytical category poses a risk for the analysis itself: while trying to 
make kinship visible—either rooted in biology; or made up by social practices; or yet, 
as a symbol embodied in the “judicial family” metaphor—the analysis takes kinship 
for granted. Consequently, kinship, more than an “influence” on (or the “other face” 
of) modern judicial reason, as previously defined, actually becomes the logic that 
drives the institution’s workings. In this respect, the local judiciary is cast as a 
distorted image of what a judicial system should be; and kinship becomes one of the 
analytical variables through which the local is scrutinized. The comparison, therefore, 
presents kinship as “a deviation of proper bureaucratic practices”;271 in other words, 
the gap between modern bureaucracy and the form in which it is locally practiced. 
Roles  
 The aforementioned separation between vocalías and secretarías that I first 
encountered through a detailed look at the judicial directory, and later apprehended 
through my subjects’ accounts, actually elicits a division of labor inside the Court that 
pivots on clerks’ views of their work in terms of creativity, instrumentality and 
agency. Notably, this division of labor is enacted in relation to the clerical movement 
of files within the judicial institution. For the most part, Supreme Court’s dossiers are 
created upon the texts of appeals to lower courts’ judicial decisions or upon lawsuits 
that are filed before the Court directly. Moreover, dossiers are made up of every 
bureaucratic matter involving the Court’s daily operation, such as staff issues, payroll, 
internal procedure and organization; budget administration and management.272 
Leaving aside the empirical question of whether a file entertains a bureaucratic affair 
or a judicial affair, files are ultimately circulated to the Justices for their opinion. Yet, 
in most of the cases, and depending on the type of appeal in question, they are first 
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reviewed by a secretaría determined by the particular branch of law the case deals 
with. As an example, appeals involving lawsuits filed by bank depositors against the 
“freezing” of their savings in U.S. dollars during the 2001/2002 economic crisis are 
sent to the secretaría or desk that deals with Tax, Customs and Banking issues for a 
legal opinion before their circulation among the Justices. My dossier, given that the 
subject matter was framed as an “administrative” affair at the outset, was sent directly 
to the Court General Administration for review, and later forwarded to the Justices for 
their opinions.  
In this scheme, vocalías (the Justices’ offices) are consistently depicted as the 
venue in which creativity “happens” or “flows,” while judicial secretarías or judicial 
desks are the “instruments” through which Justices know the Court’s previous rulings 
on similar cases. As a secretaría clerk explained to me: “the role of the secretaría is 
just technical; hence, the duty of the secretaría’s staff is to offer the Justices all the 
current available possibilities to help them reach a decision on the new case.” Yet, the 
opposition between creativity (vocalías) and instrumentality (secretarías) that clerks 
pointed out to me, evokes a very powerful image of secretarías as the “guardians” of 
the Court’s precedents and of the secretarías’ chairs (Court clerks) as  “simple 
executors” (meros ejecutores) who manage the circulation of files and assist the 
Justices in this proceeding.273 “You know, a Court clerk is an assistant; who gives the 
orders is someone else [the judge],”274 a Justice’s clerk argued, recalling in this way, 
the existing “gap” between judges and clerks, pointed out by the judge and ex-clerk’s 
account discussed above.  
In contrast to this, the data shows that those who work for the justices do not 
themselves seem bound by the Court's precedents as the secretaría’s staff attorneys 
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do. Indeed, at the vocalías, “you can choose,” as one Justice’s clerk argued, furthering 
this idea of creativity, which she experienced as the possibility to make “new” law, 
leaving aside the precedents.275 In a similar sense, another Justice’s clerk stated: “you 
can create the decision with the Ministro (Justice).”276 Yet, in the course of an 
interview, a law clerk explained to me how she had to change her discursive practices 
according to the clerical post she held at the Court—first she had been assigned to 
clerk for the “Court” in a secretaría; and later, she clerked just for a Justice, in a 
vocalía. “In the first case, I had to address my legal opinions to the entire Court, to all 
Justices…I wrote my opinions to the Court as an institution…; whereas in the second 
case, I drafted the opinions only for my Ministro ... I had to write as if I were him … I 
wrote only for myself [the Justice].”277  
Nonetheless, as I observed, the scheme of creativity versus instrumentality on 
which my subjects draw is not as rigid as the clerks’ portrayal would lead one to 
believe. On the contrary, it leaves room for both subtle and meaningful variations on 
the roles my subjects depict, in particular, those played by the clerks in the 
secretarías. For instance, a clerk of a secretaría, whose account drew heavily on the 
idea of secretarías as only technical bodies, told me that despite the fact she did not 
work for any particular Justice, she had been “called” (consulted) directly by the 
Justices on several occasions due to her expertise in a very specific sub-field of law 
(“very technical, with no political implications”).278 I return to this particular point 
further below. Along the same lines, the chair of one of the secretarías mentioned that 
his supervision of the circulation of the file was hardly a bureaucratic proceeding; in 
some instances his intervention became a significant tool for reaching a majority 
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opinion, he said to me very proudly. Equally proud of his work, a clerk from a 
secretaría told me about an opinion he had just drafted in a case (involving a 
fundamental right issue, as he made it clear) in this way: 
Clerk:  I drafted that opinion based on my philosophical 
beliefs. I strongly draw on natural law, and the rationale 
of the opinion cites natural law arguments. I could not 
have done it, but I did it.  
Leticia: So, why did you do it?  
Clerk: Because I have to be congruent with myself; 
because the Court has drawn previously on natural law, 
and also there is a large tradition that precedes my pre-
comprehension.  I cannot put my personal beliefs only 
because I want to do it. I back my opinions on thousands 
of authors and on the Court´s case law with similar 
arguments.279 
As the above accounts suggests, the binary vocalías and secretarías works on a 
discourse that both furthers and denies the autonomy of human agents. At vocalías, 
agency is acknowledged by the (law clerks’) possibility to leave aside precedents, and 
to “create” the law. Agency and creativity, therefore, appear as identical features, and, 
implicit in this association is the assumption that agency—like creativity—is linked to 
will or intention.280 Now, turning to the secretarías, my subjects’ discourses elaborate 
on a form of agency that rejects the autonomy of human agents by stressing the 
technical and instrumental role of the secretaría’s staff attorneys, who come to value 
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the constraints of their agency in the service of “papering” things or being the voice of 
the Court’s precedents.   
  Further, in the context of the practices that I observed within the Court, the 
displacement of agency that operates in the secretarías draws attention to their clerks’ 
commitment to conform their workings to an ideal model of adjudication. Here, 
judicial bureaucrats are seen as operators of a machine; or “operators of the law,”281 as 
they are commonly referred to in the literature of the civil law tradition. In this sense, 
the constraint of agency that emerges in the clerks’ view of their work might constitute 
a rhetorical tool for the maintenance of bureaucracy’s rationality, since it ultimately 
works to cast these subjects’ workings on a rational and objective basis. In other 
words, “they [Court bureaucrats] present a version of themselves as they would like to 
be seen,” to borrow Strathern’s terms.282 An anecdote told by a secretaría staff 
attorney shows how this modality of agency is deeply embedded in judicial 
bureaucrats’ consciousness and social practices:283 a draft containing a legal opinion 
on a case was sent back to the secretaría that had drafted it because it conveyed the 
opinion of the chair of the secretaría rather than that of the Court.284   
Yet, one could find analogies between this modality of agency in which these 
clerks see themselves as “instruments” and “mediators” and what Miyazaki has termed 
in his study of a community of religious practitioners in Fiji, the “abeyance of 
agency.”285 According to Miyazaki, one way to understand agency abeyance is to view 
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it as the ultimate strategic act of rhetorical manipulation;286 though he is far from 
endorsing the conceptualizations of the abeyance of agency as purely strategic—e.g. 
either as an excuse for human agency,287 or as a tool for controlling risks.288  
Subjects as Documents 
 In the internal organization of the judicial bureaucracy, persons are easily 
identified by the positions they hold inside the institution. A careful reading of the 
large Supreme Court’s Directory (Guía Judicial) was useful in this sense. People are 
listed in alphabetical order according to the functions they are assigned within the 
institution, which helped me outline a scheme of division of labor within the 
institution and orient my inquiry.  My encounter with judicial bureaucrats worked 
largely on the basis that their names were referred to me by their colleagues or found 
in the judicial nomenclature due to the posts these people held and the functions they 
were said to perform in the judicial apparatus, for instance, clerks study the cases and 
draft legal opinions; judges decide upon these drafts.   
Underlying this view, furthered by the clerks’ above descriptions about their 
workings in the Court, is the notion that persons and things are interchangeable; that is 
to say, the subjects of decision-making practices are apprehended through the texts 
and documents they create; in other words, persons are “objectified” by the things they 
produce.289 From this perspective, the subjects of judicial practices are narrated, 
described, and understood through their interventions in the judicial process, which, as 
I mentioned in the previous section, take place within the contours of the dossier. 
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Consequently, creativity and instrumentality are categories which might work for 
either persons or their labor, in the understanding that persons can be identified by the 
documents they make. This point is illustrated by Alain Pottage (building his 
argument on Marilyn Strathern’s ethnographic analogy): “Things [in a commodity 
economy] are cast as independent forces in the world, and the agency of persons is 
distinguished or disclosed by their interventions in, or modifications of these forces. 
The agency of persons is therefore understood in terms of an idiom of labor, or 
productivity, so that personal relations are reified in the composition of things.” 290  
 In Marilyn Strathern’s view, objectification is understood as “the manner in 
which persons and things are construed as having value, that is, are objects of people’s 
subjective regard or of their creation.”291 Moreover, in Strathern’s account, 
objectification becomes a basis of comparison between two economies—Euro-
American commodity economy, on the one hand; and Melanesia gift economy, on the 
other—with the assumption that this artifact enables simultaneous perceptions of 
similar and different process in each.292 As Pottage explains, Strathern’s ambition is to 
enact an analogical counterpart to the cultural domain of Euro-America, a perspective 
from which the presuppositions and contexts of that domain can be made visible.293  
If we take symbols as the mechanisms through which 
people make the world known (objectify it), these 
mechanisms themselves may or may not be an explicit 
source of their knowledge practices. The commodity 
logic of Westerners leads them to search for knowledge 
about things (and persons as things); the gift logic of 
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Melanesians to make known to themselves persons (and 
things as persons). For the one makes an explicit 
practice out of apprehending the nature or character 
(convention) of objects, the other their capabilities or 
animate powers (invention). If I call these practices 
reification and personification then, in the first case 
people are making objects appear as things, in the 
second as persons.294  
Role Players  
Strathern’s description about these two modes of objectification, of persons 
and things in commodity and gift exchange economies, helps elaborate on the different 
perspectives from which the subjects of bureaucratic practices become apparent and 
cognizable. Accordingly, as I indicated above, the subjects of Court documentary 
practices are mostly regarded through their interventions in the files. Personhood, 
therefore, is grasped in the practice of “papering,” that is, in the practice of creating 
the judicial dossier. However, from another point of view, this commonsensical 
routine of circulation of files may also render the subjects of Court documentary 
practices visible, not just as objects or things, but as relations and persons. In other 
words, if persons can be grasped through the forms of the things they produce, as 
previously described, they also may be revealed as persons, that is, “as positions from 
which people perceive one another.”295 Here, I have in mind the relations of 
knowledge that the circulation of files discloses, though in a mode in which they 
remain concealed from view.296 From the vantage of these relations, the subjects of the 
legal bureaucracy can be seen in their quality of relations/persons.  
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Under the gift exchange logic, Strathern argues, specific relations are created 
“through the separation of persons from one another”; and, it is through relations that 
persons are defined in respect of one another;297 but “relations are personified in the 
separation of persons to the extent that persons (continue to) (thereby) have an effect 
on one another.”298 Gifts, she explains, reify or objectify the capacities and powers 
contained in persons/relations. Relations are “endowed with effect, in anticipation 
of—or in commemoration of—being activated,” although the effectiveness of 
relations “depends on the form in which certain objects appear.”299 I do not seek to 
compare Court dossiers with Hageners’ wealth items; nor the circulation of files with 
gift exchange rituals. However, in one sense this analogy may work: it indicates a 
similar aesthetic effect. Accordingly, the dossier, like the transacted resource in the 
gift, holds out the possibility to elicit and actualize personal capacities.  
As I explained in the previous chapter, regardless of how files are initiated,300 
the practices of the various figures involved in document-making seem to converge in 
one particular action: the practice of file circulation (circulación del expediente). The 
circulation of the dossiers is manifested in different dimensions: materially, in the 
quotidian passage of carts saturated with files that are pulled by the Court’s staff along 
the corridors of the Palacio de Tribunales (the Palace of Tribunals, home of the 
Supreme Court)—an aesthetically powerful ritual; and virtually, in the check of 
electronic records. Both rituals lend regularity to the file circulation practice, 
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quintessential to any bureaucratic organization, making both the institution’s 
documents and subjects knowable.  
In addition to this, I also explained that the material circulation of files within 
the institution produces an effervescence of textuality that manifests into resolutions, 
legal opinions, memoranda, reports, conclusions; documents are attached—as different 
layers—to the dossier. This clerical movement of files can be tracked through the 
check of the Court’s electronic records,301 which makes possible, as in my own case, 
to follow up the status of dossiers. However, in the process of tracking down one’s 
file, one is presented with a version of the file in which all but its ends—or the file’s 
top (an appeal or a lawsuit) and bottom (a decision or the final ruling in the case) 
layers—remain concealed from view. In other words, the whole argumentative sphere 
is missing. I am not interested here in uncovering the conceptual structure of Court’s 
judgments that the apparent “bifurcation” of its discursive practices may articulate;302 
nor in the “meaning” and the “politics” underlying these documents.303 I examine 
extensively these aspects in the next chapter.304 Rather, by pointing to the documents 
that bureaucratic practices veil, I elaborate on the mode in which documents make 
persons and relations visible within the contours of the judicial apparatus. From this 
perspective, the composite of arguments, opinions, conclusions, and even the recount 
of facts usually assembled in the memorandum that accompanies the legal opinion 
(proyecto de sentencia) in a case, are relevant not so much as the foundation of a 
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decision that may or may not be accessible to others, but as the forms in which 
persons unfold and are “constituted as persons in regard of others.”305  
This insight was first suggested to me by the Court officer’s denial of access to 
the rationale of the decision on my dossier, on the basis that the documents containing 
such a rationale were only for internal circulation, from which I was excluded in my 
petitioner capacity.306 Later, this idea about the subjects of the judicial bureaucracy 
becoming apparent not in the form of the documents they create, but as persons 
themselves, was even more palpable in these subjects’ own descriptions of the 
circulation of files. For instance, in one of the interviews that I conducted with law 
clerks, one of them (a Justice’s clerk) stated that the memorandum enclosed in the file 
was something “written to us,”307 meaning by "us" the people who study the case and 
write legal opinions. She explained further: “the case must be studied, and the memo 
reflects such study; it is to persuade the other, the people who will read the file.” 
Indeed, the memo is perceived as the venue that makes discussion possible, since 
arguments and counter-arguments are deployed and exhausted beyond the external 
scrutiny.308 But more importantly, as I describe below, it is in this commonsensical 
bureaucratic practice of writing, amending, and discarding memoranda through which 
the subjects that create these documents are elicited.   
In the secretarías, memoranda are generally initialed, a practice that not only 
enables identification through the physical presence of the author’s initials on the 
document,309 but according to some of the law clerks also evidences the secretaría 
chair’s (Court clerk) deference to his staff lawyers’ professional skills. At one of the 
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secretaría, a law clerk who had held previously a clerical post at a Justice’s office 
confessed to me that her newly adopted practice of initialling her memoranda actually 
helped her overcome the feeling of being pulled back by her relocation from a vocalía 
to a secretaría. “Initially, I felt like a sort of political devaluation (devaluación 
política);” and she explained to me that clerking for a Justice implied some managerial 
advantages for her: “if you need something it is most likely that you get it faster if you 
work for a Justice than in any other place in the Court.”310 However, she told me that 
she had realized that to work in a secretaría was good “because you are not an 
anonymous person anymore.”311 She recounted that as a Justice’s clerk she used to 
work in a team and that her drafting of legal opinions for the Justice was a collective 
rather than an isolated effort. In contrast to this, “in a secretaría, you have to sign in 
(to write your initials on) your work for it to be identified and criticized by others.”312 
In her view, this act of identification made herself gain her colleagues’ “recognition” 
and “respect” as an expert in her field of law; “they even praised my writing,” she 
proudly confided to me.313  
In this context, the name of the author of the legal document (the clerk) may 
unfold the same “indicative” and “descriptive” functions as proper names.314 
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Nonetheless, that the clerks’ names are actually stamped on the documents that they 
make becomes incidental to the “individuating” effect of these documents in their 
bureaucratic circuit within the Court. As a few clerks mentioned to me, they were able 
to identify who wrote the memoranda on the cases of their specialty (e.g. public law, 
banking) even where the writer’s identity is not disclosed. “There are many people 
here, in the Court, but we know each other,”315 was one clerk’s explanation for her 
ability to identify the authors of anonymous memoranda and legal opinions that come 
for her review. In other words, regardless of the author’s name on a given document, 
the bureaucratic knowledge acquired through the routinization and specialization of 
tasks in long term office316 supplies the basis for identification and recognition. In this 
context, authorship, if claimed by the subjects that create these documents, does not 
entail an exercise of ownership of individual labor or of a particular piece of work. 
Rather, it becomes a mode of making personal capacities visible and recognizable 
among peers. A law clerk summarized this recognition’s effect in terms of trust and 
confidence. As she told me, the fact that she knew who wrote a memo in a case that 
came for her review would influence her level of confidence about the legal analysis 
and solution that person proposed in the document. “I know the person,” she said to 
me, “I know how she works, how she thinks, and how serious and reliable her work 
can be…If I trust her, it is most likely that I will agree with her legal opinion about the 
issues discussed in the case; but if I do not share her opinion, I am sure that she 
reached such a conclusion because she saw things that probably I have overlooked at 
first sight.”317 
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Putting the pieces together  
At this point, I would like to return to the description that one of my subjects, a 
law clerk, made of her work at one of the Court’s secretarías. As she explained to me, 
her role in the Court consisted of giving expert advice on a very specific and technical 
sub-field of law, “with no political implications.” She provided this emphasis to make 
it clear that she would keep herself apart from any “external” influence (whatever it is) 
that, in her view, might compromise her judgment. For instance, she would not meet 
the counsels or the parties of a case to hear informally their arguments, an ordinary 
practice in the Argentine Court: “I don’t need them [the parties’ arguments] to reach 
my opinion in a case…I read every file page; I read everything that is written [in the 
file]; and what is not, that will not make me change my mind.”318 Likewise, if she had 
to choose between her clerical post at the secretaría and a clerical position for a 
Justice in particular, she would decide to maintain her current position, as it would be 
difficult for her to keep her legal expertise if she worked at a vocalía: “Justices’ clerks 
have to be more versatile,” she asserted.319 In this clerk’s view, clerks’ meetings with 
the parties, or even her potential abandoning of her field of specialization are 
perceived as “a failure of knowledge”320—a failure of her own knowledge and unique 
role as a legal “technician”—as these circumstances represent a “deviation from 
proper bureaucratic practices,”321 that is to say, from rational and objective 
adjudication.  
While describing her professional tasks, this clerk insisted on the idea that she 
gave only technical legal advice, that she drafted technical legal opinions and that she 
discussed only technical issues in the memoranda she wrote for the Court; she even 
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saw herself as a technician.322 Consequently, the clerk gives an account of herself 
through her interventions in the process of judicial lawmaking: the documents she 
produces. From this perspective, these documents are the means through which the 
clerk’s knowledge is unfolded and apprehended. In other words, she becomes 
knowable in terms of her labor or productivity within the legal bureaucracy.  
Nonetheless, as I described above, another way in which the subjects of this 
regime of documentary practices are made apparent is not in the form of the 
documents (things) they create, but as persons themselves. Files stage a relation 
between the participants of these documentary practices through which their personal 
capacities are elicited and actualized. From this point of view, which the practice of 
adjudication keeps concealed from view, each participant is differentiated as a 
particular person and apprehended in her or his specific capacities. Seen from this 
perspective, the anecdote told by the same clerk about the Justices’ call for her expert 
advice, also noted earlier, becomes even more meaningful, as illustrative of my 
argument: “They [the Justices] have listened to me, they had confidence in me,” she 
affirmed while recalling that episode323 This effect of individuation324 that the clerk’s 
account points out takes places throughout the circuit that files complete within the 
Court. To put it in different words, the circulation of files, imagined as a sort of 
ceremonial exchange, supplies, “the context or vehicle for this constitutive display of 
[personal] capacities.”325 However, as I have demonstrated, persons are not 
immediately available; they are accessible depending on the forms in which they 
appear326 throughout the institution’s documentary practices.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FILLING IN THE GAPS 
 
 The organization of the Argentine system of government, and of the 
judiciary in particular, was inspired by the United States Constitution;327 and even the 
judicial review doctrine that grants courts the authority to declare the 
unconstitutionality of laws has been acknowledged in the Argentine Court’s 
jurisprudence as “implicit” in the text of the Constitution, mimicking the development 
and tradition of judicial review in the United States.328  
 Drawing comparisons between the two systems—not to mention the 
workings of the Supreme Courts of these two jurisdictions—appears to be a 
temptation that both scholars329 and even judicial bureaucrats in my field cannot resist. 
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What is more, being that the U.S. Court’s workings are the source of inspiration for 
the Argentine judicial system, they have become, in many senses, the ideal against 
which the workings of the Argentine tribunal are checked. Accordingly, the role, 
status, and number of clerks in the U.S. Court, the tribunal’s exercise of the writ of 
certiorari and the control it exercises upon its docket, the practice of delivery of oral 
arguments before the bench, the amicus curiae mechanism, and, to a lesser extent, the 
stare decisis doctrine followed by U.S. courts in general, are usually the features that 
prompt a comparison between the two institutions.330 Notably, in this comparative 
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schema, the U.S. Court’s practices are assimilated to the Argentine legal regime—the 
one embedded in the Federal Constitution, which, however has not yet in practice 
lived up to its theoretical promises. This argument becomes apparent in the words of a 
civil rights activist and executive director of an NGO: “we are not importing foreign 
[U.S.] legal systems and ideas; all our proposals are in the [Argentine] 
Constitution,”331 he indicated. Therefore, as the statement suggests, the Constitution 
compels the Court with an “ought to be” that current legal practices fail to achieve. 
 In my opinion, this comparative instance, as observed in the local legal 
academia, works, in fact, to point out the now canonical distinction between “law in 
the books” and “law in action.”332 In other words, these kinds of comparisons prompt 
to diagnose the existing gap between the legal norm (and hence the U.S. Court’s legal 
practices to which it is assimilated), and its realization in local legal practices.  
 Also importantly, as I will show later, in accounting for this gap, the 
comparative effort draws either on a notion of law as a set of practices and institutions 
that can be transferred from one jurisdiction to another333 or on a notion of law as the 
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reflection of a unique socio-cultural order.334 In either way, what is at the center of the 
discussion is “the inevitable loss of knowledge” in the gap between the two practices: 
the original and the transferred practice.  
 In this chapter, I participate partially in the comparative trend by examining a 
particular practice that I observed within the Argentine Supreme Court: the mode in 
which the Court exercises its power to decide what cases to review and what cases to 
discard. The mechanism, it is argued, borrows from the United States Supreme 
Court’s practice of writ of certiorari. However, I do not intend to draw a comparative 
analysis between how the practice of the certiorari is performed in these two 
jurisdictions. Nor to point out the gap between the original and the imported one—by 
definition the latter cannot be identical with the original one.335 Rather, I propose to 
obviate what scholars and judicial bureaucrats point as “lost” in the “translation" of 
the practice of certiorari, that is, the gap between these two practices as they are 
performed in the American and Argentine settings, and to focus on the knowledge that 
this gap actually elicits. In so doing, I take up Tom Boellstorff’s insight about the 
possibility of “dubbing” as a mode that “forges meaning through the holding-together 
of the otherwise incompatible.”336 Nothing is lost in dubbing, notes Boellstorff, 
because it is built around an absence337—in contrast to translation, which is always 
“haunted by its inevitable failure.” As he explains: “There is no asymptotic 
melancholia because there is no fantasy of eliminating the gap in service of perfected 
meaning. For dubbing, the gap is the meaning.338  
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As I will describe in this chapter, not only is the idea of this existing gap 
between different legal practices what triggers my present analysis. A gap of another 
kind, found in the Court’s document-making practices, is actually this chapter’s 
ethnographic milieu. Indeed, it was through my encounter of this gap that I could 
access ethnographically the particular Court’s knowledge-making practice that I 
examine in this essay.  
Finding the Gap  
 In one of the multiple visits I paid to the Court administrative office to follow 
up the status of my dossier, I was informed that a decision on the request had been 
reached; “there is a providencia”339 (a decision), I was told. That visit took place in 
early June 2006, approximately seven months after the dossier was initiated. On that 
occasion, I was also told that the decision in question had been forwarded along with 
the corresponding oficio—an official communication letter—to the Cornell Law 
School petitioners: to my thesis supervisor and the Dean for Graduate Legal Studies 
who had signed the original introductory letters, which I had delivered to each of the 
then eight Supreme Court Justices in October 2005.340 I mentioned to the member of 
the Court’s staff on duty that I had not been informed about such a decision, to which 
he responded that it had happened due to the fact that formally I was not considered a 
petitioner in such a case—the file, however, was named after me and I had written 
down my contact information on the letters that I assumed gave birth to the dossier. 
Nonetheless, after making sure that I was indeed “an interested party” by verifying my 
identity, the Court officer agreed to give me a “non-official” copy of the decision. He 
came to the front desk where I was waiting with a bundle of papers, all of them 
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containing information on my case. He pulled out the sheet with the decision, which 
he handed to me. I quickly read the decision (Figure 9):  
Buenos Aires, May 24, 2006 
Dossier 3737/05  
Let it be known to the petitioners that the Ministers 
[Justices], having been made aware of the presentation 
of pages 1/4, decided to not allow the requested access, 
without any prejudice against the possibility of carrying 
out ordinary research in the Central Library of the Court 
(italics added).  
Signature: Nicolás Alfredo Reyes 
 Supreme Court  
 General Manager341 
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Figure 9. Decision in Dossier No. 3737/05 
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I then asked the Court’s employee if I could read the entire file, assuming that 
the rationale for that decision was in the pages I was not given to read. He said that the 
information I was asking for “belonged to the [Court’s] internal circulation,” which I 
could not access. I asked to see at least the rationale, but he replied that I could not 
read that either. Then, mobilizing my legal skills, I said that I would submit a written 
petition to the Court to access the dossier. The employee responded that I could 
certainly request to look at the dossier (pedir vista del expediente), though he 
anticipated that “they would not show me the fundamentos (rationale) of the decision.” 
342
  
Consequently, on June 22, 2006, I submitted to Court General Administrator a 
formal request to access the content of the dossier, making explicit in my petition that 
I was also asking to read to the decision’s rationale. Almost two months later, on 
August 17, 2006, the Administration issued an official communication letter, which 
was addressed to me on this occasion, informing of another providencia granting me 
access to the dossier. Nonetheless, once I had the dossier in my hands, I noticed that, 
in contrast to the thick piles of documents that I had seen in the clerks’ offices and 
carried out in carts in the judicial premises, my dossier consisted only of eleven pages, 
four of which were the introductory letter (and its Spanish translation) addressed to the 
President of the Court (Chief Justice) signed by my thesis supervisor and the Cornell 
Assistant Dean for Graduate Legal Studies. The rest of the dossier contained the short 
text of the decision and the official communications addressed to my thesis supervisor 
and to the dean at Cornell Law School; my request to access the file; the decision 
which allowed me the access requested; and lastly, the notification through which the 
Administration office informed me that I was granted permission to read the file.343  
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That moment, I must confess, was disruptive. On the one hand, as a claimant 
myself I seemed to have only part of the story: after an almost ten-month process, I 
was presented with a version of my dossier in which all but its ends—the top (the 
petition) and the bottom layers (the decisions)—remained concealed from public view. 
However, on the other hand, as an ethnographer, I was aware of the textual process 
through which opinions and judgments are shaped and annexed to dossiers along the 
circuit they complete within the Court. In other words, during my fieldwork in the 
Court I had encountered and observed a whole argumentative sphere which as a 
petitioner to the Court I was completely missing. Although the effect of being in such 
a situation was confusing, it was however effective in reinforcing my position as 
participant-observer:344 the reaction that I was experiencing regarding the final 
decision on my request was much like any other claimant’s reaction when she fails to 
get from the Court a positive response—though, I must confess, I was reacting more to 
the impossibility to find out the reasons for the denial than to the denial itself, as I was 
vaguely expecting that decision.  
More importantly, as I examined the form and organization of the dossier I was 
given to read and the format of the final decision, I realized that I was also looking at 
the mode through which the tribunal dismisses or rejects the cases that are filed to it, a 
practice constantly referred to by my interlocutors at the Court in their descriptions of 
the tribunal’s workings. This practice works to exclude from the Court’s jurisdiction 
those matters that are deemed to interfere or obstruct the fulfillment of its authentic 
role. In other words, it helps the Court to keep itself apart from what Barbara 
Yngvesson has called the “garbage cases.”345 This mode of operation, as I will 
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describe further below, is essential to the Court’s establishment/production of its 
authority. 
Gatekeeping and Exclusion  
In the Massachusetts court system that Yngvesson studies, garbage cases are 
those cases that involve citizen petty complaints, that is to say, “a broad range of 
conflicts in the family, the neighborhood, or the work place.”346 These cases are 
actually regarded as so insignificant by courts’ officials that they are “out of place at 
the court” to the extent that even the trial court’s Standards of Judicial Practice in 
Massachusetts urges clerks “to refrain from initiating criminal proceedings [in these 
petty cases] where the conflict can be fairly resolved by something else”;347 and yet, 
they are generally dismissed by clerks or withdrawn by the plaintiffs themselves 
during the initial stages of the process.348 Dismissals, argues Yngvesson, constitute the 
court “as a place where ‘garbage cases’ are excluded so serious problems of order can 
be dealt with,”349 even though these (garbage) cases amount to “as much of the court’s 
work as the criminal charges by which its official business is measured….”350 That is 
to say, what Yngvesson is pointing out is that exclusion not only protects courts from 
what are regarded as ‘frivolous’ matters, it also works to shape the courts’ authority 
by allowing the court to classify certain cases as garbage cases and others as cases 
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worthy of attention; and hence to exclude certain kinds of relationships, people, and 
knowledge.351 
One way to interpret the exclusion of garbage cases from courts’ jurisdiction is 
to take courts’ gatekeeping practices at their face value; that is, as a mechanism that 
operates to protect courts from “frivolous matters” in order to keep the docket down or 
under control. However, as Yngvesson’s insight suggests, exclusion and gatekeeping 
practices are actually constitutive of judicial authority. In the Massachusetts local 
court system that she studies, the clerk is positioned at the imaginary juncture of two 
domains, the public and the private, which she contributes to by reproducing and 
distinguishing “crime” (serious and public stuff, matter of law) from “garbage” 
(mundane and private, and out of court). Seen in this light, the ethos of the court 
would lay within the dynamic tension between what courts can do and what they 
cannot do.  
  The practice of gatekeeping, argues Yngvesson (building her argument on 
Michel de Certau), becomes “a way of using imposed systems, a practice of the order 
constructed by others [that] redistributes its space,” creating “a certain play in that 
order, a space for maneuvers” (italics in the orginal).352 In her account, clerk’s 
practices of naming crime and revealing rights, that is, of naming law and excluding 
garbage, is a form of tool through which the law can be made known. Specifically, she 
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finds in her fieldsite the hearings before the clerk as the space where law’s power is 
limited and extended “through a clerk ‘who connects, by separation, classes and 
discourses.”353 Yet, in Yngvesson’s account, the clerk’s capacity for maneuver 
depends in part on who the clerk is—different institutions enable clerks differently.  
Making the Court a proper place of Law  
In Yngvesson’s study hearings before the clerk play a crucial role as a 
gatekeeping practice (“the clerk is like a watchdog”).354 In the Argentine Court, 
exclusion of garbage cases operates on more diffuse grounds; it unfolds in the 
exchanges and practices of legal officials that develop around the dossiers which 
circulate for review. In the previous chapter I presented the schema of labor division 
that I encountered in the Argentine Supreme Court based on the clerical posts that 
clerks formally hold within the judicial structure.355 Clerks, therefore, can work either 
for a Supreme Court judge (at a judge’s office or vocalia) or for one of the Court 
judicial secretaries or judicial desks (secretarias judiciales). Such a division of labor, I 
explained, pivots on clerks’ views of their roles in terms of creativity, instrumentality 
and agency. As a result, vocalias are portrayed as the venue where clerks can help 
Justices “create” the law—in clerks’ accounts, as the possibility of “making new law” 
by leaving aside the precedents356—vis-à-vis the view of clerks’ roles as merely 
technical or instrumental in the secretarias, where clerks’ papering practices are 
deemed the “voice” of the Court’s precedents.357 However, as I also explained, the 
binary creativity versus instrumentality through which the clerks’ roles are indexed is 
not as fixed or static as my subjects’ accounts would lead one to believe. Clerks’ roles 
are enacted daily in relation with the clerical movement of dossiers within the judicial 
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institution, that is, through clerks’ own documentary practices (e.g. their writing of 
memoranda, drafting of proposals for a judicial decision on a given case). Indeed, this 
commonsensical document-making practice creates room for both subtle and 
meaningful variations on the a priori creativity/instrumentality divide that clerks 
account for.358 And yet, it is this practice that activates clerks’ capacities to “name” the 
law (the cases that the Court should take) and to indicate what cases should be 
removed from the tribunal gaze. In other words, regardless of how clerks give account 
of themselves—whether as truly law-makers or mere law executors—or of the mode 
in which their roles are actually elicited in my fieldsite, I want to foreground judicial 
bureaucrats’ everyday papering practices as acts of “naming” or of “instituting”—
glossing Bourdieu and Yngvesson359—and, as such, as gatekeeping practices that 
work to keep the Court proper as a place of law by defining what is a matter of law 
(public and subject to judicial consideration) and what is banal (“garbage”) and should 
be kept in the realm of the private.360 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a strong 
belief that the Court is a place dominated by problems that should be out of the Court 
persists among my subjects. I would like to recall here the Argentine Supreme Court 
Justice’s metaphor of the “general store” criticizing the Court’s becoming everything 
but a highly specialized tribunal;361 or the clerk’s complaint against the “cases that 
should not be here [in the Court].”362 
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 Ibid. 
359
 Bourdieu identifies acts of judging as performative utterances, as they succeed in creating things, 
situations “in which no one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.” The 
law, Bourdieu argues, “is the quintessential form of ‘active’ discourse, able by its own operation to 
produce its effects.” Bourdieu, “The Force of Law,” 387.  
360
 Fieldnotes, July 28, 2006. 
361
 See Chapter One of this dissertation  
362
 Interview, June 22, 2006. 
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The “negative” certiorari  
Among the different mechanisms through which access to the Supreme Court s 
controlled,363 the most relevant—and controversial—is the one prescribed in Section 
280 first paragraph of the Federal Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure 
(hereinafter “the 280,” as it is used in the Court staff’s language).364 This mechanism 
was thought as a remedy for the dramatic enlargement of the Court docket in the last 
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 As I briefly indicated in supra note 327, the jurisdiction of federal courts (the Supreme Court and 
lower courts) is established in the Constitution. Section 116 sets up the contours of federal courts’ 
jurisdiction: in “all matters regulated by the Constitution and the laws enacted under its authority; the 
treaties made with foreign nations; all cases concerning ambassadors, public ministers and foreign 
consuls; cases related to admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; matters in which the Nation shall be a 
party; actions arising between two or more provinces, between one province and the inhabitants of 
another province; between the inhabitants of different provinces, and between one province or the 
inhabitants thereof against a foreign state or citizen.” With respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, Section 117 establishes that in all the aforementioned matters, the Court’s jurisdiction is 
“appellate” with the regulations and exceptions that Congress may prescribe, though it also makes clear 
that in the matters concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers and consults, and in those in which a 
province is a party, the Court exercises “original and exclusive” jurisdiction. A reader familiar with the 
U.S. Court’s system probably will notice the commonalities between these texts and that of Article III, 
Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States. In addition to the Constitution, the Court’s original 
jurisdiction is regulated by Section 23 (last part) and Section 24, subsection 1 of the decree-law 1285 of 
1958. See: María Cecilia Hockl and David Duarte, Competencias y atribuciones de la Corte Suprema 
de Justicia de la Nación (Buenos Aires: Legis, 2005) 45. For their part, cases of appellate jurisdiction, 
as defined in Sections 116, 117, and in the first part of the Constitution establishing Declarations, 
Rights and Guarantees (matters of federal law) can be reviewed through two main mechanisms: 
ordinary appeal (recurso ordinario) and extraordinary appeal (recurso extraordinario). Ordinary 
appeals are governed by Section 24, subsection 6: cases in which the federal government is a party, 
directly or indirectly, if the sum at issue exceeds a specific amount; cases of criminal extradition; cases 
involving naval embargoes. Extraordinary appeals, in turn, are used to remedy violations to the 
Constitution, and federal laws and procedures. They are established in Law 48, August 25, 1863, R.N. 
1863-1869, 49,  Section 14 (1863); Law 4055 section 6; Decree-law No. 1285, February 4, 1958, B. O. 
18581, 1,  Section 24, Subsection 2; and the Federal Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, Sections 
280 and 285. Legal scholars point toward the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 25 as the source of 
Law 48 (on jurisdiction of federal courts and Supreme Court’s jurisdiction). See: Jonathan Miller, 
Susana Cayuso and María Angélica Gelli, Constitución y Poder Político, jurisprudencia de la Corte 
Suprema y técnicas para su interpretación (Buenos Aires: Astrea, 1995) 413-14; Lino Enrique Palacio, 
Manual de Derecho Procesal, Decimotercera Edicion Actualizada (Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 
1997) 102.  
364
 As it emerges from the statistics compiled by the Argentine Judicial Power in the year 2006 (the 
latest available information), 2,333 appeals filed to the Court were rejected based on Section 280, out of 
a total of 4,926 appeals rejected. This data excludes appeals filed in the Court by retirees which are 
recorded separately. Thus, if we add the number of these latter appeals that were rejected on the 280 
grounds (610), the figure rises to 2,943 (out of a total of 5,654 appeals rejected in 2006). See: Poder 
Judicial de la Nación, Oficina de Estadísticas, 
http://www.pjn.gov.ar/99_varios/estadisticas/Libros/Estadi_06/Indice06.htm (accessed August 12, 
2008). 
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decades,365 as it grants the Court discretionary power to deny applications for 
extraordinary appeal366 when the alleged breach to federal law or federal question does 
not suffice to hear the case, or the issues involved are not substantial or not 
transcendent.367 That is to say, through this statutory provision, the Court is entitled to 
refuse to hear a given extraordinary appeal without giving any reason of denial to the 
parties (as in my case). It is a matter of judicial discretion—Court’s “good judgment” 
(sana discreción) as provided by the statute.  
The Court’s judgment resulting from the application of the rule of Section 280 
is presented in the form of a laconic and formulaic decision, to the extent that Court 
staff refers to it ordinarily as the “template” or formula 1 (“the template is the 
                                                 
365
 Since the 1950s the use of both the extraordinary appeal and the appeals submitted for review of 
denial of extraordinary appeals has grown dramatically to the extent that these kinds of appeals far 
exceed the use of the ordinary appeal. The excessive growth of these two appeals (recurso 
extraordinario and recurso de queja) has been due to two doctrines created by the Supreme Court itself: 
the question of “arbitrariness” or “arbitrary decision” (arbitrariedad or sentencia arbitraria) and the 
question of “imperative institutional importance” (gravedad institutional), which, in fact, expanded the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction beyond its legal regulation, permitting the tribunal to hear cases that did 
not meet the requirements for extraordinary appeals or did not involve strictly federal questions. See, 
e.g.: Genaro Carrió, “Don Quijote en el Palacio de Justicia (La Corte Suprema y sus problemas),” La 
Ley, T 1989-E Sec. Doctrina,1131-49, 1143. As a way to counteract the relentless enlargement of the 
Court docket resulting from the Court’s increasing reliance on these two doctrines, Congress amended 
the federal procedural code Sections 280 and 285 granting the Court the discretionary power to reject 
extraordinary appeals. See: Supreme Court bylaw No. 44  C.S.J.N. 312  Fallos 1515-1519 (1989); 
María Angélica Gelli, “Dilemas del Recurso Extraordinario Federal” La Ley T 2004-Sec. Doctrina, 
1306-7; Augusto M. Morello and Ramiro González Cuello,“La competencia de la Corte Suprema: 
presente y futuro”, La Ley, T. 2005-E, 1014-1026. 
366
 Extraordinary appeals are filed to the lower court whose decision is being challenged. This court 
may either grant or reject the appeal. If the extraordinary appeal is granted, then the case is sent to the 
Supreme Court for review. If the lower court rejects the appeal, then the litigants can file a “complaint” 
appeal (recurso de queja or recurso de hecho) directly to the Supreme Court asking it to decide whether 
or not the lower court’s refusal was correct. The same procedure applies in the case of ordinary appeals. 
See: Roland Arazi, Derecho Procesal civil y commercial, partes General y Especial, Segunda Edición 
actualizada y ampliada (Buenos Aires: Astrea, 1999), 528;Víctor De Santo, Tratado de los Recursos 
Tomo II Recursos Extraordinarios, Segunda edición actualizada (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad, 
1999), 521; Miller et al., Constitución y Poder Político, 412.  
367
 […] La Corte, según su sana discreción, y con la sola invocación de esta norma, podrá rechazar el 
recurso extraordinario, por falta de agravio federal suficiente o cuando las cuestiones planteadas 
resultaren insustanciales o carentes de trascendencia.” Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Nación, 
art. 280, as amended by Law No. 23.744, April 16, 1990, B.O. 26864, 1.  
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judgment”).368 Decisions based on the 280 are structured in a single-sentence 
customary format that reads (Figure 10):  
Buenos Aires, [date] 
Given [literally “Seen”]: [citation of the case] 
Whereas: 
That the extraordinary appeal is inadmissible (Civil and Commercial 
Procedural Code of the Nation, section 280).  
On this ground, rejects the extraordinary appeal. Notify and return. 
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 Interview, October 30, 2006.  
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Figure 10. The “template”, or judgment based on Federal Civil and Commercial 
Procedural Code, Section 280 
The 280 is a practice that my interlocutors both inside and outside the Court 
understand and perceive as a mimicry of the U.S. Court’s writ of certiorari, one of the 
tools through which the U.S. Court decides to take jurisdiction.369 However, unlike the 
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 “Es, asimismo, un criterio coincidente con el que, desde ya hace tiempo, ha venido aplicándose 
respecto de una Corte de obligada referencia, la norteamericana” (italics added). Supreme Court bylaw 
No. 44, C.S.J.N. 312 Fallos 1515-19 (1989). Likewise Lino Palacio recalls the US writ of certiorari as 
one of the precedents that Congress discussed at debate about the bill that introduced into the Argentine 
code of Civil and Commercial Procedure. Lino E. Palacio, El Recurso Extraordinario Federal, Teoria y 
Practica (Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 2001), 26. See also: Néstor Pedro Sagüés, “El writ of 
certiorari argentino (Las reformas de la Ley 23.774, respecto al recurso extraordinario)”, La Ley 
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U.S. Court where the certiorari works as a selection process of the cases that the Court 
chooses to hear,370 the so-called certiorari in the Argentine judicial practice is 
presented as a procedure that allows the Argentine Court not to hear a case from the 
thousands of cases that are filed annually. This modality has made the law clerks with 
whom I discussed the practice of the 280 in Argentine Court, name this practice as a 
“negative” certiorari of the one practiced by the U.S. Court, which they identify as an 
“affirmative” or “positive” one.371 Even more remarkable is that Argentine clerks take 
the difference between their practice and that of the U.S. Court for granted, as much as 
they assume that the local rule of section 280 is a genuine certiorari.372 Seen from the 
clerks’ vantage point, what would work to open the American Court’s jurisdiction, in 
the Argentine Court’s practice is thought and conceived as a closing mechanism of the 
tribunal’s authority. Nonetheless, as I briefly mentioned above, clerks find that the 
local practice has not been able to reduce the number of cases that are filed everyday; 
“filing an appeal to the Court is rather accessible,” a clerk explained to me.373  
Outside the Court, the challenges to the practice of certiorari as performed by 
the Argentine Court—in particular to the incorporation of the certiorari into the Court 
practices374 via the procedural code reform—are abundant: building upon either 
formalistic or culturalist arguments, these critiques point toward either the reformers’ 
                                                                                                                                             
T.1990-C, 717-724; Alberto F. Garay, “Comentario sobre las reformas al recurso extraordinario”, La 
Ley T-1990; 984-1002.  
370
 See: Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (Adopted July 17, 2007, Effective October 1st 
2007), Part III: Jurisdiction on Writ of Certiorari, Rules 10 to 16, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ctrules/2007rulesofthecourt.pdf (accessed July 29, 2008). In particular, 
Rule 10 (Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari) begins with the following statement: 
“A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for writ of 
certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.”  
371
 Interviews, June 22, 2006, August 18, 2006, July 25, 2008.  
372
 Fieldnotes, July 25, 2008.  
373
 Interview, October 30, 2006.  
374
 Bianchi and Gelli, among others, argue that the Argentine Court practiced a sort of de facto certiorari 
even before the amendment to the procedural code, Section 280. See: Alberto B. Bianchi, “El ‘Writ of 
Certiorari’ en nuestra Corte Suprema (La ‘cuestión federal suficiente’ como concepto jurídico 
indeterminado,” El Derecho 125 (1989): 857-865; María Angélica Gelli, “El writ of certiorari en 
perspectiva,” La Ley, T.1994-B Sec. Doctrina, 880-890. 
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misreading of the rules and mechanisms that they were “transplanting” from the U.S. 
Court,375 or their lack of awareness of the local mentalité376 in interaction with the 
imported legal idea. In either way, the so-called “Argentine certiorari”377 is seen as the 
result of a failed legal transplant or of a partial translation.378  
Central to the culturalist critique of “the 280” is the argument that the Court’s 
discretionary dismissal of cases is at odds with a transparent reasoning requiring 
judges to explain their decisions and hence to offer the reasons for denial. Indeed, the 
critique builds on a wider standpoint from which the refusal to disclose judicial votes 
is seen as a breach of the basic tenet of the rule of law that requires government 
decisions be made public.379 Ultimately, the critique goes, the lack of argumentative 
transparency contributes to the undermining of judicial authority. But more 
importantly, underlying this critical stance toward this particular judicial practice is a 
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 See, e.g.: Garay, “Comentario sobre las reformas al recurso extraordinario”; Héctor Sabelli, “El 
rechazo ‘sin motivación’ del recurso extraordinario cuando la cuestión federal es intrascendente, es 
constitucional? (sobre el certiorari criollo),” Jurisprudencia Argentina. 2000-3, 1343-1362. Both 
authors point out the differences between the U.S. certiorari and the Argentine certiorari.  
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 “Pero lo que no se ha tenido en cuenta es que este instituto [certiorari] repugna a los antecedentes y a 
la idiosincrasia nacional, formada alrededor del derecho continental europeo, incluso a los de la misma 
Corte…” José María Olcese, “La institución del ‘certiorari’ repugna al concepto nacional de derecho de 
defensa”, La Ley 1999-IV, 981-984, 984.  
377
 Ibid.  
378
 The adequacy of the legal transplant metaphor to explain the circulation and transference of legal 
institutions and practices among societies and jurisdictions has been largely criticized. Building upon a 
culturalist approach to law, comparative and socio-legal scholars have proposed other analytical 
categories to examine these phenomena, challenging, in this way, the formalistic view of law embedded 
in the transplant metaphor. See, e.g.: Gunther Teubner, “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or 
How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences,” Modern Law Review 61 (1998):11-32; Máximo 
Langer, “From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure,” Harvard International Law Journal 45 (2004):1-64.  
Annelise Riles, for her part, notes that in drawing on the cultural argument to challenge the dogmatic 
understanding of law as a set of rules advanced by the legal transplant metaphor, some comparatists 
take culture as “an integrated, totalizing whole,” a concept that anthropologists have been rejecting 
since the 1960s. Riles, “Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies,” 798.  
379
 See: Gelli, “Dilemas del Recurso Extraordinario Federal”; Sabelli, “El rechazo ‘sin motivación’ del 
recurso extraordinario cuando la cuestión federal es intrascendente, es constitucional?; Olcese, “La 
institución del ´certiorari´ repugna al concepto nacional de derecho de defensa.” Along the same lines, 
other critics argue that this practice violates the constitutional due process of law and equal protection 
clauses. See, e.g.: Hércules, “La sana discreción de la Corte viola el principio de igualdad,” 
Jurisprudencia Argentina, Tomo II (2005) 785- 786. 
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notion of adjudication in which judicial reasoning is reduced to (or even replaced by) 
its visible end: the final decision, the ruling. Borrowing from Mitchel Lasser’s 
material:  
The legitimacy of a given judicial decision thus stands 
and falls in large measure on the logic and 
argumentation of the signed judgment, not on the 
structural legitimacy of the entire judicial apparatus 
from which it hails.380  
In sharp contrast to this view, the judges and judicial bureaucrats that I 
encountered in the Court approach judicial reasoning—and judgment itself—not as an 
isolated outcome or rule but as an institutional process.381 Thus, from this latter 
standpoint, judgment (including judgment decided upon Section 280) would emerge 
as the result of the textual exchanges and interactions that flow alongside the internal 
circulation of the dossier. In other words, by virtue of these subjects’ contrasting 
points of view about judgment, this is seen as a continuum and gapless process from 
inside the Court, while it is also apprehended as a disruptive gap in judicial 
adjudication from the outside.  
The “Memo” and the possibility of knowledge  
In his book Judicial Deliberations comparative legal scholar Mitchel Lasser 
traces an interesting correlation between three allegedly different modes of judicial 
decision-making (the U.S. Supreme Court, the French Cour de cassation, and the 
European Court of Justice) and the vision of republic, democracy, law, etc. that these 
                                                 
380Mitchel de S.O.-l.-E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial 
Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 338.  
381
 This, however, does not mean that my subjects endorse the old legal anthropology “processual 
model” school which opposed the idea of law as an institutional process to that of law as merely a set of 
norms or rules. See: John L. Comaroff and Simon Roberts, Rules and Processes, The Cultural Logic of 
Dispute in an African Context (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).  
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modes represent.382 Through an insightful comparative endeavor, Lasser actually 
challenges the alleged antithesis between common law (in its American version) and 
civil law (represented by the French legal tradition) based on the assumption that 
transparency, deliberation, accountability and legitimacy—“the very backbone of Karl 
Llewellyn’s ‘Grand Style’ of American judicial decision-making”383—are exclusively 
encountered through a mode of adjudication built upon “individually signed opinions 
(including concurrences and dissents), the disclosure of judicial votes, the forthright 
recognition of interpretive difficulties, the candid discussion of judicial legal 
development, and public judicial debate over substantive policy issues.” From an 
American comparative perspective, Lasser remarks, this combination is assumed to 
foster “judicial accountability and control, to encourage democratic debate and 
deliberation, and thus to accord well-deserved legitimacy to American judicial 
power.”384 In this schema, he explains, civilian judicial decision-making is portrayed 
as a system that lacks appropriate legitimacy because judicial decisions are not 
sufficiently transparent.385  
More specifically, I am interested in particular in Lasser's description of the 
radical “bifurcation” of the judicial discourse that operates in the French cour: on the 
one hand, he finds that the form and tone of the “official” decisions of the cour 
(collegial, syllogistic and magisterial), reinforces the image of the French judicial 
system as a formalist application of codified law. On the other hand, Lasser´s work 
uncovers an “unofficial” argumentative sphere of conclusions and rapports in which 
socially meaningful judicial solutions are constructed through hermeneutic 
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 Lasser, Judicial Deliberations; A comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 
383
 Ibid., 3. 
384
 Ibid., 4. “In the United States, legal theory has long associated transparently reasoned individual 
judicial opinions with judicial control and accountability, democratic debate and deliberation, and 
ultimately judicial legitimacy itself.” Lasser, Judicial Deliberations, 3. 
385
 Ibid., 61. 
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discourse.386 For Lasser, the bifurcation of French civil judicial discourse is explained 
by a complex conceptual and institutional framework in which judges must not and 
cannot make the law though they must be technically sophisticated managers capable 
of adapting and modernizing judicial norms in order to respond to changing social 
needs in a manner that promotes general interest.  
I bring attention to Lasser’s work here because the mode in which gatekeeping 
practices are performed in the Argentine Court through Section 280 unfolds a process 
of bifurcation in the legal discourse that resembles the “argumentative bifurcation” 
that he encounters in the judgments of the cour de cassation.  
When I examined in the previous chapter the forms through which the subjects 
of legal bureaucracy make themselves visible, I described how the material circulation 
of dossiers within the judicial apparatus was also physically manifest in the Court 
bureaucrats’ papering practices: in their drafting proposals for judicial decisions 
(proyectos de sentencia), writing memoranda, reports, as well as any research 
documents that might be helpful to build up a judgment on a given dossier, such as the 
attachment of previous documents written on similar cases, or statutory provisions 
regulating the issues involved. To put it differently, in the Argentine case, all these 
documentary practices, epitomized in the writing of the “memo” (or the “note of 
secretaria”),387 are the venue in which argumentation and persuasion takes place, the 
instance in which judges and clerks deploy all their argumentative resources to 
convince their brethren to adopt a particular decision on the case at issue, though all 
this “argumentative arsenal” (Lasser’s terms) remains veiled to the external gaze. In a 
law clerk’s words: “the case must be studied, and the memo reflects such study; […] 
                                                 
386
 Ibid., 200-202.  
387
 When this document is prepared by a law clerk in a secretaria, it is called “nota de secretaria” 
(secretaria note). However, I refer here to both the memorandum and the note of secretaria 
indistinctively as the “memo,” as my informants usually do.  
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without the memo, nothing is convincing …The memo is like a dialogue, as most of 
the time deliberation here in the Court is written.”388 However, as one of the Court 
clerks confided to me, “the better the memorandum is written at the outset, the faster 
the decision on the case will be achieved,” meaning that an exhaustive memorandum 
is most likely not to be challenged.389 In contrast to the succinct structure of judgment 
based on Section 280 described above, the memorandum does not have a 
predetermined length. It can be as long as the author deems necessary to present her 
arguments in support of the judicial decision that she is proposing. Yet, the memo is 
structured in the following order:  
On the top right hand: the complete heading of the dossier (type of appeal, 
number and the appellant’s names). For instance: “Extraordinary Appeal B. 1408 XL. 
Barrera, Leticia v. Government of the City of Buenos Aires.” On the top left, the name 
of the office where the author of the memorandum works: either a Justice’s vocalia or 
one of the seven judicial secretarías. In this latter case, the memorandum is 
specifically called nota de secretaría (secretary note) and is generally initialed by the 
author.390 On the left margin, the subject of the memorandum: the type of appeal under 
review (either an extraordinary appeal, or an appeal seeking reversal of the appeal 
court’s denial of extraordinary review) followed by the indication of the court of 
original jurisdiction (where the action was initiated and first heard) and the lower 
instance courts that heard the case before it reached the Supreme Court (a federal court 
of appeals or a Provincial court of last resort). 
With respect to the main text, it is presented in a “chronological order”:391  
• the statement of facts;392 
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 Interview, June 20, 2006.  
389
 Interview, November 2, 2005. 
390
 See Chapter Three of this dissertation. 
391
 Interview, July 25, 2008.  
392
 In the few memos that I could access, the presentation of facts ran about three pages.  
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• the description of the decision of the court of appeals or court of last resort 
whose reversal the appellant seeks;  
• the presentation of arguments exposed in the federal appeal submitted to 
the Court;  
• the author’s (clerk’s) opinion (consideraciones) providing her 
understanding of the law that applies to the issues involved in the appeal 
and the proposed judicial decision. If in the author’s opinion the appeal 
should be rejected, her report usually concludes with the recommendation 
for the Court to apply the current “formula 1” to the case (Section 280).  
The memo is often attached to the draft of the proposed judicial opinion that it 
(the memo) supports. If different judicial decisions leading to opposed results are 
drafted on the same case, all of them are “backed” by their respective memoranda 
explaining the reasons for such conclusions. All these documents are enclosed in a 
yellow folder that is annexed to the dossier and circulated alongside even though they 
are not considered to be “officially” part of the dossier itself, at least in the sense that 
they are not physically integrated to the main dossier, and, unlike the main dossier, 
they cannot be accessed by the parties.  
This particular feature of the memo—that is, the duality of being considered as 
intellectually fundamental though materially excluded from the official dossier—is 
most palpable in the process of tracking down one’s dossier at the Court. As I noted 
earlier, in this proceeding one is presented with a version of the dossier in which only 
its ends (the application for review or lawsuit, the final ruling, or, if in the case, an 
intermediate decision) are made public. Once the Court’s judgment is delivered and 
the parties are notified, the dossier is sent to the Court’s general archive, whereas all 
the attached documents (memoranda, proposed decisions, and any other document 
collected as research material for the case and hence enclosed in the yellow folder) are 
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compiled in a binder by the staff of the secretaria that supervised the circulation of the 
dossier. This binder, so-called “cartapacio de secretaría,” is kept for the secretaria’s 
record and can be accessed only by the Court staff—for instance as research material 
in future and similar cases.393 
Notably, the above bifurcation of judicial reasoning is encountered in the 
appeals in which full review is granted by the Argentine Court as in the applications 
for review that the Court rejects on the grounds of Section 280, since the memo is 
produced in preparation of every Court decision. Nonetheless, the effects of this 
bifurcation are more likely to be experienced as disruptive in the appeals that the 
Court rejects than in the cases in which it grants full review. In the appeals that are 
granted full review, the arguments developed in the memorandum—or in the various 
memoranda if that is the case—explaining the reasons for the legal opinion finally 
endorsed by the majority of Justices are most likely to be reproduced (although 
heavily edited) and published in the judgment. In other words, the arguments 
discussed in the memorandum make up for the decision’s rationale (fundamentos). In 
contrast to this, when the appeal is rejected on the basis of Section 280, the reasons or 
fundamentos for such a decision “never make [their] way out of the Court’s internal 
dossiers.”394 Notably, this is the point where gatekeeping practices can be mostly 
perceived as “naming” practices that operate to define what is of public domain and 
what is private, rather than as simple instruments to control the Court’s docket. 
Both practical and political considerations would justify, in clerks’ view, the 
Court’s sheltering deliberation of 280 cases in its internal workings: on the one hand, 
it is said that the current Court workload would make impossible to turn all the 
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reasoning developed in the memo into the final ruling.395 On the other hand, keeping 
the memo as a Court’s internal document, a clerk of a secretaría indicated, allows 
[him, his colleagues] “to write things that cannot be said in the final ruling.” As he 
explained to me, “The Court can get itself bound by its own words…it [the Court] has 
to be careful with its saying. The Court is constrained by what it has to say in a given 
case and by the terms of the remedy it provides.”396 Thus, seen from this perspective, 
the memo is more than the “informal” and “personal”397 explanatory device, the means 
“to convey one’s legal opinion on the case,”398 that accompanies and supports a 
proposed judicial decision. The memo also elicits a moment of expansion399 in which 
knowledge is temporarily freed from the physical and political constraints of legal 
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forms (e.g. the application for review, the judgment, the dossier)400 that anticipate such 
knowledge or action.401 “All that is not written in the draft [of the judicial decision] is 
in the memo”;402 although all the constellation of meaning that the memo elucidates is 
“backgrounded, held at bay”403 for the Court’s authority to work out.  
The reflexive path of the Law  
Unlike Lasser’s work about the cour de cassation, I could not find in my 
research any correlation between the practices of the Argentine Court and an 
indigenous idea of law and judicial decision-making that these practices might 
reflect.404 As an anecdote from the field, however, I may tell that in an early stage of 
my fieldwork I decided to play with Lasser´s idea of correlation in order to provoke 
my informants’ reactions, in particular those of the Supreme Court Justices. 
Unfortunately, it did not work. Or perhaps I thought it did not work at that moment, 
because I could not make sense of any hint of correlation between the Argentine 
Court's discursive practices and an established idea of law, republic and democracy in 
Argentina from my informants’ responses. “There are so many ideas here about what 
the law is,” a Justice told me, pointing out different and even conflicting notions of 
law within the Court, and even within the small circle of his Supreme Court 
colleagues.405 “It is almost impossible to find a pattern of the Court’s decisions,” a 
Justice’s clerk noted, pointing out to me what she saw as the Court’s erratic case law 
in the last years—by “pattern” she understood a stable and coherent line of precedents. 
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Yet, when I queried a few clerks about the Court’s discursive practices, they reacted to 
my questioning with isolated comments about the so-called “Court’s writing style,” 
which, in their view, was being gradually abandoned by the Court new-comers, 
namely, the lastly appointed Justices and their clerks. Additionally, a few of them 
mentioned to me an unofficial manual of style written by an ex-Court Justice that still 
circulated among the Court staff.  
Despite the above arguments about the shifting discourse in the Argentine 
Court, a closer analysis of the Court’s discursive practices, specifically of the 
workings of the gatekeeping practice of Section 280, unfolds two stable and 
competing understandings about judicial adjudication depending on the subjects’ 
positions vis-à-vis the judicial apparatus. As I noted earlier, on the one hand, 
adjudication is perceived and experienced, from an internal point of view, as a sole 
and collective process actualized in the circulation of the dossier within the Court. 
Accordingly, for judicial bureaucrats, judgment is achieved, contested and negotiated 
through a work of “intertextuality”406 manifested in the material aggregation of pages 
to the circulating dossier—this latter understood in a broad sense, as encompassing the 
main body and the annexed folder(s). However, it is only from the vantage point of 
legal bureaucrats, in which the forms of judicial lawmaking are perceived as a whole, 
where both the “official” and “unofficial” discourses are brought together407—or 
borrowing from Tony Crook, from which both sides “the clear and the hidden”408 can 
be seen—that adjudication can be understood as a processual and deliberative 
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phenomenon. It, therefore, is by putting the hidden in clear vision that such meaning 
achieves a moment of completion.409  
On the other hand, if we look at the parties to a case and their counsels, who 
after years of pursuing litigation throughout the judicial system receive as judgment 
solely a piece of paper with a one-sentence decision, then it is most likely that what is 
perceived internally as a “perfect” mechanism may be perceived as a failure of 
knowledge410—a failure that the practice of adjudication reveals—from an outsider’s 
point of view; a failure built into the Court’s practice of adjudication as the above 
critiques of the Court’s application of Section 280 pointed out (here, adjudication is 
represented and substituted by the plain text of the decision).  
This dual perception about judicial decision-making practices becomes most 
evident by the opposed, albeit mutually enabling, metaphors about death that in the 
lapse of only a few days two different informants, a legal scholar and practitioner and 
a Court law clerk, built upon to explain their understandings of the Court’s working 
under Section 280. After making clear that he was aware of the argumentative sphere 
“hidden” behind the Court’s gatekeeping practice, the former interlocutor drew a 
comparison between the reactions to the Court’s denial of a petition based on Section 
280 and to a relative’s death: “you feel frustrated…you always will think that things 
could have happened differently; that something else might have been done to 
lengthen your kin’s life.”411 I then asked him why the reaction he was describing 
would be distinctive of a 280 case and not a common response to any negative 
decision one might get from any tribunal. He replied that this first reaction—
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frustration—was indeed a response to the denial and to the impossibility to reverse 
this situation. However, in a second moment, when one realizes that no reason for 
denial is given, the initial frustration is even stronger; much more if the appellant’s 
counsel has no previous experience in arguing before the Court. “If he [the counsel] 
has a record in the Court, it is most likely that he knows about the existence of the 
memo”; though even in this event, a strong feeling of frustration prevails, he 
asserted.412  
Metaphors work on the basis of the explicit or implicit “identification of one 
phenomenon with another phenomenon from which the first is literally distinct.”413 
But yet, calling a court denial “death”  seemed quite an extreme move, unnecessary 
hyperbole—even when knowing the causes of such death was foreclosed. To stick to 
this hyperbole, however, would distract attention from what I believe is the real 
ground for this lawyer’s metaphor: the character of legal knowledge, which 
autopoietic theorists Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner have described as a self-
referential structure.414  
Legal discourse, Teubner argues, works on normative self-reference and 
recursivity:415 
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The self-referential closure of the legal system can be 
found in the circular relation between legal decisions 
and normative rules: decisions refer to rules and rules to 
decisions…This basal circularity is the foundation of 
legal autonomy.416  
In explaining Teubner’s work Riles indicates that law’s reflexivity is the 
capacity of the legal systems “for building up its own autonomy by observing and 
commenting on themselves (as in legal debates about legal process).”417 No external 
forces influence the mode in which law reproduces itself, its autopoietic 
organization418—likewise, legal knowledge “is not oriented toward an outside target 
…even when it pretends to have a specific aim or target in mind.”419  
Precisely, the self-referential character of the law420 is manifest in the Court’s 
denial, not so much through the explicit reference to Section 280 made in the 
judgment—literally, the decision states that the appeal is not admitted only by 
invoking this norm421—as through the way in which gatekeeping is performed. This 
insight about law’s self-reflexivity is most clearly explained by another metaphor 
drawn by a law clerk when he showed me the cartapacio, the binder made up of a 
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composite of arguments, opinions, conclusions, and research materials “unofficially” 
annexed to the dossier along its circulation. “This is the corpse,” the clerk said to me 
while handing me the binder that was on his desk. “You can find in it all the forensic 
evidence and the clues to interpret a Court’s decision in every case.”422 “Everything is 
there,” he asserted as I started perusing the binder I now had in my hands. Indeed, the 
material I was presented with came up as an assemblage of memoranda, opinions, 
drafted decisions, statutory provisions, newspaper articles, and other “physical 
evidence” of the same sort that appeared as key elements for the reconstruction of 
judgment. About his having this particular binder in his office, he explained to me that 
he had borrowed it from the archive of one of the secretarías; that he needed to read 
the content of this particular binder for an appeal he was currently reviewing—a 
memo written for this latter case cited the cased discussed in the binder. When I asked 
him why he did not just go and read the cited ruling rather than examining all the data 
contained in the binder, he responded that that would not suffice; that he wanted to 
know what had really happened.423 In other words, during the process of making a 
decision, the clerk locates knowledge in the Court’s own act of making the decision. 
Indeed, this clerk’s move transcends this pursuit of a particular knowledge for the case 
under his review. Rather, it speaks of a mode of operation, of knowledge making: it 
“reflexively constitutes the legal act,”424 the decision.  
Certainly the two metaphors discussed in this section reflect different and fixed 
understandings of the act of judicial decision-making from the point of view of the 
actors involved, either actively or passively. On the one hand, judicial practice is 
perceived as a mode of knowledge enclosure: there is nothing beyond judgment—
                                                 
422
 Interview, July 25, 2008.  
423
 Ibid.  
424
 Annelise Riles, “Law as Object,” in Law & Empire in the Pacific, Fiji and Hawai‘i, Sally Engle 
Merry and Donnald Brenneis ed. (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2003), 194.  
130 
thus, my informant’s analogy between judgment and death. In contrast to this, judicial 
decision-making is also presented as a form a disclosure enabling clerks, judges and 
other judicial bureaucrats (the forensic practitioners) an enduring possibility of 
knowing. But yet, more importantly, both metaphors allow me to move beyond the 
conflicting understandings and fixed appearances of judicial practice that they may 
enact.425 Accordingly, as I showed above, both metaphors offer simultaneously the 
means for appreciating the practice of judicial decision-making as a self-referential 
form of knowledge-construction. In this light, enclosure may be seen as both the 
consequence and condition of disclosure.426  
Filling in the Gaps  
The main task of this chapter has been to provide a detailed description of how 
gatekeeping operates in the Argentine Court. In exploring this practice as multiple 
gaps—a gap in my dossier, a gap that litigants experience in their cases, a gap in legal 
knowledge, and as a gap between norm and reality, or law in the books and law in 
action—I have encountered a certain kind of knowledge that is not exactly known by 
its function and significance.  
Accessing the memorandum, which my subjects’ descriptions take as the site 
for the Court’s internal deliberation in every case, it is certainly important to 
understand how judgment is articulated through a bifurcation of the legal discourse 
which the ethnographic observation amalgamates. Yet, knowing that this document 
(deliberation) is produced in preparation of every Court decision—that is, whether the 
Court decides to grant review or whether it is denied—is even more significant as it 
sheds light on the particular function that gatekeeping performs in this setting.  
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Building on Barbara Yngvesson’s material, I described gatekeeping as a 
practice of exclusion that operates to keep the Court apart from the cases that are 
deemed to interfere with its responsibility and constitutional mandate, namely the 
“garbage cases.” Additionally, I argued that exclusion and gatekeeping are themselves 
constitutive of judicial authority. Nonetheless, as my description of the practice of “the 
280” unfolded, exclusion is performed in the Court through a deliberative instance 
similar to that encountered in the cases where the Court grants full review. At first 
glance, this finding would question the practice of the 280 on grounds that it might 
entail a failure of gatekeeping: the Court actually rules in garbage cases as much as in 
any other case it decides, rather than excluding them from its jurisdiction. It, however, 
would mean implicitly to place my observations in a comparative perspective from 
which I would be able to check the Court’s inner workings against an ideal practice of 
gatekeeping—whether it may be the practice of certiorari as performed by the U.S. 
Court or whether it may be an ideal of this practice as imagined by my subjects. This 
is the gap—or in Boellstorff’s words, the translation failure—that I tried to obviate at 
the outset. 
Now, when attention shifts back to the aesthetics of the dossier, another gap, 
namely the Court’s internal deliberation, is perceptible in the form in which the 
dossier is presented to, and grasped by “outsiders”; that is, through the dossier’s 
visible ends (e.g. the negative decision in my case, the judgment denying review in a 
280 case). This gap, in the account of the lawyer described above and in the 
understandings of those critics of the local practice of certiorari, is apprehended as a 
failure of legal knowledge. However, internally, from the Court bureaucrats’ point of 
view, the concealment of deliberation is experienced as the space where knowledge 
achieves momentum through a whole sequence of knowledge-making practices. The 
knowledge that this gap elicits remains hidden; though in the cases that the Court 
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grants full review it nonetheless may emerge in the form of the decision’s rationale. In 
contrast, when the Court denies application for review, knowledge is completely 
“backgrounded” in the laconic structure of the denial. Therefore, it is in this effort of 
keeping knowledge concealed from view that the practice of gatekeeping as 
encountered in the Argentine Court may be appreciated in its true dimension.  
As the materials presented in this essay show, gatekeeping operates as a fiction 
of exclusion. The “As If” quality of the fiction427 makes it possible to consider the 
appeals decided upon Section 280 as “garbage cases,” that is, as cases that the Court 
excludes from its jurisdiction while, in fact, these cases are reviewed like almost any 
other appeal filed to the Court. However, as judicial decision-making is made explicit 
to the outside in the form of judgment, exclusion of garbage cases is presented “as if it 
were a fact.”428 This fiction, as I demonstrated in this essay, ultimately works as a 
mode of constructing judicial authority.  
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CHAPTER 5 
PERFORMANCE, TRANSPARENCY AND THE MAKING OF A NEW 
INSTITUTIONALITY 
 
The first public hearing in the so-called “Riachuelo”429 case just began and we, 
the public, were watching it broadcast live in the Federal Court of Appeal’s room 
located in the ground floor of the Court’s building.430 Among the audience, I 
recognized two Courts’ clerks I had interviewed months ago, two environmental 
lawyers, a watchdog organization member that I had seen on other occasions (in a 
public hearing held at the Senate and in a symposium on justice reforms). There were 
also a few researchers, but I only became aware of them later. Sitting just behind me, 
there was a group of people from the affected area (“vecinos de la zona afectada” as 
they were referred frequently in the litigants’ arguments), who were whispering 
critical comments as the Secretary of Environment delivered her argument before the 
Court on behalf of the federal government, the City of Buenos Aires, the Province of 
Buenos Aires, all defendants in this case.  
Unlike the litigants of the case431 and the media, “the public in general” was 
not invited into the room (“sala de audiencias”) where the Court was to hold the first 
of a series of hearings in this case. “Your name must be in the Court’s Protocol and 
Ceremonial Office’s list to enter this room,” a Court Protocol officer informed me as I 
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tried to make my way to the fourth floor hearing room. Indeed, I had been told the day 
before that if I were a mere member of the ‘public’, I could watch the hearing 
projected onto a screen in the Court of Appeals’ second floor hearing room.  Upon 
finally arriving at the entrance of the screening room, a staff member from the Court’s 
protocol office directed me to take a seat “only in any of the last three rows.” Looking 
over the near-empty room, I could not help but be surprised by such a request; I shared 
my surprise with the Court protocol officer. She, however, replied firmly that the other 
seats were reserved for both Court clerks and other judicial functionaries; hence, those 
who were not judicial functionaries and wanted to watch the hearing had been 
assigned to the rear of the screening room.432  
As with other encounters with Court administrative staff during my fieldwork, 
I noticed these officers playing on personal notions of public space to pose limits to 
my field setting. This hearing, a very infrequent event in the Court’s calendar, 
provided a unique opportunity to see the enactment of these notions at work. On this 
occasion, the protocol office personnel that I encountered not only interpreted the 
category of “the public” through the instrumentality of the office’s listing,433 but also 
in more political terms, for instance excluding the Court from the outsider’s gaze.434 
Indeed, that was the reaction I got when I was not allowed to take photos either on the 
fourth floor, outside the courtroom, or once the hearing was finished. A Court officer 
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stopped me and warned me not to take photos on the fourth floor (the floor that houses 
the majority of the Court’s operations). I then replied that it (the building) was a public 
building; to which he responded: “yes; but not the fourth floor.”435  
In the first chapter of this study, I draw on my own experience of accessing the 
Court to explain, through an ethnographic example, how the notion of place is 
implemented in the Argentine Supreme Court. I have found a working parallel 
between the aesthetics and politics of the notion of place within the Court and the 
intricate path toward the practices of judicial adjudication. The place—the Court’s 
building—enacts a set of relations that in my account mirror the process of reaching 
the Court.436 In this context, I take the protocol office staff's attitudes toward my 
queries during these hearings as displays of the conception of place that I have 
encountered in the Court. In the present chapter, however, I want to shift my focus 
away from these organizations of place, and towards the nature and function of 
technical tools such as hearings and other instruments of judicial procedure. As I 
mentioned earlier in this dissertation,437 working on this technical dimension of law 
implies not only turning these actual tools of legal knowledge themselves into objects 
of inquiry, but also using them as a means to advance the knowledge of my subject.  
Ultimately, I hope that my present appeal to the aesthetics of legal forms contributes 
to an understanding of the workings of the judicial institution by bringing to the 
surface the commitments and practices of the subjects that make up the institution.438  
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The aesthetics of hearings  
In modern legal theory and practice, hearings are a settled instrument of 
adjudication. Regardless of the system of civil procedure we focus on—either a more 
lawyer-dominated procedure, such as the American civil system, or other procedures 
in which the bench exercises greater responsibility in fact-gathering, such as the 
Continental tradition439—hearings are defining features of judicial decision-making.  
Black’s Law Dictionary provides a general definition of a hearing as “a judicial 
session usually open to the public, held for the purpose of deciding issues of facts or 
of law, sometimes with witness testifying.”440 Underlying this basic and introductory 
definition are the notions of hearings as tools of knowledge construction, as the means 
to an end.441 In a more epistemological sense, Foucault finds the right to testify—the 
right to oppose truth to power (“to oppose a powerless truth to an untruthful 
power”)—central in the development of the Greek democracy. This right, he argues, 
paved the way for several cultural forms central to Western society, all inherited 
features from the Greeks: the rational systems of proof and evidence (central in  
philosophy and science); the art of persuasion (proving one's point through rhetoric); 
and the development of a new kind of knowledge (knowledge through testimony, 
memories, or examination).442   
Hearings are also said to facilitate the interaction between the parties of a case 
and the judge or judges who have to decide it: “they bring about immediacy between 
the judge and the litigants,” a Court Justice pointed out to me.443 Not incidentally, this 
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Justice was a former criminal judge. In Argentina, whose civil procedure system 
draws on a marked tradition of written (and usually faceless) procedure,444 such 
immediacy is usually praised as an advantage—and a guarantee—of criminal 
procedure vis-à-vis civil procedure.445  
The Argentine Civil and Commercial Procedure Code defines hearings as 
“procedural acts,” and devotes a short chapter to describe the general rules applicable 
to them.446 Unlike lower courts whose decision-making processes are ruled by either 
the Civil, or Criminal Procedure Codes, the Supreme Court’s adjudication processes 
(both judicial and administrative)447 are governed by its own bylaws (“Reglamento 
Interno”)448 At the Court level, the practices, meanings and perceptions of the hearings 
I encountered were disparate—if not personal. Take, for instance, the Justice I just 
mentioned above: at the time of our first encounter, she expressed her concern about 
the absence of public hearings at the Supreme Court level, which, in her view, 
unfortunately prevented the Justices from establishing contact with the parties 
concerned in a matter before the tribunal.449 Nonetheless, when I mentioned this 
proposal to a few Court clerks, all of them rejected the idea of the Court holding 
public hearings, arguing that the Court’s current case load would give no room for 
public hearings.  
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Although the Court’s practice has traditionally rejected any sort of public 
hearing, it has developed several alternative models for hearings. These actually are 
private meetings between a Justice450 and a litigant in a case, rather than "hearings" in 
the definition expressed by the procedural code—yet any meeting with a Court Justice 
is assumed to be a hearing, even if you simply want to ask the judge a few questions 
for your research project. These meetings have become an extended institutional 
practice, to the extent that while asking my informants to address the topic of hearings, 
they almost instinctively—and many times defensively—assumed that my query about 
hearings was actually a question about the private meetings that a Justice or clerks 
may hold with a litigant.451 The reason is that these private hearings are pejoratively 
called “alegatos de oreja” (“ear argument”),452 in the Argentine judiciary jargon, in 
reference to the counsels’ willingness to deploy all kinds of strategies to persuade the 
judges or clerks to issue a favorable decision.453 These hearings, among other 
practices, were targeted by a series of so-called “transparency bylaws” (“acordadas de 
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transparencia”) that the Court issued in 2003-4. The Court ruled that Justices would 
not hear the arguments of a litigant without all the parties of the case being present.454 
Remarkably, in response to my query on the reception of that bylaw within the Court, 
a Court clerk (secretario)455 pointed out that even though it was being obeyed, he 
found that rule somewhat unfair since the new norm affected the situation between the 
parties of the case, giving a de facto veto power to the party not interested in having 
the Court hear the case.456 I will return to the implications of the enactment of these 
transparency bylaws later in this chapter.  
The effect of those hearings on my informants (clerks) cannot be assessed, at 
least not in general terms, since each clerk experiences hearings in different ways. In 
one of my first interviews at the Court, a Court clerk told me he was bound by the 
Court bylaws to meet with all the litigants and/or their counsels, and that listening to 
them can help him either to confirm his previous idea on the case or to anticipate his 
[the clerk’s] reading, or, in his words, “just to make it [the case reading] simpler.”457 
On the other hand, he said it was not clear to him to what extent a hearing helped 
counsel and clients advocate their case, although he acknowledged that, “it might be 
that seeing the person who will decide the case face-to-face or the person who will 
collaborate in the decision-making would make a difference for them”458 A few 
months later, another Court clerk confessed to me that he usually was annoyed when, 
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in the course of the hearings with the parties or/and their counsels, they asked him “to 
please read the file.” “Of course we read the files! How can they believe that we do 
not read the files?” he said to me.459 In another interview, a Justice's clerk told me that 
the fact of meeting counsel “did not add any useful information for [her] to decide the 
case.” Rather, she said, counsels only use the space of these encounters to repeat the 
content of the file, “to repeat what is already written.”460 To my question whether she 
was able to ask counsels more precise and detailed questions that might orient her 
reasoning and decision, she responded that she did not ask anything during the 
hearings. On the contrary, she only listened to her interlocutors’ speech.461 Like other 
clerks I interviewed, she found these meetings—entertaining the parties of case—as a 
deviation from proper judging (bureaucratic) practice,462 this understood as “the 
procurement and dissemination of knowledge on a rational basis.”463  
Hearings may work as instruments of knowledge construction, as tools for 
reaching the legal truth, as acts that validate a formal procedure, or, they can assume 
other different and even personal meanings, as my informants’ accounts just showed. 
But, more importantly, hearings may also be understood as objects of performance. A 
vast law review literature on the value of oral arguments before appellate courts in the 
United States illustrates this point.464  
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[…] we might liken [oral arguments before an appellate 
court] to the passing parade, with judges and litigants 
functioning simultaneously as participants and as 
interested spectators watching from opposite sides of the 
street. The sense of immediacy and involvement—the 
three-dimensional experience—one gains from such a 
proceeding is specially important to the judges465 
Within this legal literature, oral advocacy before the Supreme Court has been 
defined as an “art,”466 an “essential art,”467 and even as the art of “building a 
cathedral.”468 As such, it requires specific techniques and advocate’s very best 
performance—this latter probably embodied in Daniel Webster’s delivery of oral 
arguments in Gibbons v. Ogden.469 Yet, as object of performance, hearings may be 
turned into political tools. To support this argument, I return to my account of the 
public hearing of the Riachuelo.  
The public who had watched the hearing broadcast live in the improvised 
screening room began to gather at the room’s front door to exchange opinions about 
the arguments delivered by the defendants.470 I noticed that for many of the attendees, 
in particular for the neighbors of the Riachuelo area, the arguments they had just heard 
were very provocative, in particular those delivered by the Secretary of Environment.  
I then approached a group of them who also happened to be grassroots activists 
(“unemployed female members of the unemployed workers’ movement,” as they 
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introduced themselves)471 to get their reactions on the event we all had just attended. I 
began asking about their opinions of the hearing. These women, showing a strong 
political commitment, promptly responded that it was the same old thing: “They [the 
government] always make the same promises. We heard the same speech fifteen years 
ago.” I then rephrased my question, inquiring this time about their assessment of the 
Court’s handling of this case: “But what do you think about the Court’s attitude 
toward this case?” I asked, noticing a shift in their attitudes as they responded to my 
new question.  “The Court has a clear knowledge [about this issue]” (“la Corte la tiene 
clara”), one of the women responded to me while her fellows affirmed the response.472   
In their account, the public hearing showed them that the Court was handling 
this case in a fair and innovative way, revealing the tribunal’s deep knowledge about 
the issues at play—they had seen the Justices asking the defendants thoughtful and 
sharp questions about matters regarding the neighbors’ daily life (housing, health, 
labor, displacement, etc).473 Interestingly, other people directly involved in this case 
who I interviewed also emphasized the importance that the Court conduct public 
hearings in this (their) case. Regardless of their backgrounds (one was a counsel of the 
plaintiffs’; another, a young environmental lawyer and civil rights activist; a third, the 
president of a civil association of the Riachuelo zone), they all agreed that the fact that 
the Court had decided to conduct a hearing in their case was indexical of the case’s 
institutional relevance. Yet it meant something more important to them: that their 
claim was finally being heard by a government body.474  
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The hearing was a unique event in different ways. It was infrequent for the 
Court to conduct public hearings on cases under its revision.475 Indeed, the procedural 
rules for this hearing were issued ad hoc, two weeks before the event took place476 
(the same rules were applied to the subsequent (4) hearings the Court held on the same 
case).477 The provisional nature of the procedural rules matched the uniqueness of the 
event: as the neighbors’ accounts illustrate, the public hearing worked to open the 
Court and remove it from its usual closed setting. The end result was a public judicial 
event open to a massive audience. A high-ranking civil servant from the city of 
Buenos Aires, who had followed the hearing from one of the seats reserved for the 
representatives of the city government in the fourth floor courtroom,478 told me that it 
was the first time in his twenty-odd years of legal practice that he was able to be “in 
presence of the tribunal”; “it is like you are seeing in person what you have always 
read in the texts,” he said to me; “to see the Justices come in the hearing room and that 
all of us have to stand up, that is stunning … it was a sober ceremony.”479 On a 
personal level—as an individual with a specific research interest in the Court’s 
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knowledge practices—the hearing certainly expanded my vision of my subject of 
study by bringing into being new sets of practices and arrangements within the 
institution; this experience allowed me a vantage point previously unavailable through 
the fog of the Court’s documentary practices I had accessed so far.480 The event itself 
was further evidence that Court was addressing an audience placed elsewhere outside 
the institution.    
This insight is somewhat evocative of the ethnographic categories of “inside” 
and “outside” the Court drawn from my field, on which I resorted to explain the 
disparate representations of the Court’s practices gathered in different moments and 
venues throughout my fieldwork—a move mostly determined by the fluctuant access 
opportunities I was granted by my informants who worked at the Court.  Indeed, the 
outside emerged as a construct against which to work those informants’ insights of 
enduring and rule-bound Court’s practices. These categories, however, are not 
representative of different analytical orders. On the contrary, both are instantiations of 
the same phenomenon that I address in this dissertation: the Court’s knowledge 
practices in contemporary Argentina. Thus, by pointing toward “an outside audience,” 
I mean the Court’s practices that are ethnographically visible through the fictional link 
between the Court and an outside subject, rather than looking at the institution’s 
bureaucratic workings—or the other way around: “bureaucratic practices also point 
again and again to their own incompleteness,” paraphrasing Riles.481 This is also the 
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aesthetics of public hearings, in which the presence of the outsider per se elucidates 
the phenomenon.  
Crafting Institutionality  
The practices I mean herein are made up not only of public hearings, as such 
described above, but also by a series of bylaws, the aforementioned “transparency 
bylaws,” and a new communicational strategy.482 Particularly, the transparency 
bylaws have introduced mechanisms into the Court’s decision-making process that, in 
both the institution’s discourse483 and that of its critics,484 work to render judicial law-
making more visible and accessible to the public.485 These bylaws have incorporated 
the public announcement of files circulating within the Court;486 the advanced 
publication of the scheduled date in which cases of institutional relevance will be 
decided by the Court;487 the publication in the Supreme Court Official Reports 
                                                 
482
 The Supreme Court’s webpage was redesigned by mid-2007. Under a “Welcome” heading, and right 
after a very brief introduction that indicates that the Court opened its doors in January 15, 1863, the 
reader finds a citation belonging to Jose M. Guastavino (then Supreme Court’s Secretario), in 
opportunity of the publication of the first volume of the “Fallos” collection (the Court’s official reports) 
in 1864. Guastavino’s words emphasize the need of the Court’s decisions to be available to the public, 
as Court’s decisions, he argues, not only to affect the people’s lives but also they are a tool for the 
people to exercise control upon the judges. Following this statement, another paragraph explains that 
the publication of the Court’s judicial decisions and administrative activity in the Court’s webpage 
pursues to meet both the republican principle of publicity of governmental acts, and the society’s right 
to information; all this in the context of the tribunal’s transparent operation.  See: 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/; last visited October 26, 2007. I was quite familiar with Guastavino’s words 
before seeing them posted in the Court’s webpage. Indeed, I was referred to his statement on several 
opportunities during my fieldwork—in interviews conducted with civil rights advocates and Court’s 
law clerks— to the extent that I obtained  myself a copy of that from the Court’s archives. Interviews, 
September 21, 2005; February 8, 2006; and December 21, 2006. See also the recently launched 
webpage of the Center for Judicial Information (“Centro de Información Judicial”), 
http://www.cij.gov.ar/inicio.html (visited December 10, 2008).  
483
 By the Court’s discourse I refer here the reasons of the issuing the bylaws, as stated in the text of the 
norms.  
484
 For instance, NGOs, civil rights activists, progressive liberal scholars. See: the introduction and 
Chapter Three of this dissertation.  
485
  See, generally: Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, La Corte y los Derechos, Un informe sobre el 
contexto y el impacto de sus decisiones durante el periodo 2003-2004 (Buenos Aires: ADC/Siglo XXI 
Editores, 2005). 
486
 See: Supreme Court bylaw No. 35, December 11, 2003, 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/documentos/verdoc.jsp (accessed July 15, 2007). 
487
 Supreme Court bylaw No.36, December 18, 2003, http://www.csjn.gov.ar/documentos/verdoc.jsp 
(July 15, 2007). 
146 
(Fallos) of the complete versions of the Court’s most relevant decisions;488 the 
updating of the Court’s data bases, and the improvement of the conditions for the 
public access to the Court’s case law,489 as well as of the content of and the access to 
the Court’s web page;490 the prohibition for the Justices to hear one of the parties’ 
arguments in private without the presence of the counter-part;491 the implementation of 
the Amicus Curiae mechanism in cases of “institutional transcendence” or “of interest 
of the public”;492 the creation of a judicial information center;493 the public delivery of 
oral arguments before the tribunal,494etc.  
As these bylaws were being implemented, four new Justices were appointed 
(out of the seven who currently preside on the bench), which meant a substantial 
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change in the physical composition of the Court. In this context, the image of an 
ongoing institutional change in the Court emerged and advanced, significantly, by a 
rhetoric of change articulated not only by the Court’s Justices—particularly, albeit not 
exclusively, by the recently appointed Justices—but also from opinion-making 
institutions (for instance, NGOs and the media)495 and legal experts.496 As a result of 
the many new faces and regulations, both the Court’s members and the public at large 
began to call the present Court “the new Court” to distance the current incarnation of 
this institution from that of the previous years. A recent document issued by the 
Court’s President furthers this idea: after the 2001/2002 crisis that impacted upon the 
judicial power, deepening its preexisting problems, came a period of “transition,” he 
                                                 
495
 See: Adrián Ventura, “Habrá juzgados abiertos las 24 horas, anuncio el Juez Petracchi. El alto 
tribunal impulsará su propia reforma judicial,” La Nación, May 15, 2004, 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/herramientas/printfriendly/printfriendly.asp?origen=3ra&nota_id=601365 
(accessed July 7, 2007); Irina Hauser, “Cómo hacer que la Corte tenga un peso propio” Página 12, 
October 17, 2004, 2-3; Laura Rommer, “La Nueva Corte. En busca de más transparencia,” La Nación, 
August 14, 2005, Sec. Enfoques, 1-3. See also: Silvana Boschi, “La Corte avanza con la reforma 
judicial,” Clarín, August 18, 2005, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/18/elpais/p-01301.htm (last 
accessed July 7, 2007); “Conferencia Nacional de Jueces, Una cumbre para afianzar el rol de la justicia 
en la sociedad,” La Gaceta, March 28, 2006, Sec. Tribunales, 1,3; “Los Jueces intentan protegerse,” 
Clarín, April 2, 2006, 8;  “El dedo político está más limitado ahora,” La Gaceta, May 14, 2006, 
http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/vernotae.asp?.id_nota=158371 (accessed July 7, 2007); Silvana Boschi, 
“La Corte, entre las sillas vacías y el fantasma de la mayoría automática,” Clarín, August 20, 2006,12; 
Jorge Lanata, “El Gobierno y la Corte Suprema, Será Injusticia,” Perfil, September 10, 2006, 18-19; 
Silvana Boschi, “Aires de cambio para la Corte: Un futuro presidente que ya se muestra en funciones. 
El santafecino Lorenzetti puso en marcha una serie de anuncios e iniciativas,” Clarín, October 14, 2006, 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/10/14/elpais/p-02801.htm (last accessed: July 15, 2007); Adrián 
Ventura, “Preocupa a la Corte que Kirchner sume tanto poder. El tribunal aspira a convertirse en un 
referente institucional,” La Nación, October 15, 2006, 1, 15; Silvana Boschi, “En la Corte Suprema 
prometen no hacer lugar a su propia reelección,” Clarín, November 5, 2006, 19; “Para Petracchi, 
terminó uno de los errores mas graves de la historia,” Clarín, November 11, 2006, 7; Horacio Verbitsky, 
“Corte en Confección,” Página 12, November 19, 2006, 14-15;  Silvana Boschi, “La Corte Suprema, 
con nuevos aires y menos perfil político,” Clarín, December 31, 2006, 16; Adrián Ventura, “Pidió la 
Corte respeto por la independencia judicial,” La Nación, March 28, 2007, 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/nota.asp?notal_id=895138 (accessed April 26, 2007).  
496
 See, e.g.: Alberto G. Garay, “Cambios en la Corte Suprema,”  Jurisprudencia Argentina, I (2004): 
1136-1139; Héctor Héctor E. Sabelli, “El final de una etapa. Un panorama de la jurisprudencia de la 
Corte Suprema en el ano 2003,” Jurisprudencia Argentina III (2004): 1369-1439 ; Asociación por los 
Derechos Civiles, “Reformas Institucionales y la Corte en Números”, in La Corte y los Derechos, Un 
informe sobre el contexto y el impacto de sus decisiones durante el período 2003-2004 (Buenos 
Aires:ADC/Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2005), 23-41; Héctor E. Sabelli, “Como trabaja la Corte,” 
Jurisprudencia Argentina I  (2007): 1163-1171.  
148 
argues, which lasted up to 2006. During that period, it was possible to manage the 
effects of the crisis while continuing with the provision of justice. In turn, all of this 
prevented an institutional debacle.497 The present moment, explains the judge, is the 
period of “institutional reconstruction,” that is, the time for restoring the damaged 
links between the judicial power and society. But the current moment is also the time 
for a reassertion and consolidation of judicial power vis-à-vis the other (state) 
powers.498  
If one looks at the Court’s recent case law, one may also notice that the Court 
“in this current composition”499 overruled its previous decisions on cases involving 
violations of human rights during the last military dictatorship.500 Likewise, it has 
assumed a proactive standpoint toward economic and social rights by increasingly 
admitting cases in which governmental policies have infringed upon these rights, to 
the extent that some voices—both inside and outside the Court—have found hints of 
judicial activism in the Court’s behavior.501  
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Access, Performance, and the Meanings of Accountability  
Whether in newspaper and magazine interviews, conferences, seminars, 
symposia, expert gatherings, press conferences, reports, or public hearings, Justices 
appear themselves as the agents of a change oriented toward a new (Court’s) 
engagement with society. The purpose is to bring the Court to the people or, as a 
Justice told me, “to humanize it.”502 “Meeting the judges in person brings about a 
different perception of the judiciary," she said, “it implies a perception503 of access to 
justice.”504 Also, “the fact that the people on the street recognize the Justices makes 
the people confident in the judicial process,”505 she asserted.  I take these activities 
along with the enactment of the legal documents that incorporated new practices in the 
Court’s decision-making process as artifacts of performance,506 of exhibition. These 
are situations in which, to borrow Schener’s terms, “participants not only do things, 
they try to show others what they are doing or have done”;507 thus, “actions take on a 
“performed-for-an-audience aspect.”508 Using verbal and written materials—combined 
with an active public schedule—Justices display a new “institutionality” while making 
themselves visible to others as participants—or rather, as the engine—of a new 
political order.509  
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At first sight, the performative practices described above appear as exhibitions 
or displays aimed at impacting upon the public—these are practices that work to 
perform and to create a new image of the Court. Law clerks and other legal 
bureaucrats (with only few exceptions) do not see their everyday practices affected by 
the “performed” Court—at least they do not give an account of change in their work 
routines. The above description of these subjects’ attitudes toward hearings would 
support this argument. In one of my interviews a Justice stressed the idea that the 
Court needed to turn to simpler discursive practices in its decisions;510 “the purpose,” 
she argues, “is that the people understand what the Court says … [t]hey speak about 
the Court’s [writing] and I wonder what it is.” She also told me that the Court's Office 
of Copies, the office that prepares and releases the final versions of the Court’s 
decisions, used to edit her prose, until she personally asked them to stop.511 Perhaps it 
is not a coincidence that a clerk described that same Justice as “the most rebellious in 
terms of breaking from the Court’s writing style.”512 
I am not suggesting that there is no perception of change internally. Indeed, my 
informants’ discourses (mostly law clerks) drew on the divide between “the new 
Court” (meaning the Court’s present composition) and “the old Court,” in reference to 
the Court’s previous composition; and they also pointed to the enactment of 
“transparency bylaws”513 as another example of the new Court's accomplishments. 
Additionally, during a round of interviews in late 2005, many clerks echoed the 
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comment that it still was too early to make any judgment about the workings of this 
new Court—a comment that suggested that the clerks did not see themselves as parts 
of either the old or the new versions of the Court. My observation of lawmaking 
procedures within the Court revealed the practices of those committed to the Court’s 
day-to-day routines, like clerks, as a very stable aspect of law. Nonetheless, the 
implementation of new mechanisms in the Court’s decision-making process, like 
public hearings, necessarily implies rethinking old bureaucratic proceedings and 
creating new routines to make those mechanisms work.514  
What I am arguing, instead, is that these practices—invested in creating an 
image of the “new Court”—operate much more forcefully at a rhetorical and political 
level than at level of the mundane practices that I encountered in the Court. A Justice’s 
comment on the Court’s calling of public hearings in relevant cases (like the 
Riachuelo case) supports this argument: the Justice indicated to me that hearings are 
aimed at showing the public that the Court really works, that it cares about the issues 
involved, and that it enforces its decisions.515 This is also the underlying purpose of 
the Court President’s document that I cited above. In the judge’s account the (lay) 
citizen mixes up the notion of “justice” (justice as a value, he explains) with that of 
“judicial power”; this confusion creates an immense gap between the justice people 
expect to find when they go to court to claim their rights, and the actual fulfillment (or 
disappointment) of those expectations by the judicial power. Accordingly, he asserts 
that it is necessary that the judicial power indicate (to the citizenry) “what it can do, 
and what the other powers must do”; as well as to show what the judicial power do in 
the cases of conflicts triggered by omissions or non-compliances on the side of the 
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other powers omissions or non-compliances”516 (italics added). Consequently, it is by 
exhibiting the “new Court” (“a Court that has reassumed its role of a real state 
power”,517 “that brings the Court to the people,”518 “a co-governance body and real 
check of both the Congress and the Executive”519), that the symbolic construction of a 
novel institution comes into being.  
The performative nonetheless has a constitutive power: it is one of the 
influential rituals by which subjects are formed, contested and reformulated.520 The 
role of the performative, argues Janet Borgeson, is to deliver the organized subject.521  
In some way, this argument was made long before by anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
when he pointed out the metaphysical theater embedded in state ceremonials—
specifically, the state ceremonials of classical Bali (Negara) that he studied: “theatre 
designed to express a view of the ultimate nature of reality, and, at the same time, to 
shape the existing conditions of life to be consonant with that reality; that is, theatre to 
present an ontology and, by presenting it, to make it happen—make it actual.”522 
Performance, indicates organization theory scholar Rolland Munro, is assumed 
to efface individuality. Drawing on Carlson, he notes that theorists (in particular 
Erving Goffman) view performance as a practice that “owes more to context and to 
the dynamics of reception than to the specific activities of the performer.”523 Indeed, 
Goffman argues that performance “serves mainly to express the characteristics of the 
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task that is performed and not the characteristics of the performer.”524 In contrast to 
this, in Munro’s view cultural performance may both create and reproduce the 
performed order and stage a display of self: “artefacts are more than instrumental, they 
are also expressive. Persons do not act alone; they draw on available materials to 
‘show’ where they stand.”525 Based on his ethnography of Bestsafe—a financial 
corporation in Scotland—Munro illustrates how his subjects (the corporation’s 
managers) draw on devices associated with control (i.e. quality initiatives or output 
charts) to exhibit themselves as members of a group; but also, in Munro’s 
understanding, the managers draw on these devices not only due to their instrumental 
capacity, “but because these are indexical to their cultural performance as a ‘doing’ 
manager….”;526 hence, he concludes that, “In the performed order of Bestsafe, 
managerial devices and ethos are never disjunct.”527  
Drawing on Munro’s insight,528 I point out now the legal documents, reports, 
hearings, expert conferences, etc., through which my subjects instantiate the “new 
Court,” not as mere artefacts of performance, but also as technical interventions that 
are key devices of judicial decision-making; that is, they make up for adjudication. 
Also notably, the displays of the “new Court” further a new “institutionality” and 
render the Justices’ identities visible, thus ratifying the dual capacity of performance, 
as in Munro’s account: as both exhibition of membership and display of the self.  
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In the context of this “performed” Court, the figures of the Court as an 
institution and that of the Justices who sit on the bench, appear as interchangeable. 
This relation is suggested in the aforementioned Justice’s utterance “that the people on 
the street know who the Justices are”; or, paraphrasing another Supreme Court Justice: 
“the [Court’s] openness, the publicity of hearings, make things simpler for the lay 
people to understand what the Court does; we don’t want the people to believe that the 
Court does not do anything.”529 The Court President’s aforementioned document may 
also be taken as a manifestation of the same phenomenon: the Justice drafted a 
document on “state policies for the judicial power” (“Políticas de Estado para el Poder 
Judicial”), although he made it clear that he bore personal responsibility for the 
proposed policies since the document had not been institutionally approved.530 
However, it is worth noting that the document is published and available at the 
Supreme Court webpage.  Similarly, the law clerks who deferred evaluating the 
actions of this 'new Court' may be interpreted along the same way: in their accounts, 
the notion of the Court as an institution merges with the individual Justices.   
Munro’s insight also notes performance as an activity integrated to everyday 
life. Accordingly, he distances himself from theorists like Singer, Hymes and Bauman, 
who exclude everyday life from the notion of cultural performance, and points to 
Cohen’s argument about cultural processes as part of the mundane and everyday 
experience of life (rather than rare and formalized procedures).531 Moreover, he draws 
on Carlson’s view of performance as a “border, a margin, a site of negotiation”;532 
thus, rejecting any static concept of performance—like that suggested in Goffman’s 
account of the scenic parts that constitute the “setting” of the performance (furniture, 
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physical layout, decoration, etc.) and the “personal front” (clothing, sex, age, racial 
characteristics, posture, speech, etc.) of the performer.533 Likewise, in her account of 
the tacit performative aspect of power, Butler refuses the notion that the performative 
is represented in a singular act by an already established subject; rather, she argues 
that the social performative is one of the powerful and subtle ways in which subjects 
are called into social being from diffuse and powerful parts.534  
The Court’s performative practices discussed in this chapter are the sites in 
which the institution negotiates its own legitimacy—paraphrasing a Court’s Justice, 
“not the formal [legitimacy] that it has always held, but real legitimacy”535 
(legitimacy, in this account, is defined in terms of public acceptance and trust; or 
“prestige”, as suggested by the Court President’s document).536 Moreover, these 
practices frame the terms through which legitimacy should work: in the context of the 
“performed” Court, authority and reputation build on technologies of transparency and 
accountability. Notably, the Court’s achieved visibility also acts as a conduit for the 
Court’s gaining a new position in the political arena.537  
Legal scholar Michael Dowdle finds that historically Anglo-American political 
and legal theory has tended to define public accountability primarily in terms of 
discrete institutional architectures (elections, rationalized bureaucracies, judicial 
review, transparency, and “markets” among the most prominent), and that each of 
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these architectures developed as exigent responses to various legitimacy crises that 
have periodically beset Anglo-American governance.538 In the context of the practices 
of the Argentine Court that this dissertation addresses, I have found accountability to 
be the common platform for the “institutional reconstruction” efforts articulated from 
different actors since the 2001/2002 crisis. 
Public hearings, reports, bylaws, legal documents, as enacted by the Court, 
foster audit practices and the idea of accountability. Also, notably, they are themselves 
performances of good practices. But, above all, these practices address old critiques of 
the Court’s lack of accountability in decision-making.539 I, however, do not want to 
engage in discussions about whether the Court is accountable or transparent; whether 
it responds to the critiques of opinion-making institutions; or if it meets the watchdog 
organizations’ expectations about the openness of judicial decision-making. Nor do I 
intend to make a critique of accountability per se. As Marilyn Strathern indicates, 
accountability has already been well laid as an object of anthropological inquiry; 
among other fields, by the “anthropology of the state,” organizations and institutions, 
globalization, and European studies literatures.540 I want to note, instead, the 
association between the (Court’s) pursuit of legitimacy and the displaying of 
accountability, manifested through the coupling of its performative practices and the 
practice of transparency. 
Critical accounting scholars like Carruthers argue that rational procedures, 
processes and rules (including formal accounting systems) are both the rubrics that 
lend organizations their formal structures and help confer legitimacy upon the 
                                                 
538
 Michael Dowdle, “Public accountability: conceptual, historical and epistemic mappings,” in Public 
Accountability, Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences, Michael Dowdle, ed. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1-29.   
539
 See Chapter Three of this dissertation.  
540
 Marilyn Strathern, “Introduction: New Accountabilities”, in Audit Cultures, Anthropological Studies 
in Audit, Ethics and the Academy. Marilyn Strathern, ed. (London: Routledge, 2000) 1-18.  
157 
organization. Drawing on New Institutionalism scholars Meyer and Rowan, Carruthers 
explains: “Modern Western society privileges a particular form of rationality, and so 
organizations operating within that cultural context will garner more legitimacy.”541 
He, however, finds that formal organizational structure is in fact decoupled from 
actual organizational practice; and that organizational structure has much more to do 
with the presentation of organizational-self than with the things that actually transpire 
within the organization. In his account, “formal structure is mythical and ceremonial, a 
kind of window-dressing”542 (as opposed to an accounting-as-mirror version of 
accounting that reflects what goes on in the organization).543 If one were to follow this 
insight, one then might conclude that legitimacy depends more upon a highly rational 
appearance than upon reality. Shore and Wright come up with a similar analytical 
divide, though they draw on a different theoretical approach: they ask about that which 
the emphasis on institutions’ visible performance conceals. From a Foucauldian 
approach, they point toward a mode of coercive accountability that embodies a 
rationality similar to that of the panopticon: “it [the rationality of audit] has become a 
powerful and pervasive technology, and non-compliance is not an option.”544 Under 
the façade of legal-rational practices, audit technologies have created a new regime of 
control, they argue.545  
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In analyzing “audit cultures,” Marilyn Strathern stresses the ubiquity and 
pervasiveness of the values and practices promulgated in the name of accountability. 
Indeed, audit cultures—audit regimes—she argues, are parts of a global phenomenon, 
not confined to one population or type of state apparatus, but rather “compose a field 
of institutionalized expectations and instruments.” “Transparency of operation,” she 
explains, “is everywhere endorsed as the outward sign of integrity.”546 Thus, as 
Strathern’s insight indicates, the performative practices that I have described in this 
essay are indeed the local manifestations of a global trend—an aspect that has been 
generally overlooked by my informants. Nonetheless, it does not mean that there have 
been no questions in the field about the origins of these practices; but discussion has 
been focused mainly on whether the “transparency bylaws” and other practices of 
accountability that the Court implemented were the result of NGO advocacy of 
transparency in judicial procedures, or whether they responded to the Court’s own 
perception of how its decision-making practices “ought to be.”547 Nonetheless, 
whether developed through internal policies or as the consequence of external 
pressures, these performative practices discloses a faith-like commitment to 
accountability’s agentive powers.548 
Legal Forms and Knowledge Relations  
I would like to conclude by returning to Carruthers’s insight that accounts are 
indexical and polysemic—like other symbol systems. He argues that accountability 
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may be assumed as furthering different meanings to different audiences.549 
Accordingly, my present account would suggest that different observers interpret the 
Court's movement towards accountability in different ways: for instance, the 
neighbors of the Riachuelo area may remark that the magistrates have finally begun 
listening to their claims, whereas for civil rights organizations this same movement 
towards accountability would provide verification that the NGOs themselves have 
helped shape the Court’s agenda and influenced its decision-making practices. Within 
the Court itself, the judicial actors may view the movement toward greater 
accountability as demonstrating their new engagement with society conducive to the 
Court regaining authority and prestige.  
Regardless of how we may interpret these subjects’ uses, understandings, and 
practices of accountability, they altogether bring us back to the focal point of this 
piece (and the whole dissertation): the aesthetics of legal forms and the relations of 
knowledge it elucidates. Throughout this chapter, my appeal to this aesthetics has been 
double: on the one hand, in the above pages I have described a series of the Court’s 
practices that work to render the institution (and the Justices) visible to both particular 
audiences and to the larger public; and I elaborated on the effects that said visibility 
brought about. But I have also indicated that these practices are themselves 
instruments of judicial knowledge. In other words, hearings, decisions, reports and 
other legal documents are not only familiar to the Court’s everyday decision-making 
process; they have become the instruments that further a new image of the institution 
as well. On the other hand, I have borrowed those tools of legal and bureaucratic 
knowledge, and, drawing on the aesthetics of instrumentality similar to those I 
observed in Court, I worked to advance my own knowledge process. 
                                                 
549
 See: Carruthers, “Accounting, Ambiguity, and the New Institutionalism,” 320. 
160 
CONCLUSION 
 
As I noted earlier in this dissertation, the way law is usually perceived and 
apprehended in legal analysis is through its very results, its visible ends: a judgment, a 
decree, a bylaw, an administrative decision, and so forth. Seen from this perspective, 
judicial decision-making is turned into its outcome: the signed judgment.550 Even 
critical and socio-legal studies that focus on judicial reasoning tend to engage 
themselves in the textual analysis of the decision (a general of a set of decisions, a 
group of cases) to point to, from the discursive procedure by which rules are made, the 
ideological content of judgment and hence to infer either the ideological551 or strategic 
behavior552 of judicial decision-makers (judges). In one sense, it seems paradoxical 
that in seeking to understand how lawmaking works, legal analysis ignores what 
appears to be lawyers and even legal scholars’ ubiquitous understanding of law: a set 
of relations of means to ends. As Riles notes: 
Put into practice as a way of performing legal 
knowledge, this legal means-ends relation consists of a 
nesting, cascading set of relations of means and ends. 
Acts of regulation are means to social ends; the 
decisions of judges in property cases about the scope of 
those acts, likewise, are means to particular ends; and 
scholarly thinking about judicial decision-making 
constitutes further means to ends. The law is simply the 
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aggregation of each of these knowledge practices: in 
lawyers’ conception, the law is a nested set of means 
and ends, and these are concretized in institutions that 
themselves are means to another ends.553 
Throughout this dissertation I have consciously sought to replicate the essence 
of the instrumental thinking of legal knowledge and ground it in the ethnographic 
account of the means through which law is made and created in the Argentine Court of 
Justice. But this is not to say that my description builds upon this pragmatic reading of 
law that Riles describes. Rather, the notion of means—of law’s means—that my 
account advances lies on more material bases; that is, it examines the practices and 
techniques of manufacturing, crafting the law. In a sense, I draw on Bruno Latour’s 
insight about court as a “factory” of law. However, at another level of analysis, I 
borrow from the above orientation of law its aesthetics of instrumentality to turn the 
objects of lawmaking on which I build my account into analytical tools—thus, the 
means to advance my own knowledge of the subject. And yet, with this ethnography 
of judicial practice I seek to contribute to a broader socio-legal debate about the 
making of law. That is, continuing the chain, this ethnography becomes my own 
means to intervene in socio-legal theory.    
Artifacts of Knowledge  
This dissertation pivot on four artifacts drawn from my subjects’ practices: 
place, documents, subjects and performance. Through the first three artifacts I explore 
the materiality of lawmaking through the description of a set of documentary practices 
such as file-making and circulation, the writing of memoranda, gatekeeping, among 
others, often regarded as merely mundane and bureaucratic procedures in the judicial 
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practice toward the construction of the final ruling, thus is to say, the material bases 
for reaching the decision. In contrast to this, the fourth artifact, performance, might 
suggest at first sight that judicial practice as embodied in the workings of the “new” 
Court554 becomes an end itself. This image is reflected by the perception of many of 
my interlocutors in the Court, and in general fostered by opinion-making institutions 
(NGOs and the media) about a new institutionality that would emerge as a result of a 
set of practices and regulations enacted by the Court; in other words, a tribunal more 
opened to public scrutiny and participation, closer to the people on the street. 
However, as I demonstrated in Chapter Five, the performative practices displayed at 
the Court level may enact disparate meanings for different audiences. Public hearings, 
for instance, taken by these subjects as a symbol of institutional change, are in fact 
indexical of different uses and meanings of transparency for those who perform the 
hearings (judges, legal bureaucrats) and those who in some way or another are 
involved in them, for instance, litigants, government agencies, NGOs. Consequently, a 
critical assessment of the performative turns these practices into means to an end—an 
open end yet.  
With the notions and senses of place enacted by my subjects’ practices and 
perceived through my own access to the institution, I recreate my fieldsite, but neither 
in purely physical nor symbolic terms. On the contrary, the judicial space that emerges 
from my account questions the commonplace representation of judicial practice as a 
phenomenon constrained within a delimited site, by pointing toward practices that are 
seen as external to lawmaking. In so doing, it offers the possibility to rethink the 
contemporary judicial space, and elaborate on the efforts to negotiate the legal 
authority triggered from constant disruptions to the juridical order generated by these 
practices.  
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Documents, files, lay at the surface of the bureaucratic practice; they are 
grounded on the materiality of bureaucracy’s working. Indeed, these tools are taken 
for granted, and thus, ignored as objects of physical examination in legal studies. The 
cognitive and analytical potentialities of these instruments, however, are obscured 
precisely due to the familiar and commonsensical way in which we relate with them. 
Chapters Two and Three described the kinds of documentary practices that I 
encountered in my fieldsite, in particular among law clerks, and emphasized their 
mundane and routine character. In Chapter Two I argued that if these practices may 
appear somewhat disruptive to the course of the ethnographic practice, they are 
actually the commonsensical reaction that researchers of bureaucracy should expect 
when they access the institution.555 Bureaucratic knowledge moves on scripted 
routines (more documents and files)556   which hold their own progression;557 but as I 
demonstrated, these routines are not just mechanical inscriptions of words on paper. 
Files lay the ground for law’s authority and accounts for its everyday operations. 
Exploring files’ administrative capacity, I have noted that they take on a certain 
agency; they elicit relations of knowledge. Probably, this finding arises more clearly in 
the description of the Court’s practice of gatekeeping, the separation of the cases that 
are proper for legal attention from those that are considered “garbage.” As the 
materials presented in that chapter show, this practice actually operates as a fiction of 
exclusion that ultimately works as a mode of constructing the tribunal’s authority.  
And yet, documents can be turned into artefacts of performance, and as such, 
political tools. In this dissertation, I have argued that even documents of the Court’s 
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administration such as bylaws can be re-read as performative practices, both of the 
institution and persons themselves to advance the agenda of different actors, both 
inside and outside the Court. As I mentioned above, Chapter Five, specifically, shows 
how public hearings, themselves instruments of legal knowledge, become indexical of 
different uses and meanings of transparency for the individuals who participate 
directly in these hearings as well as for those who in some way or another are involved 
in them.  
For their part, the subjects of legal bureaucracy unfold through the making and 
material circulation of the documents they create. Looking at these subjects’ mundane 
documentary practices, their drafting of legal opinions, writing of memoranda and 
reports, and even research, it is possible to draw an appreciation of them that moves 
beyond other forms of imagined  legal bureaucrats; thus, leaving behind ubiquitous 
characterizations of bureaucratic behavior that draw on dichotomies such as modern/ 
pre-modern, objective/subjective, or stable/erratic. Observing these subjects’ practices 
closely as in Chapter Four’s description of the gatekeeping practices, one gets the 
sense of how difficult it is to apprehend clerks’ figures—not to mention their 
understandings about judicial decision-making—under a sole rubric. Yet, this is also 
noticeable when these subjects occasionally move outside their documentary practice 
to interact with litigants, counsels, and even the researcher. For instance, as noted in 
Chapter Five, judges and clerks experience (private) hearings in different ways, 
according to their personal understandings of this practice—and of judicial decision 
making. 
Nonetheless, in Chapter Three I provided a description of the particular figures 
of law clerks, often regarded as side actors, in light of forms in which these subjects 
are rendered visible and cognizable through their own documentary practices. 
Building upon Marilyn Strathern’s insight about how persons become “objectified” in 
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a commodity-driven economy,558 I demonstrated that legal bureaucrats, through a 
similar process of objectification, become apparent to the external observer on a 
rational and objective basis. This process occurs via the subjects' own interventions in 
the bureaucracy; that is, through the papers—the documents—they produce. 
Nevertheless, I also showed that there is another form in which these bureaucratic 
subjects may appear not as things but as persons themselves, through the personal 
capacities that the documentary practices actualize. From this perspective, which the 
practice of adjudication keeps concealed from view, each subject is differentiated as a 
particular person, and apprehended in her or his specific capacities. This argument 
builds upon Strathern’s description about persons’ unfolding as persons act in regard 
to others in Melanesia’s gift-exchange logic.  
Two Levels  
This dissertation, therefore, develops two levels of analysis. On the one hand, 
it describes a more mundane aspect of judicial practice: the workings of the legal 
bureaucracy; the uninteresting and even boring tools and procedures through which 
legal knowledge is built up. On the other hand, it lays out another dimension of 
judicial practice, the performative, in which judicial decision-making is presented 
through an inside-outside relation. In spite of the fact that these two analyses are 
temporarily separated in this text, one inevitably permeates the other. But it is 
necessary to know in the first place how these everyday practices and techniques of 
lawmaking operate, to come up with the image of the Court’s apparatus at work, for 
instance in the context of a public hearing.  
At both levels of analysis, I lay out the sets of social relations that emerge from 
the practices observed, even from those that work on more routine grounds, such as 
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the subjects’ notions and senses of place. People’s everyday interactions with the legal 
apparatus shape the judicial space in ways that challenge both legal bureaucrats’ 
understandings and scholarly representations of judicial practice (and law itself) as a 
distant and localized phenomenon, removed from other social practices. I cannot help 
but make connections here between the now canonical gap between “norm” and 
“reality,” advanced by law and society scholarship on the basis that legal and social 
practices work as two different milieus, and Bruno Latour’s denial of such a divide 
and the Durkheimian  view of society on which it is based.559 In contrast to this, 
Latour embraces Gabriel Tarde’s insight about society not “as a separate ontological 
domain that can explain everything”560 but as the thing itself that needs to be 
explained, and argues then for a move beyond Durkheim: “the task is thereby to study 
the heterogeneous elements, such as legal ways of organizing relations and 
connections, that produce it.”561 In certain way, the enactment of the judicial space 
that arise out of my subjects’ quotidian practices furthers this idea that law is not a 
field constituted by external forces which can be studied independently, but one of the 
ways in which the world is articulated and assembled. 
Through the concept of performance judicial practice assumes a “staged-for-
an-audience” form, as implied in both the requests and efforts to “open up” the Court 
to the people. However, as I suggested at different moments of this dissertation562 this 
inside-outside divide is constitutive of other lawmaking practices that I encountered in 
my fieldsite, although the image of spectacle, of theater, is certainly more palpable in 
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state ceremonials563 and justice rituals,564 such as public hearings or the practice of 
oral advocacy where the Other’s empirical presence is necessarily required.  
But the need to create the Other in terms of spatial distance is present at both 
levels. Legal order and authority are permanently challenged through concrete senses 
of mobility, accessibility, and even of disruption at work within the contemporary 
judicial space, which are nonetheless “naturalized” by institutional practices that work 
to re-instate the disrupted order and to reconfigure the proper space of law, and 
authority. This move, as I suggested, can be perceived in the deployment of fences 
throughout the premise, which brings into play a dissymmetry between the Court and 
the public. Moreover, the inside-outside relationship is also activated through the 
Court’s documentary practices, which keep internal deliberation and the subjects who 
create these documents concealed from view, even though at some junctures these 
latter figures are rendered visible through their own interventions in the bureaucratic 
practice. And even the workings of gatekeeping practices at the Court level suggest 
that if the socio-legal context in which these practices develop makes actual exclusion 
impossible, this nonetheless can be performed through a fiction that presents exclusion 
as if it were a fact.  
Taking these two levels of analysis together, my investigation has sought to 
capture the forms and practices of legal knowledge that I encountered and 
apprehended in my fieldsite, and, building on their own aesthetics of instrumentality—
means and ends relationship—to replicate them to produce my own knowledge tools. 
If legal documents and other practices of lawmaking are the instruments of our 
subjects’ knowledge-making practices, they also may become the artifacts of 
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ethnographic knowledge and the ethnographer’s own practices of knowledge-making. 
The result of this effort, this ethnography, is a fine-grained and different understanding 
of judicial practice that arises out the analysis of the most commonsensical and routine 
aspects of lawmaking: the workings of the legal bureaucracy. As this study 
demonstrates, this material and mundane aspect of the law offers an analytical space 
from where socio-legal scholarship can orient its inquiry.  
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